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ABSTRACT
Previous research on the determinants of economic inequality in the wealthy democracies
has found that differences in the size and constitution of labor unions accounts for much of
the cross-national and over time variation in economic inequality. Despite numerous
theoretical and empirical reasons to suppose the contrary, most of this research assumes
that the union effect on economic inequality is independent of the particular socioeconomic and political environment unions are situated within and the types of workers
actually unionized. The broad purpose of this dissertation is to push back against these
assumptions and examine whether the union effect on economic inequality is conditioned
by certain factors external and internal to unions. This is done through consideration of the
four processes by which unions impact economic inequality; which I label the employer,
intra-union, insider, and political mechanisms. In particular, I argue that the level of
unionization conditions the political mechanism by providing (dis)incentives for parties of
the left and right to respond to union member preferences for government action to reduce
economic inequalities (chapter 2); that increasing exposure to the world economy
conditions the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms by reducing the ability and
willingness of lower-paid union workers to extract wage gains from their employers
(chapter 3); and that market institution and welfare state regimes indirectly condition the
employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms for female and male union workers by
generating particular forms and levels of vertical gender occupational segregation within
unions (chapter 4). The empirical analyses focus on between 8 and 16 wealthy democracies
(depending on data availability) over the final decades of the twentieth century and the first
v

decade of the twenty-first century. The evidence presented suggests that we cannot
understand the totality of the union effect on economic inequality - or on any other socioeconomic outcome - without considering each of the four mechanisms by which unions
impact economic inequality, the many and varied ways these mechanisms are expressed,
and how these mechanisms interact within particular contexts.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION

General Introduction
Although some degree of economic inequality1 is probably inevitable – and perhaps
even desirable (e.g., to incentivize or reward individual effort), high levels and/or specific
forms of economic inequality are likely to conflict with basic norms of fairness and produce
outcomes that, according to modern liberal values at least, are suboptimal and even
pernicious (Foster and Sen 1997). Empirical work on the consequences of higher levels of
economic inequality have found it to be harmful to economic growth (Stiglitz 2013); the
survival of democratic institutions (Reenock et al. 2007; Houle 2009); the protection of
civil liberties and private property (Landman and Larizza 2009; Fails 2012); tolerance
toward minorities (Andersen and Fetner 2008); political engagement (Solt 2008; Pontusson
and Rueda 2010; Anderson and Baramendi 2012); the responsiveness of politicians to
citizen preferences (Ellis 2013; Rigby and Wright 2013); trust in individuals and the
government (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Anderson and Singer 2008); and even overall
public health (Ghobarah et al. 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Perhaps less worrisome,
but highly significant nonetheless, are findings that higher levels of economic inequality
increase ideological, political party, and class polarization (McCarty et al. 2006; Garanda
2010; Newman et al. 2015); the positive evaluation of the role of religion in politics

1

Economic inequality is defined here as differences across a particular population in access to, or control
over, monetary resources or certain factors of production. This definition is a slightly modified version of
that provided by Jenkins (1991).
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(Karakoç and Başkan 2012); nationalist sentiment (Shayo 2009; Solt 2011); and support
among the poor for radical right-wing political parties (Han forthcoming). In short, in
addition to its inherent moral implications, economic inequality matters for a host of
important socio-economic and political outcomes.
Labor unions (also referred to as trade unions; hereafter unions) are organizations
consisting primarily of wage earners and dedicated to improving the economic well-being
of their members – and, at times, certain non-union members - through the exertion of
pressure on employers and policymakers.2 This exertion of pressure takes many forms,
from economic strikes (targeted at particular firms or industries) to general strikes (targeted
at government) to information and political campaigns (targeted at union members and the
wider public) to lobbying efforts (targeted at particular political parties, politicians, or
bureaucrats) to simple hard-nosed bargaining tactics (targeted primarily at employers)
(e.g., see Leighley and Nagler 2007; Anzia 2011; Avdagic et al. 2011; Iversen and Soskice
2011; Hamann et al. 2013). By substituting collective action for separate individual action
(McLean 1996), unions are often able to gain concessions from employers and/or
policymakers (or install their preferred employers and policymakers) through these
methods, and thus have a substantial impact on numerous national level outcomes. These
include, but are certainly not limited to, tax structures (Swank 2006; Beramendi and Rueda
2007; Plümper et al. 2009), social insurance policies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 2006;
Nijhuis 2009), economic growth (Durham 2004; Hall and Gingerich 2009), unemployment

2

This is a slightly modified version of the definitions provided by Webb and Webb (1920) and Bennett and
Kaufman (2007).
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(Mares 2004; Baccaro and Diego Rei 2007; Bradley and Stephens 2007), and, of course,
economic inequality.

The Union Effect on Economic Inequality
One of the few areas of broad consensus in the comparative political economy
literature has been that differences in union strength account for much of the cross-national
and over-time variation in economic inequality in the wealthy democracies, with stronger
unions resulting in less economic inequality (Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999;
Freeman and Oostendorp 2000; Kahn 2000; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Alderson and
Nielsen 2002; Pontusson et al. 2002; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 2004; Golden and
Londregan 2006; Oliver 2008; Visser and Checchi 2009; Martin and Swank 2012).
However, there has been less consensus on how, exactly, unions achieve this effect. Each
of the major academic branches and theoretical traditions in comparative political economy
has argued that unions impact economic inequality through one or more of four (nonmutually exclusive) processes; or what I label here the employer, intra-union, insider, and
political mechanisms. The employer mechanism is emphasized in the power resource
theory (PRT) literature and refers to unions’ ability to extract wage and other
compensation-related concessions from employers (Stephens 1980; Korpi 1985); the intraunion mechanism is emphasized in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) and economics
literature and refers to the tendency of unions to compress wages among their own
members (Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002;
Card et al. 2003; Checci et al. 2007; Hall and Thelen 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2010); the
insider mechanism is emphasized primarily in the economics literature and refers to the
3

(positive or negative) externalities that result from the costs associated with collective
bargaining (e.g., higher wages for non-union members or elevated levels of
unemployment) (Friedman 1962; Freeman 1980; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Rueda and
Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein and Western 2000; Card et al. 2003; Rosenfeld and Western
2012); and the political mechanism is emphasized in PRT and the insider-outsider model
and refers to the ability of unions to (successfully) pressure governments to implement
policies that have consequences for economic inequality (e.g., employment protections and
particularly designed social insurance policies) (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rueda 2007;
Bacarro 2008; Visser and Checchi 2009; Ellis 2013).
Despite a long-standing (and unstated) agreement across the major academic
branches and theoretical traditions that the net effect of the employer, intra-union, insider,
and political mechanisms is to reduce economic inequality, a number of recent studies have
found the size and significance of the union effect on economic inequality to vary across
countries and over time (Baccaro 2008; Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Beecher and
Pontusson 2011; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013). More specifically, these
studies have generally found the union effect on economic inequality to have diminished,
on average, across the wealthy democracies since at least the 1990s.3 The explanation
provided for this finding varies. One claim is that it is the result of a less effective employer
mechanism, or unions losing the ability to extract substantial wage gains from their
employers. The argument here is that greater economic globalization, particularly trade

3

The one exception to this is Scheve and Stasavage (2009). In their analysis of the determinants of the
proportion of total income shares held by top earners over the course of most of the twentieth century, these
authors find that the effect of union density has diminished in recent decades but that the effect of the level
of wage bargaining has grown.
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with less developed countries (LDCs), has produced wage pressures that increasingly weak
unions have been unable to resist (Golden and Wallerstein 2011). Another claim is that
the diminished union effect is the result of a less effective intra-union mechanism, or lesserpaid union members extracting fewer wage gains relative to higher-paid union members as
they did in the past. There have been two different but related reasons given for this
phenomenon. First, in response to membership losses, unions in the manufacturing sector
increasingly support employer efforts to decouple wage developments in the
manufacturing and service sectors (Pontusson 2013). Second, economic globalization and
technological change have changed how wage bargaining institutions function, as the
former reduces demand for less skilled (and lower-paid) union members and the latter
increases demand for more skilled (and better-paid) union members (Baccaro 2008). Still
others claim that the diminished union effect is the result of a more potent insider
mechanism, or a growing wage gap between union and non-union members. The argument
here is that unions increasingly consist of workers that are better-paid than most non-union
members. This condition also has implications for the political mechanism, as better-paid
union members support inequality-reducing social insurance transfers less than lesser-paid
union members (Becher and Pontusson 2011). Some recent scholarship on labor markets
and the welfare state also alludes to a weakened or altered political mechanism. For
example, Mares (2004) argues that union members become less likely to practice wage
restraint as taxes on labor rise and social insurance policies become increasingly targeted
at non-union members; and Kwon and Pontusson (2010) find that left governments

5

increase social insurance spending less relative to center and right governments when union
strength is declining; a condition that currently exists in nearly all wealthy democracies.4
If unions no longer reduce economic inequality to the same extent as in the past,
then this necessarily implies that unions’ indirect effect on the socio-economic and political
outcomes associated with greater economic inequality has also diminished. Furthermore,
it suggests that the direct union effect on other macro-level outcomes – such as
unemployment and inflation – is changing as well. Why has the union effect on economic
inequality diminished? Or, more precisely, why does the union effect on economic
inequality vary across countries and over time? The broad purpose of this dissertation is
to provide some preliminary answers to these questions by considering how the union
effect on economic inequality is conditioned by certain features of the environment that
unions operate within as well as particular union characteristics.

How the Dissertation is Organized
Each of the three core chapters in this dissertation is dedicated to examining a
conditional union effect on income or wage inequality through consideration of how a
particular factor or factors external or internal to unions influence the employer, intraunion, insider, and/or political mechanisms.
In chapter 2, I examine how the level of unionization determines the responsiveness
of particular partisan governments to union member preferences for less economic
inequality. Scholars have long argued that partisanship matters for income inequality

4

A political mechanism-based explanation for the diminished union effect on income inequality is also
provided by Jacobs and Myers (2014), but their analysis focuses exclusively on the United States.
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because left governments favor government action to reduce economic inequalities more
than center or right governments (e.g., see Esping-Andersen 1990 and Korpi and Palme
2003). However, many other scholars have claimed that partisanship does not matter for
income inequality (or most other socio-economic outcomes) because environmental
factors, including voter sentiments and political institutions, frequently prohibit politicians
from pursuing their first-order policy preferences (e.g., see Kitschelt 1994; Pierson 2001;
Beckfield 2006). Both the “partisanship matters” and the “partisanship does not matter”
viewpoints have found empirical support in studies examining the determinants of income
inequality across the wealthy democracies (Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 2004; Scheve and
Stasavage 2009; Mahler et al. 2013). I argue that these inconsistent findings are at least
partly the result of scholars not properly modeling the relationship between unionization
and the partisan composition of government. If we accept that union members favor greater
government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than non-union members
(Iversen 2001; Checchi et al. 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2011), politicians desire to hold
elected office and be popular but also to implement particular public policies (Muller and
Strom 1999), and left party politicians share union members’ policy preferences to a greater
extent than center and right party politicians (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kwon and Pontusson
2010), then partisan differences should be greatest at moderate levels of unionization, a
condition that allows all politicians to pursue their policy preferences while maintaining
electoral viability. The empirical analysis in this chapter examines 16 wealthy democracies
between 1970 and 2010. The results of error-correction models confirm the theoretical
expectation and hold regardless of whether there is a majoritarian or proportional
7

representation electoral system. These findings suggest that the impact of declining
unionization on political and socio-economic outcomes will depend on the level of
unionization from which a country is falling from and that electoral outcomes only have
consequences for economic inequality under certain (relatively limited) conditions.
In chapter 3, I examine how economic globalization influences the ability and
willingness of particular types of union members to extract wage gains from their
employers. Although scholars have speculated as to the possible causes of the decline in
the union effect on wage inequality since the 1990s, a comprehensive theory explaining it
has not been crafted or tested. I argue that economic globalization – or increasing exposure
of states to the world economy – reduces the ability and willingness of traditionally lowerpaid union workers (in sectors and occupations substantially exposed to international
competition) to extract wage gains from their employers while having no such effect on
the ability and willingness of traditionally higher-paid union workers (in sectors and
occupations relatively sheltered from international competition). This results in greater
earnings dispersion between traditionally lower-paid union workers and employers,
traditionally lower-paid union workers and traditionally higher-paid union workers, and
low-paid non-union workers and employers.

The empirical analysis in this chapter

primarily focuses on 8 wealthy democracies between 1980 and 2010, although three
additional countries are examined as well.

The results of error-correction models

demonstrate that as a state becomes more exposed to the world economy, the union effect
on the level of wage inequality declines (and perhaps even reverses for the lower half of
the wage distribution); but that the union effect on the “structure” of wage inequality (or

8

the extent to which the upper half of the wage distribution is more compressed than the
lower half) grows. This finding suggests that the meaning of the “the union effect on wage
inequality” depends on which aspects of wage inequality are being considered; and
increasingly changes as economic globalization proceeds. A more general implication is
that the union effect on economic inequality is likely influenced by a range of other factors
– such as those relating to the partisan or ideological orientation of government and public
opinion – that alter the bargaining power of (some) employers relative to (some) union
members.
In chapter 4, I examine how gender occupational segregation among union
members influences the female union effect on female wage inequality and the male union
effect on male wage inequality. Although numerous scholars have acknowledged the
decline in union strength in recent decades and its likely consequences for wage inequality,
few have explored whether certain types of union workers have experienced a more
substantial decline than others; and whether any such divergence has had consequences for
wage inequality. Of particular interest is evidence that male union strength has weakened
substantially more than female union strength; and that a large and growing share of union
members are women as a result.5 All else being equal, this suggests that aggregate union
decline has contributed more to a rise in male wage inequality than female wage inequality.
Yet different degrees and types of gender occupational segregation across liberal market
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) as well as liberal,
conservative, and social democratic welfare states, suggests that all else might not be equal

5

Data on female and male union membership are presented in Chapter 4.
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(Sainsbury 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999; Chang 2000; Korpi 2000; Soskice 2005;
Estevez-Abe 2006). I argue that a particularly large number of professionals among female
union members in LMEs (with liberal welfare states) means that the female union effect is
likely to be smaller than the male union effect within that regime; and that a particularly
large number of workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations among female union
members in CMEs with conservative welfare states means that the female union effect is
likely to be larger than the male union effect within that regime. In other words, the size
of the female union effect relative to the male union effect is indirectly conditional on
market institution and welfare state type. The empirical analysis in this chapter focuses on
15 wealthy democracies between 1980 and 2010. The results of error-correction models
confirm the theoretical expectations, although differences between the female and male
union effects across the regimes are generally larger than those between the female and
male union effects within each regime. These findings suggest that the occupational
composition of union members is critical to explaining the union effect on economic
inequality; and that the consequences that aggregate union decline has on economic
inequality in general and gender economic inequality in particular depends (indirectly) on
the market institution and welfare state regime that such union decline is happening within.
In the fifth and final chapter, I summarize the main empirical and theoretical
contributions of each of the core chapters and the dissertation as a whole; discuss three
important factors that were omitted from the preceding chapters – employer organizations,
wealth inequality, and conceptions of economic inequality that incorporate consumption
and/or non-paid non-market work; provide suggestions on how to incorporate these omitted
10

factors into future research on labor unions and economic inequality; outline a potentially
promising research agenda that focuses on unions as an effect rather than unions as a cause;
and offer some reflections on how union weakening may ironically be leading to the
growing popularity of redistributive public policies and, eventually, stronger workers’
movements as well.

11

CHAPTER II
UNIONIZATION AND THE PARTISAN EFFECT ON INCOME
INEQUALITY
Introduction
Do left governments reduce income inequality6 relative to center and right
governments? The expectation that partisanship should matter for income inequality arises
somewhat tautologically out of the traditional political party typology, whereby left parties
are defined as those favoring government intervention to reduce economic inequalities; and
center and right parties are defined as those favoring either less government intervention
in the economy generally, or government intervention that maintains or exacerbates
economic inequalities (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Lijphart 1997;
Korpi 2002; Korpi and Palme 2003).7 The expectation that partisanship should not matter
for income inequality arises out of the recognition that environmental factors, including
voter sentiments and political institutions, frequently prohibit politicians from pursuing
their first-order policy preferences (Kitschelt 1994; Pierson 2001; Beckfield 2006).8 Both
the “partisanship matters” and the “partisanship does not matter” viewpoints have found
empirical support in studies that have examined the determinants of income inequality
In this article, the term “income” encompasses wages, other market (pre-tax and pre-transfer) income such
as rents and capital gains, and government transfers such as means-tested benefits and pensions.
7
Two assumptions in this article are that politicians consciously pursue a policy based on its likely outcome
and, once implemented, a policy typically results in that expected outcome.
8
A “first-order preference” is defined here as an actor’s (not necessarily revealed) “ideal point”, or the
particular option an actor would choose under minimal external constraints. This can be contrasted with
“revealed preferences”, or the choices that are made by actors within a particular environmental context,
frequently as a result of practical or pragmatic concerns. In the theoretical argument outlined here, left party
politicians are assumed to possess a greater first-order preference for government intervention to reduce
economic inequalities than center and right party politicians (Korpi 2002, 2006). The question, therefore, is
under what political conditions such politicians are able to pursue these preferences to a greater or lesser
degree.
6
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across wealthy democracies (Pontusson et al. 2002; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 2004;
Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Mahler et al. 2013).
What explains the inconsistent findings of partisan effects on income inequality? I
argue that one part of the explanation is the difference in unionization levels across
countries and over time. Although many scholars acknowledge the strongly symbiotic
relationship between unions and particular political parties, surprisingly few model such a
relationship when they empirically examine the determinants of income inequality.
Instead, partisan effects are assumed to be constant across space and time, despite the
scholarly consensus that parties strategically adapt to their environment in general and to
union movements in particular (Kitschelt 1994; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Simoni 2013).
When partisanship has been argued to be conditional on union presence,9 scholars have
tended to assume that this union impact is exclusively through left parties (Pontusson et al.
2002; Kwon and Pontusson 2010; Golden and Wallerstein 2011). This is understandable
given the historical connection between unions and left parties and their similar first-order
preferences on matters relating to economic inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990; EspingAndersen 1999). However, if union members have a stronger preference for government
intervention to reduce economic inequalities than non-union members (Iversen 2001;
Checchi et al. 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2011), politicians have policy preferences but also
desire to hold elected office and be popular (Muller and Strom 1999), and left party

A country’s degree of union presence can be measured in numerous ways, including by union density (the
proportion of workers that belong to a union), union coverage (the proportion of workers that are covered by
a collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the workers are union members), or the level of wage
bargaining (the primary level at which unions and employers negotiate over compensation) (Visser and
Checchi 2009).
9
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politicians share union-member policy preferences to a greater extent than center and right
party politicians, then left party politicians should see higher unionization levels as an
opportunity to pursue their first-order policy preferences and lower unionization levels as
necessitating consenting to non-union member preferences. Likewise, center and right
party politicians should see lower unionization levels as an opportunity to pursue their firstorder policy preferences and higher unionization levels as necessitating consenting to union
member preferences. In other words, an environmental condition that acts to constrain
politicians from one political party simultaneously acts to enable politicians from another.
These expectations imply that the anticipated negative effect of left government on income
inequality is likely to diminish as we reach relatively low and relatively high levels of
unionization, conditions in which left party politicians and center and right party
politicians, respectively, have to veil their first-order preferences in order to remain
electorally viable. Stated another way, the partisan effect on income inequality is likely to
grow as we reach relatively moderate levels of unionization.
To assess whether unionization rates condition the partisan effect on income
inequality in a non-linear manner, I employ data on net income inequality from 16 wealthy
democracies over the years 1970 to 2010. The evidence I present suggests that countries
with lower and higher levels of unionization experience less of a partisan effect on income
inequality than countries with moderate levels of unionization. This result holds regardless
of whether a country has a majoritarian or proportional representation (PR) electoral
system, although a country’s electoral system does influence at what level of unionization
partisanship matters more or less for income inequality. This article is divided into six
14

sections. The first section discusses how public policy may act to decrease or increase
income inequality. The second and third sections place the theoretical expectations
outlined above within the context of the existing literature. The fourth section details the
methods and variables used in the analysis. The fifth section report the results of the
empirical analysis and the sixth section provides a discussion of the findings.

Public Policy and Income Inequality
Income inequality can be described as arising from a two-stage distributional
process (Kelly 2009; Morgan and Kelly 2013). The first stage consists of those factors that
lead to the “pre-tax and pre-transfer” distribution of income, while the second stage
consists of those tax and spend policies that alter this distribution and replace it with the
“post-tax and post-transfer” distribution of income. The change in income inequality from
the first stage to the second stage of the distributional process is typically termed
“redistribution” (Bradley et al. 2003; Iversen and Soskice 2006). Redistributive policies
may entail taxing the rich and providing cash benefits to the poor or taxing the employed
and providing cash benefits to those without employment, but it also may include
publically financed and managed social insurance, such as pensions, in which individuals
at least partially finance their own benefits (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Moene and
Wallerstein 2003; Pennings 2013).

Redistributive policies may also include any

government transfer that is financed through more diffuse and regressive means, such as
with a general sales tax (Prasad and Deng 2009).
Given that governments are able to choose more or less progressive methods of
financing redistributive policies, as well as the specific individuals or households that will
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benefit from government transfers, it is by no means certain, a priori, that “redistribution”
reduces income inequality from before taxes and transfers to after taxes and transfers. The
issue becomes further complicated by the fact that the “pre-tax and pre-transfer”
distribution of income is itself dependent on redistributive policies. For example, longterm unemployment benefits may encourage individuals to remain outside of the labor
market (and thus earn zero pre-tax and pre-transfer income) or generous public pensions
may crowd out private pensions or encourage early retirement (and thus, again, produce
greater numbers of individuals with zero pre-tax and pre-transfer income) (EspingAndersen 2009; Bradley and Stephens 2012). On the other hand, redistributive policies
may also increase pre-tax and pre-transfer incomes by raising the “reservation wage” and
thus inducing employers to offer higher wages (Golden and Wallerstein 2011). These
higher wages, however, are also likely to increase the cost of business and thus may result
in elevated levels of unemployment, once again producing a greater stock of individuals
earning zero pre-tax and pre-transfer income (Boix 1998).
In order to examine whether the net effect of redistributive policies is to increase or
decrease income inequality, Figure 1 plots redistribution10 by pre-tax and pre-transfer
(“market”) income inequality and post-tax and post-transfer (“net”) income inequality in
16 wealthy democracies between 1970 and 2010 for all available country-years. A clear
positive relationship emerges in the plot containing redistribution and market income
inequality (r=.5412), suggesting that redistributive policies do tend to increase “pre-tax and
pre-transfer” income inequality. However, a clear negative relationship emerges in the plot

10

Redistribution is arrived at by way of the equation provided by Iversen et al. (2006): [(market income
inequality – net income inequality)/market income inequality)]*100. Data provided by Solt (2009).
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Figure 1. Bivariate Correlations of Redistribution and Market (Net) Income
Inequality in 16 rich democracies for all available country-years between 1970 and
2010
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containing redistribution and net income inequality (r=-.6615), with higher (lower) levels
of redistribution clearly associated with lower (higher) levels of net income inequality.
Given that post-tax and post-transfer income inequality is the result of both the first and
second stages of the distributional process, this suggests that the net effect of redistributive
policies is to reduce income inequality.
Such explicitly redistributive policies are not the only method at the disposal of
governments if they wish to impact income inequality. Governments may engage more
directly in the first stage of the distributional process and implement policies that determine
the distribution of “pre-tax and pre-transfer” income. Most obviously, governments can
enact a minimum wage, expand public sector employment, or increase public sector wages
(Pontusson et al. 2002; Rueda 2008). In addition, governments can actively encourage and
facilitate (private or public sector) employment (so called “active labor market policies”)
or invest in education or worker training, which act to improve the skills of the labor force
and thus increase workers’ market earning potential (Huo et al. 2008; Bradley and Stephens
2012). There are countless other government policies that may impact the distribution of
“market” incomes, from trade agreements, to (lack of) restrictions on capital flows, to
taxation and employment regulations (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Burgoon 2001;
Reuveny and Li 2003; Beckfield 2006; Koske et al. 2014).

Partisanship and Income Inequality
Given that governments have a plethora of policies at their disposal to impact the
distribution of income, one would expect the partisan orientation of government to matter
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for income inequality. After all, parties of the left are typically defined as those favoring
government intervention to reduce economic inequalities, while parties of the center and
right are defined as those favoring either less government intervention in the economy
generally, or government intervention that maintains or exacerbates economic inequalities
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Lijphart 1997; Korpi 2002; Korpi and
Palme 2003). Thus, we would anticipate left party electoral success to be associated with
lower levels of market and net income inequality and higher levels of redistribution than
center or right party electoral success. However, the empirical evidence is notably mixed.
In their examination of market income inequality across wealthy democracies over the
twentieth century, Scheve and Stasavage (2009) found a modest negative effect of left
government on the share of national income held by the top 1 percent of income earners,
but no such partisan effect on the share of national income held by the top 10 percent of
income earners. In one of the few cross-national studies of wealthy democracies that
focuses on the determinants of both pre-tax and pre-transfer income inequality and
redistribution, Bradley et al. (2003) found no partisan effect on the former but the
anticipated positive effect of left government on the latter. Given the clear negative
association between redistribution and net income inequality that we observed in Figure 1,
this finding would lead us to expect a negative association between left government and
post-tax and post-transfer income inequality. Yet in one of the few cross-national studies
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examining the determinants of such inequality across wealthy democracies,11 Mahler
(2004) found no such partisan effect.12
One explanation for absent or inconsistent partisan effects on income inequality or
redistribution is the difficulty any partisan government has in making major changes to the
public sector and existing welfare state policies due to political pressure from voters and
interest groups (Pierson 2001; Mahler et al. 2013).

However, this explanation is

unsatisfying given the plethora of public sector and welfare state reforms across rich
democracies in recent decades (Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Allan and Scruggs 2004) and
the growing body of evidence that partisan governments are not systematically punished
for engaging in welfare state retrenchment (Wenzelburger 2014). A likelier explanation
for absent or inconsistent partisan effects is that, over time, common underlying forces or
processes push most political parties in the same ideological direction; or, similarly, result
in “waves” of party convergence and divergence (Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Kwon and
Pontusson 2010). In other words, partisan behavior is not driven solely (or primarily) by
the inherent programmatic differences between party families or relatively constant
constituent preferences, but by parties’ changing environmental contexts (Mahler 2004).
If this is correct, then absent or inconsistent partisan effects on income inequality would be

11

Bradley et al. (2003) and Mahler (2004) use a Gini coefficient as their measure for income inequality.
Unlike the income share data utilized by Stasavage and Scheve (2009), Gini coefficients consider the entire
income distribution. This may or may not have practical empirical implications. A change in the share of
national income going to the top 1 percent of households will be apparent with both measures. However, a
change in the share of national income going to households representing a particular subgroup within the top
1 percent (e.g., the top .1 percent) may only be reflected in the Gini coefficient.
12
Empirical results are similarly mixed in examinations of wage or earnings inequality (e.g., see Wallerstein
1999; Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Martin and Swank 2012). This is
not surprising given that individual labor income inequality accounts for most of the variation in household
market income inequality (Hoeller et al. 2014).
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the result of politicians’ shifting (revealed) preferences, which at times produce a partisan
consensus for greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities or (at other
times) produce a partisan consensus for less government intervention to reduce economic
inequalities.

Politicians’ Preferences and Partisan Behavior
If the absent or inconsistent partisan effects on income inequality are the result of
trending environmental factors that pressure most or all political parties to drift in the same
ideological direction and if these environmental factors consistently impact partisan
behavior in the same manner over time, then there are at least two reasons for us to expect
these factors to result in an increase in partisanship in some circumstances and a decrease
in partisanship in other circumstances. First, while it is reasonable to suppose that most
politicians want to hold elected office and be popular, politicians from different party
families are likely to have divergent preferences regarding the size, scope, and role of
government, and consequently the type of public policies they would prefer to implement.
In other words, most politicians are simultaneously “office-seeking”, “vote-seeking”, and
“policy-seeking” (Laver and Schofield 1990; Muller and Strom 1999). Second, each party
family has a different base of electoral support. While politicians’ policy agenda may not
perfectly reflect that favored by their constituents, it is likely to be more representative of
their constituents’ preferences than that of parties representing other voters with different
preferences (Dalton 1985; Bartels 2008; Adams and Ezrow 2009). In short, even if all
politicians and party families experience a common external stimuli that pushes them
towards implementing particular public policies, their divergent preferences and
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constituencies are likely to lead them to resist (or exploit) this pressure more or less
(Plümper et al. 2009).
Although early work that explored candidate preferences assumed that politicians
were exclusively office- or vote-seeking and were able to change their policy positions to
appeal to the pivotal voter with relative ease (Downs 1957), more recent work has
acknowledged that politicians, like most political activists, have their own policy
preferences (Wittman 1983; Aldrich and McGinnis 1989); and that politicians’ ability to
shift their positions for electoral purposes is constrained by party activists (Kitschelt 1994;
Moon 2004). This more sophisticated characterization of politicians’ preferences and
behavior suggests that political leaders are likely to desire to seek to mobilize and exploit
their activist base (which presumably shares their policy preferences) when it is large
enough and strong enough to be a benefit electorally (as this will assist the politicians in
both winning elected office and implementing their preferred policies), but attempt to
dislodge themselves from this activist base when it is a hindrance to their electoral
prospects (as this will at least provide the politicians with the opportunity to be successful
electorally).

Labor Unions and Parties of the Left
Parties of the center and right have traditionally found their largest base of activist
support and a reservoir of potential political leaders among employers and the (upper)
middle class. By contrast, parties of the left have traditionally found their largest base of
activist support and a reservoir of potential political leaders among working class wage
laborers and the poor (Duverger 1990; Ware 1996). Micro studies have consistently found
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members of the latter group to have a stronger preference for economic inequality reduction
than the former group (Corneo and Gruner 2002; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Pontusson
2013). While there are numerous types of political resource theories, each emphasizing
different actors, actions, or institutions, nearly all postulate that political influence
increases as the result of larger (informal or formal) membership numbers and sustained
collective action.13 Since the traditional left party constituency is numerically larger than
that of the center or right, there would appear to be a natural advantage for parties of the
left within a democratic context. However, this advantage is substantially hampered as a
result of the low levels of political knowledge and market resources within these left party
constituencies (Korpi and Palme 2003; Iversen and Soskice 2011) and the collective action
problems that arise with large, diverse groups (Rudra 2002).
Labor unions have played a critical role in overcoming such challenges faced by
left parties, acting to educate and organize these parties’ natural constituencies. There is a
broad scholarly consensus that, even controlling for income, union members have a greater
preference for economic inequality reduction and generous social spending than non-union
members (Iversen 2001; Checchi et al. 2007; Pontusson 2013); and that greater union
presence translates into lower levels of wage and income inequality (e.g., see Wallerstein
1999; Pontusson et al. 2002; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler et al. 2013). The negative
association between union presence and wage and income inequality is primarily explained
by reference to the ability of unions to extract compensation-related concessions from
employers, the tendency of unions to compress the earnings distribution within their

By definition, political resource theories “share a focus on the empowering role of resources for the
realization of outcomes that advance actors' perceived interests” (Hicks and Misra 1993, 61).
13
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membership (as well as for others covered by collectively bargained contracts),14 and union
support for a redistributive public policy agenda (Bacarro 2008; Visser and Checchi 2009).
This latter, indirect union effect is typically assumed to work through left government, with
a country needing both strong left parties and strong labor unions to construct a
comprehensive, universalistic welfare state, and therefore lower levels of income
inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999; Kwon and Pontusson 2010;
Simoni 2013).
When acknowledging the conditional relationship between partisan behavior and
union presence, scholars tend to make one of two arguments. Either unions and left parties
are complements, and thus greater unionization increases partisanship by moving left
parties to the left (Kwon and Pontusson 2010); or unions and left parties are substitutes,
with the latter engaging in greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities
when unions are weak (Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Wallerstein 2011). These
seemingly contradictory arguments rest on the same underlying assumption; that
politicians are primarily “policy-seeking”.15 The first argument implies that no matter how
many voters are unionized, center or right party politicians will not appeal to union member
preferences for greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities. The
second argument implies that left party politicians will respond more to union member

Union negotiated wages may also “spillover” to workers not explicitly covered by a collectively bargained
contract if non-unionized firms voluntarily abide by such agreements (Rueda and Pontusson 2000).
15
Scholars within the policy-seeking tradition “implicitly (assume) that the ultimate outcomes that flow
from…policies matter to (politicians)” (Muller and Strom 1999, 8).
14
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preferences for greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities as the
number of voters that are unionized declines.16
If we maintain the assumption that politicians are policy-seeking, but accept that
they are substantially office- and vote-seeking as well (an assumption underlying most of
the work on political party behavior), then we deviate from both the “left party as
complement” and the “left party as substitute” to unions theses. Instead, we are lead to
expect the union effect on partisan behavior to be conditioned by the overall level of
unionization. Higher levels of unionization should create an incentive for all office- and
vote-seeking politicians, no matter their partisan persuasion, to appeal to union member
preferences, while lower levels of unionization should create a disincentive for such
politicians to appeal to union member preferences.

However, given that left party

politicians are likelier to share union members’ first-order preferences regarding
government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than center or right party
politicians, we can expect them to respond to union member preferences “sooner” (at lower
levels of unionization) than center or right party politicians. In other words, pragmatic
politicians seek an opportunity to simultaneously pursue their first-order policy preferences
and attain or hold elected office.

This expectation suggests that at low levels of

16

It is possible that union member preferences for government intervention to reduce economic inequalities
increase as unionization declines and union organizations become weaker. However, this still leaves open
the question as to why an organization that must achieve electoral success to survive (a left leaning political
party) and whose members (politicians) desire to hold elected office and be popular would appeal just as
much to the preferences of a weaker union movement as they did to a stronger union movement. Another
possibility is a more complex causal chain in which a decline in union presence precipitates an increase in
economic inequality, which then leads to greater demand (among non-union members) for government action
to reduce economic inequalities. While there are strong theoretical reasons to anticipate a positive association
between economic inequality and a preference for redistribution, the empirical evidence has been notably
mixed (e.g., see Moene and Wallerstein 2003; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Kelly and Enns 2010).
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unionization, no pragmatic politician will appeal to union member preferences, but at high
levels of unionization, all pragmatic politicians will appeal to union member preferences.
However, at more moderate levels of unionization, a circumstance in which left, center,
and right party politicians may substantially reveal their first-order preferences and still
maintain electoral viability, pragmatic left party politicians will appeal to union member
preferences, while pragmatic center and right party politicians will not. This leads us to the
central hypothesis of this article:

Hypothesis: The negative effect of left government on income inequality is likely to increase
(decrease) as unionization approaches relatively moderate (low or high) levels

Thus far we have focused on the incentives for pragmatic politicians to appeal to
union member preferences. What is crucial for the partisan effect on income inequality,
however, is not mere rhetorical appeals, but actual government policy. If party policy
positions tend to reflect the policy preferences of those voters within their electoral
coalition, a crucial link between union member preferences and partisan behavior is the
extent to which a political party depends on union members for votes.17 The above
argument implies that no major political party will substantially depend on union member
votes in weakly unionized countries, only left parties will do so in moderately unionized

17

There is an ongoing scholarly debate regarding whether politicians are more responsive to the general
electorate or partisan constituencies (Ezrow et al. 2011). However, this research has largely focused on
relatively short-term shifts in public opinion and political rhetoric more than actual government policies
(Adams 2012). Analyses focusing less on change and more on the general correspondence between the issue
positions of party elites and those party’s voters find a significant correlation between the two (Dalton 1985;
Iversen 1994).
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countries, and all major political parties will do so in highly unionized countries. In order
to explore whether this is indeed the case, Table 1 uses European Values Study (EVS) and
World Value Survey (WVS) data to examine the proportion of each major political party’s
voters that are union members in the years 1981 to 2008 in 14 wealthy democracies.18 The
countries are listed in descending order based on the average level of unionization in the
country during the examined period.
As conventional wisdom would anticipate, across all countries left parties depend
on union member votes more than their main center and right party competitors.19 The only
partial exception to this is in Belgium, where the left is fractured along ethnic lines. Here,
the centrist Christian People’s Party20 relies more on union member votes than the
Francophone Socialists, but less than the Flemish Socialists. However, the degree to which
political parties depend on union member votes in absolute terms and relative to their main
party competitors varies significantly across countries. In the two most weakly unionized
countries, France and the United States, and the moderately unionized Italy, union
members comprise less than 13 percent of the voters of all major political parties. By
contrast, in the four most heavily unionized countries, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and
Norway, union members comprise more than 30 percent of the voters of all major political
parties. In fact, union members comprise more than 40 percent and 50 percent of the voters

18

The EVS/WVS asks respondents whether they belong to a trade union (variable a067) and which political
party they would vote for if the election were held tomorrow (variable e179).
19
This analysis uses the party families outlined in the Comparative Manifestos Project. “Left” parties are
those coded as belonging to the “Social Democratic” party family, while “center” or “right” parties are those
coded as belonging to the “Agrarian”, “Liberal”, “Christian Democratic”, or “Conservative” party families.
Center and right parties that received at least 10 percent of the vote in two or more elections during the 19812008 period (and for which data is available) are included in the analysis.
20
The Christian People’s Party changed its name to the Christian Democratic and Flemish Party in 2001.
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Table 1. Proportion of Left, Center, and Right Party Voters that are Union Members,
1981-2008
Country

France
US
Netherlands
Germany
Canada

Union
Members as %
of Left Vote

Union Members
as % of Non-Left
Vote

10.2

6.8
(Socialists)

3.4
(UMP)

2.0

14.7

12.1
(Democrats)

8.8
(Republicans)

1.4

24.6

28.6
(PVDA)

14.1
(VVD)

2.0

28.7

26.3
(SPD)

15.2
(CDU/CSU)

1.7

31.9

19.8
(NDP)

11.7
(Liberals)

1.7

Union Density†

10.8
(Progressive
Conservative)
UK††
Italy

Ireland

Belgium

Norway

1.8

36.1

15.9
(Labour)

8
(Conservatives)

2.0

38.2

10
(PSI)

4.8
(Forza Italia)

2.1
2.1

10
(SDI)
Austria

Left-Center (Right)
Ratio

42.2

26.1
(SPA)

10.6
(AVP)

2.5

43.8

19.4
(Labour)

9.6
(Fine Gail)

2.0

9.6
(Fianna Fail)

2.0

29.8
(SP)

21.8
(CVP)

1.4 (SP/CVP),
3.3 (SP/PVV-VLD)

14.4
(PS)

9.1
(PVV-VLD)

0.7 (PS/CVP),
1.6 (PS/PVV-VLD)

51.8
(Labor)

40.9
(SP)

1.3

37
(Christian People's)

1.4

31.2
(Conservative)

1.7

51.1

56.3
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Table 1. Continued.

Country

Union Density†
73.7

Finland

75.2
Denmark

79.6
Sweden

Union Members
as % of Left
Vote
43.3
(Social
Democrats)

57.8
(Social
Democrats)

Union Members as
% of Non-Left
Vote

Left-Center (Right)
Ratio
1.4

30.3
(Centre)
31.7
(National Coalition)

1.4
1.3

45.9
(Venstre Liberals)
38.7
(Conservative)

56.3
(Social
Democrats)

1.5
1.0

55.4
(FP)
48.9
(Centre)
35.5
(Moderate
Coalition)

† Average union density level, 1981-2008.
†† Voting statistics do not include Northern Ireland.
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1.2
1.6

for the centrist liberal parties in Denmark and Sweden, respectively. In other words, voters
for center and right parties in highly unionized countries are anywhere from 2.5 to over 4
times more likely to be union members than voters for left parties in weakly unionized
countries. Such data implies that center and right governments in highly unionized
countries are likelier to respond to union member preferences (for government action to
reduce economic inequalities) more than left governments in weakly unionized countries.
In the two most weakly unionized countries, France and the United States, and the
moderately unionized Italy, union members comprise less than 13 percent of the voters of
all major political parties. By contrast, in the four most heavily unionized countries,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, union members comprise more than 30 percent
of the voters of all major political parties. In fact, union members comprise more than 40
percent and 50 percent of the voters for the centrist liberal parties in Denmark and Sweden,
respectively. In other words, voters for center and right parties in highly unionized
countries are anywhere from 2.5 to over 4 times more likely to be union members than
voters for left parties in weakly unionized countries. Such data implies that center and
right governments in highly unionized countries are likelier to respond to union member
preferences (for government action to reduce economic inequalities) more than left
governments in weakly unionized countries.
In addition to differences in absolute levels of reliance on union member support,
also critical is the difference between left and center or right party reliance on union
member support within the same country. The theory outlined above leads us to expect
larger partisan differences in moderately unionized countries than weakly and strongly
30

unionized countries.

While the correlation between unionization level and partisan

differences is not perfect, these expectations are largely borne out. We find the partisan
differences to be smallest in the five most heavily unionized countries (the four Nordic
countries and Belgium) and the second most weakly unionized country, the United States.
By contrast, the two largest partisan divides are in the moderately unionized countries of
Austria and Italy.21 Substantial partisan differences are found in the moderately unionized
countries of the United Kingdom and Ireland as well, but also the more weakly unionized
Netherlands and the least unionized country, France.
In short, union members are a minor constituency of all major political parties in
weakly unionized countries, a substantial constituency of only left parties in most
moderately unionized countries, and a major constituency of all major political parties in
strongly unionized countries. Thus, if unionization matters for the partisan effect on
income inequality, as most extant literature suggests it should, we are likely to find
partisanship to be greatest at relatively moderate levels of unionization.

Data and Measurement22
To test whether unionization rates condition the partisan effect on income
inequality in a non-linear manner, I examine 16 wealthy democracies between 1970 and

21

There is a very large partisan divide in Belgium between the Flemish Socialists (SP) and the liberals (PVVVLD). However, there is a substantially smaller partisan divide between SP and the Christian People’s Party
(CVP) and between the other socialist party, the Francophone Socialists (PS), and both the PVV-VLD and
CVP.
22
Data and do file are available from author upon request.
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2010.23 The dependent variable in this analysis is net income inequality. The measure is
from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2009). SWIID
attempts to combine the strengths and neutralize the weaknesses of inequality measures
produced by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the United Nations University
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). The LIS data has
consistent measurement concepts across countries, but is only produced at 5 year intervals.
The UNU-WIDER data has inconsistent measurement concepts across countries, but is
produced more regularly. SWIID examines the country-years in which the two datasets
overlap as well as the income concepts used in UNU-WIDER to arrive at estimates for
inequality that are both wide ranging and consistent in the concepts that they measure. The
net income inequality measure is a Gini coefficient24 for post-tax and post-transfer
household income inequality adjusted for household composition.
I focus solely on the determinants of post-tax and post-transfer (net) income
inequality as opposed to pre-tax and pre-transfer income (market) inequality or
“redistribution” (the change in income inequality from before taxes and transfers to after
taxes and transfers). This is because the theoretical argument put forth here is agnostic
regarding what types of policies are pursued to reduce, maintain, or increase a certain level
of income inequality.

Whether a particular partisan government pursues policies that

23

The countries included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
24
A Gini coefficient represents the area between the Lorenz curve (a plot of the cumulative percentage of
total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest households and
moving toward the wealthiest households) and a linear line that represents (hypothetical) perfect income
equality. Gini coefficients range from 0 to 100, with 0 identifying perfect income equality (all households
have identical income), and 100 identifying perfect income inequality (one household has all of the income).
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primarily impact wage or market income inequality (e.g., through the generosity of
investments in education or worker training), redistribution (e.g., through the progressivity
of the tax structure or the extent to which benefits are universalized), or a combination of
the two is unclear (Kelly 2009). The claim in this article is only that union members
condition the behavior of politicians towards government intervention in the economy; and
that this behavior has measurable consequences for income inequality.
There are two main independent variables of theoretical interest, union presence
and the partisan composition of government. Since the focus is on the relative electoral
power of union members, union presence is measured as the percentage of wage earners in
employment that are union members (“union density”). This data is from the OECD and
Visser’s Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and
Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2010 database. The partisan composition of government is
measured by the proportion of cabinet seats held by parties of the left.25 This data is from
the Comparative Political Data Set I (Armingeon et al. 2013). As a robustness check,
partisanship is also measured as the percentage of all legislative seats held by parties of the
left. This data is from the Comparative Political Parties Dataset (Swank 2013).
Two interaction terms containing the union density and partisan composition of
government variables are constructed. The level of union density and the level of union

In the dataset use here, all of the countries have at least one party of the “center” or “right” that has been
represented in the cabinet. However, two countries, Canada and the United States, do not have a party of the
“left” that has been represented in the cabinet. While Canada has a legitimate and relatively robust left party,
the New Democratic Party, which has been able to gain a substantial portion of the national vote over
successive elections, the United States does not. In the absence of a clear left party, it is likely that the center
party acts as the defacto party of organized labor, and thus behaves in the same manner discussed above
regarding parties of the left. Therefore, I have recoded the center party in the United States (the Democratic
Party) as a party of the left. Nonetheless, the overall conclusions of the analysis do not change substantially
if this party is instead coded as a party of the center.
25
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density squared are separately interacted with the level of government partisanship because
the argument outlined above suggests that lower and higher levels of unionization should
be associated with a smaller partisan effect on income inequality relative to moderate levels
of unionization. The Union Density X Partisan Composition of Government variable is
expected to have a significant negative sign, indicating that as unionization increases from
lower to moderate levels, left parties have more of a negative effect on net income
inequality relative to center and right parties. The Union Density2 X Partisan Composition
of Government variable is expected to have a significant positive sign, indicating that as
unionization increases from moderate to higher levels, left parties have less of a negative
effect on net income inequality relative to center and right parties.

Control Variables

Previous research has identified a host of institutional and socio-economic
determinants of income inequality.26 The institutional variables most commonly explored
in this literature are welfare state design27 and wage bargaining structure. The welfare
regime typology outlined by Esping-Andersen identifies three types of welfare states in

26

Control variables are chosen based on their anticipated effect on market income inequality and
redistribution (i.e., the first and the second stage of the distributional process). At times, a variable will be
anticipated to increase (decrease) market income inequality, but also increase (decrease) redistribution. This
does not necessarily mean that this variable is expected to have no effect on net income inequality, as it is
possible that the effect on market income inequality (redistribution) is substantially greater than the effect on
redistribution (market income inequality).
27
Given the substantial controversy over which regime type most appropriately characterizes particular
countries, only those 9 countries for which a broad scholarly consensus exists regarding their regime type
will be included. Therefore, welfare regime type will only be included in an alternative specification that
serves as a robustness check. See Appendix for details.
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wealthy democracies (Esping-Andersen 1990).

Social democratic welfare states,

paradoxically, tend to be both “de-commodifying” (i.e., reduce workers’ reliance on the
market) and “labor activating” (i.e., encourage employment) (Bradley and Stephens
2006). By contrast, conservative welfare states, based on corporatist (i.e., welfare state
benefits differentiated by occupation) and traditional familial (i.e., supporting the male as
bread winner, female as caregiver model) principles, while frequently generous and decommodifying, tend to discourage employment and engage in limited redistribution
(Iversen and Wren 1998). Liberal welfare states that rely on means-tested or other benefits
that provide only a basic level of economic security tend to incentivize employment
without increasing skills or earnings and thus have only a modest impact on redistribution
(Boix 1998; Korpi and Palme 1998). The level of wage bargaining refers to the primary
level (national, industry, or firm/workplace) at which unions and employers negotiate over
compensation. More centralized wage bargaining institutions tend to compress wages
between different categories of workers (less skilled and more skilled), different firms,
and/or different industries (if bargaining occurs at the national level) (Wallerstein 1999;
Scheve and Stasavage 2009).

Relatedly, the support of more skilled workers for such a

system that holds down their earnings relative to less skilled workers may be maintained
by generous public provisions relating to worker training and unemployment benefits
(Iversen and Soskice 2010).
The socio-economic variables most frequently cited in the income inequality
literature are national wealth, unemployment, female labor force participation, service
sector employment, and social spending. The overall impact of these variables on income
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inequality is not straightforward. Increasing national wealth may reduce market income
inequality by slowing population growth (and thus also the supply of labor) and producing
a more educated and skilled citizenry (Nielson and Alderson 1995), or increase market
inequality if the rate of return on capital grows at a faster rate than the economy as a whole
(Picketty 2014). While increasing national wealth likely results in higher government
revenue which can be used for greater social spending, it may also lower demand for
compensation (because of widely shared improvements in the quality of life). Greater
unemployment is likely to increase market income inequality, as less skilled individuals
make up a disproportionate number of the unemployed and the greater surplus labor stock
that higher unemployment implies may act to increase the bargaining power of capital
relative to labor (Iverson 1996; Hall and Franzese 1998; Korpi 2002). However, the
positive impact of unemployment is likely to be attenuated by automatic economic
stabilizers, such as unemployment insurance and means-tested benefits, which exist to
varying degrees in all wealthy democracies (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005). Female
labor force participation28 is likely to increase market income inequality if women who
join the workforce are primarily from already wealthy households, but likely to decrease
market income inequality if women who join the workforce are primarily from already
poor households (Maxwell 1990). If greater economic participation translates into greater
political participation, then we might expect higher female labor force participation to lead
to more inequality-reducing policies on the part of all political parties given that women
tend to support redistribution more than men (Alesina and Guiliano 2009). Because service

28

Female labor force participation data is only available for the 1980-2010 period. Therefore, this variable
will only be included in an alternative specification that serves as a robustness check.
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sector employment tends to be bifurcated between those jobs that require high skills and
provide generous compensation (e.g., physicians and lawyers) and those that require little
skill and provide meager compensation (e.g., retail store clerks and dishwashers), there is
general consensus that market income inequality increases as a country becomes more
service-oriented and less industry-oriented (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). However, if the
reduction in the industrial sector results in economic insecurity and lower wages, we may
expect people to demand (and government to respond with) compensation (Iversen and
Cusack 2000). As alluded to in the discussion of redistribution above, social spending
may act to either increase or decrease market income inequality and redistribution
depending on whether benefits are employment reducing or employment enhancing, how
focused the benefits are at strengthening the skill level of the citizenry, and which
households receive the most benefits.
Scholars also frequently cite the impact on income inequality of policies and
processes associated with economic globalization.

Most frequently discussed are

international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the degree of capital openness.
Since international trade incentivizes firms to specialize in those functions that utilize their
country’s comparative advantage, firms in wealthy capital abundant countries tend to focus
relatively more on those industries or services that require little physical labor but a high
level of skill. Therefore, the so-called “losers” from trade are likely to be the less skilled
(and therefore less generously compensated) workers (and the capital owners that employ
them) (Boix and Adserà 2000). However, these losers from trade may demand and receive
compensation from the government in the form of targeted social transfers or subsidies,
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resulting in less of an increase in income inequality than would be anticipated without
explicit government intervention (Garrett 1995; Cao et al. 2007). FDI refers to investment
involving a lasting interest in and control by a resident entity in one country of an enterprise
resident in a different country, while capital openness refers to restrictions on cross-border
financial transactions. Both of these factors are typically argued to increase market income
inequality and reduce redistribution, as greater exit options for capital are likely to lead to
more labor concessions and fewer redistributive taxing and spending schemes (Rodrik
1997; Reuveny and Li 2003; Boix 2010).
Data measurement and sources for all control variables are included in the
appendix.

Method
To examine the impact that union members have on the partisan effect on net
income inequality, I utilize single-equation time-series cross-sectional error correction
models (ECMs) estimated with OLS and the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator.
The Rogers’ variance estimator allows for valid hypothesis tests in the presence of any
pattern of correlation within units (countries), including serial correlation and correlation
due to unmodeled country-specific factors (Rogers 1994). However, this estimator also
assumes that errors are uncorrelated between units. This assumption could be violated if
there are unmodeled factors that impact net income inequality in all or most countries at a
particular point in time (Huber et al. 2006). In order to address this possibility, dummy
variables representing each decade are included in the analysis, with 2000 to 2010 serving
as the baseline category.
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ECMs are flexible time-series models that have at least two advantages over other
statistical models. First, they can be applied to both integrated and stationary data.29
Second, they are able to estimate both the short-term and long-term effect of an
independent variable on the dependent variable. A short-term (or immediate) effect
indicates that a change in an independent variable in one time period produces a change in
the dependent variable only in the concurrent time period. By contrast, a long-term effect
expresses dynamic causality and indicates that a shift in an independent variable in one
time period produces a change in the dependent variable over many time periods.
A single-equation ECM can be expressed in the following way:

ΔYt = α0 + α1Yt-1 + β1ΔXt + β2Xt-1 + εt,

Each independent variable is included in the equation twice, once in its differenced
form (∆Xt) and once in its lagged level form (Xt-1). The short-term effect of an independent
variable can be determined simply by observing the coefficient for the differenced version
of the variable (β1). The long-term effect, by contrast, is determined by dividing the
coefficient for the lagged version of the variable (β2) by the coefficient for the lagged
dependent variable (α1). The latter coefficient is known as the “error correction rate” and
represents the speed at which the independent variable and the dependent variable arrive

29

While ECMs may be applied to both integrated and stationary data (DeBoef and Keele 2008), Enns et al.
(2014) demonstrate that cointegration tests only produce correct inferences when the dependent variable is
integrated. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test was conducted on the dependent variable used in this analysis
(the Gini coefficient for net income inequality). The null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root could
not be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level or greater, indicating that the dependent variable is
integrated.
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back at equilibrium after a shift in the level of the independent variable. For example, an
α1 of -.1 would indicate that 10 percent of the full long term effect is felt after one time
period, that 10 percent of the remaining long term effect is felt in the following time period,
and so on. Higher absolute values of α1 indicate a faster movement back to equilibrium.

Results
Model 1 in Table 2 is the baseline model. It includes all of the independent variables
outlined above with the exception of female labor force participation and welfare regime
type and covers the years 1970 to 2010. The error correction rate is -.051 and significant
at the 95 percent confidence level. This informs us that any long-term effect on net income
inequality will be incrementally distributed over time and not fully realized until
approximately 20 years after a shift in the level of an independent variable. There are only
two control variables that reach statistical significance. First, the coefficient for the level
of trade is negative and significant at the 99 percent confidence level. A one standard
deviation, or 34 percentage points of GDP30, increase in trade eventually decreases net
income inequality by 4.09, or nearly one standard deviation. This finding has at least two
possible explanations: governments “overcompensate” losers from trade (i.e., provide
more in the way of compensatory benefits than individuals have lost as a result of trade)
and/or countries that trade the most are also those that invest most heavily in human capital
(with such investments expanding the pool of skilled labor and thus enlarging the number
of workers that are able to win from trade). Second, the coefficient for the difference in

30

Between 1970 and 2010, the average level of trade of the 16 countries examined here increased by 34.78
percentage points of GDP.
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Table 2. Determinants of Net Income Inequality in 16 (15) Wealthy Democracies

Model

Time

1

2

3

Main Model

No France

No Sweden

1970-2010

1970-2010

1970-2010

-0.051**

-0.065**

-0.050**

(0.021)

(0.022)

(0.022)

-0.000

-0.000

0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

0.012***

0.014***

0.012***

(0.002)

(0.005)

(0.002)

-0.030

-0.040

-0.044

(0.029)

(0.032)

(0.031)

0.042**

0.020

0.034**

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.015)

-0.000***

-0.000**

-0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.001***

-0.001***

-0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.058

0.064

0.045

(0.054)

(0.058)

(0.057)

-0.011

-0.013

-0.013

(0.013)

(0.010)

(0.014)

0.017

0.012

0.015

(0.031)

(0.032)

(0.036)

0.016

0.024*

0.015*

(0.012)

(0.013)

(0.014)

-0.009

-0.003

-0.016

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.034)

0.016

0.015

0.016

(0.010)

(0.012)

(0.011)

Net Income Inequality (t-1)

Δ Govt. Partisanship (t)

Govt. Partisanship (t-1)

Δ Union Density (t)

Union Density (t-1)

Union Density X Union Density (t-1)

Union Density X Govt. Partisanship (t-1)

Union Density X Union Density X Govt. Partisanship (t-1)

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1)

Δ Unemployment (t)

Unemployment (t-1)

Δ Service Sector Employment (t)

Service Sector Employment (t-1)
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Table 2. Continued
Model

1

2

3

Main Model

No France

No Sweden

1970-2010

1970-2010

1970-2010

.0.037

.0.049

.0.016

(0.055)

(0.063)

(0.063)

0.001

0.006

-0.001

(0.009)

(0.011)

(0.009)

0.051

0.044

0.027

(0.063)

(0.066)

(0.067)

0.049

0.055

0.035

(0.063)

(0.068)

(0.071)

0.008

0.006

0.008

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.007)

-0.006***

-0.006***

-0.006***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

0.019*

0.017**

0.014**

(0.010)

(0.008)

(0.006)

0.010

0.012*

0.007

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.005)

0.125

0.131

0.139

(0.108)

(0.118)

(0.105)

-0.013

-0.061

-0.009

(0.053)

(0.065)

(0.051)

0.285

1.316

0.391

(1.470)

(1.650)

(1.521)

29 to 70

31 to 70

30 to 68

48

49

49

Positive and Significant Left Govt. Effect (Low UD)

19

13

19

Positive and Significant Left Govt. Effect (High UD)

75

78

None

586

552

546

0.087

0.093

0.086

Time
Δ Social Spending (t)

Social Spending (t-1)

Δ The Level of Wage Bargaining (t)

The Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1)

Δ International Trade (t)

International Trade (t-1)

Δ Foreign Direct Investment (outflows) (t)

Foreign Direct Investment (outflows) (t-1)

Δ Capital Openness (t)

Capital Openness (t-1)

Constant

Range of UD for Negative and Significant Left Govt Effect
Peak Negative and Signficant Left Govt. Effect (Moderate
UD)

N
2

R

(Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)
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outward FDI flows is positive and significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
This is in line with expectations and informs us that growth in outward FDI flows increases
net income inequality in the short-term, although the size of the coefficient is substantively
small.
As anticipated, the UNION DENSITY X PARTISAN COMPOSTION OF
GOVERNMENT variable has a significant negative coefficient, and the UNION DENSITY2
X PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT variable has a significant positive
coefficient.31 Given that the interaction terms contain the levels of, as opposed to the
changes in, the partisan composition of government, the coefficients for these variables
represent the long term effect that a left (center and right) government has on net income
inequality relative to center and right (left) governments.
Figure 2 charts the marginal effect of a shift in government partisanship to the left
over the observed values of union density in the dataset used here. A clear U-shaped
relationship can be identified, whereby the negative effect of left government relative to
center or right government on net income inequality increases as union density approaches
moderate levels. Left government has its largest negative effect on net income inequality
relative to center and right governments when the union density level reaches 48 (a
condition that existed in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s, near the start of Margaret
Thatcher’s term as Prime Minister). At such a time, a shift in government from one
controlled completely by the center or right to one evenly divided between the left and the

31

T-tests of the marginal effects confirm that UNION DENSITY X PARTISAN COMPOSTION OF
GOVERNMENT and UNION DENSITY2 X PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT are
significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
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Figure 2. Conditional Effect of Left Government on Net Income Inequality Across
Range of Union Density Levels in 16 Wealthy Democracies

44

center or right results in a decrease in net income inequality of 4.25, or slightly over one
standard deviation. In the final two decades of the analysis, only Finland experienced a
change in net income inequality exceeding this amount.32 A shift in government from one
controlled completely by the center or right to one controlled completely by the left results
in a decrease in net income inequality of 8.50, or slightly more than two standard
deviations. This is approximately the difference between Japan, the tenth most equal
country in the analysis, and Sweden, the most equal country in the analysis, in 2010.33
Moving our attention away from moderate levels of union density towards higher
and lower levels, we observe that left government does not reduce net income inequality
relative to center and right governments when union density is less than 29 or more than
70. In 2010, the final year of the analysis, 9 of the 16 countries examined here fell in the
former category34 while not a single country fell in the latter category. However, Finland
and Sweden were above a union density level of 70 as recently as 2008, while Denmark
fell below this level only in 2006.

This suggests that partisan differences towards

government intervention in the economy may be on the rise in these three countries. At
very low (less than 20) and very high (more than 76) levels of union density, the marginal
effects indicate that left governments actually increase net income inequality relative to
center and right governments.
In an effort to determine the robustness of the above results, 7 additional models
are included in Tables 2 and 3. First, excluded from the analysis are those countries that

Finland’s level of net income inequality increased from 21.04 to 25.54 between 1990 and 2010.
2010 data is not available for Canada and Ireland.
34
The countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
32

33
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Table 3. Determinants of Net Income Inequality in 16 (9) Wealthy Democracies
Model

Time
Net Income Inequality(t-1)

Δ Govt. Partisanship (t)

Govt. Partisanship (t-1)

Δ Union Density (UD) (t)

Union Density (UD) (t-1)

UD X UD (t-1)

UD X Govt. Partisanship (t-1)

UD X UD X Govt. Partisanship (t-1)

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1)

Δ Unemployment (t)

Unemployment (t-1)

Δ Service Sector Employment (t)

Service Sector Employment (t-1)

4
No Social
Spending
1970-2010

5
W/ Female
Labor Part.
1980-2010

6
W/ Welfare
Regime†
1970-2010

7
W/ Partisan
Leg.
1970-2010

8
Reduced
Model
1970-2010

-0.050**

-0.050**

-0.159*

-0.061**

-0.048***

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.084)

(0.022)

(0.016)

-0.000

-0.001

-0.001

0.007

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.009)

(0.001)

0.013***

0.015***

0.011***

0.049***

0.013***

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.015)

(0.003)

-0.028

0.003

0.017

-0.035

-0.030

(0.029)

(0.033)

(0.030)

(0.029)

(0.034)

0.041**

0.054***

0.006

0.120**

0.034**

(0.014)

(0.017)

(0.031)

(0.041)

(0.012)

-0.000***

-0.001***

0.000

-0.001**

-0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.001***

-0.001***

-0.001***

-0.002***

-0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

0.000***

0.000***

0.000***

0.000**

0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.038

-0.040

0.039

0.059

(0.042)

(0.056)

(0.136)

(0.055)

-0.010

-0.018

0.029

-0.020

(0.013)

(0.015)

(0.039)

(0.013)

0.023

-0.027

0.069

0.008

(0.030)

(0.051)

(0.055)

(0.033)

0.016

0.006

0.017

0.006

(0.012)

(0.015)

(0.042)

(0.016)

-0.008

0.011

-0.082

-0.011

(0.032)

(0.013)

(0.181)

(0.031)

0.016

0.024

0.043

0.015

(0.010)

(0.006)

(0.049)

(0.011)
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Table 3. Continued.
Model

Time

4

5

No Social
Spending

W/ Female
Labor Part.

1970-2010

0.055
(0.065)
0.051
(0.063)
0.007
(0.006)
-0.006***
(0.001)

1980-2010
-0.062
(0.088)
0.014
(0.008)
0.106*
(0.056)
0.127***
(0.038)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.008***
(0.001)

6
W/
Welfare
Regime†
1970-2010
-.0.063
(0.068)
-0.069
(0.071)
0.141
(0.083)
0.216
(0.118)
0.014*
(0.008)
-0.013***
(0.005)

7

8

W/ Partisan
Leg.

Reduced
Model

1970-2010
0.036
(0.063)
0.004
(0.013)
0.041
(0.065)
0.031
(0.065)
0.006
(0.006)
-0.007***
(0.002)

1970-2010

0.019*

0.019*

0.019

0.018

0.013*

(0.009)

(0.010)

(0.015)

(0.011)

(0.007)

0.010*

0.009

0.011

0.007

(0.006)
0.123

(0.005)
0.063

(0.013)
0.080

(0.007)
0.102

(0.106)

(0.131)

(0.193)

(0.106)

-.013
(0.053)

-0.016
(0.056)
-0.162
0.141
0.008
0.013

-0.172
(0.222)

-0.024
(0.054)

1.800
(1.087)
1.086
(0.099)
7.255
(5.221)

-0.520
(1.631)

Δ Social Spending (t)

Social Spending (t-1)

Δ The Level of Wage Bargaining (t)

The Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1)

Δ International Trade (t)

International Trade (t-1)
Δ Foreign Direct Investment (outflows)

0.013**
(0.006)
-0.004***
(0.001)

(t)

Foreign Direct Investment (outflows) (t1)
Δ Capital Openness (t)

Capital Openness (t-1)

Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t)

Female Labor Force Participation (t-1)

Liberal (t)

Conservative (t)

Constant

0.315
(1.345)

-0.294
(1.152)
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1.188**
(0.455)

Table 3. Continued.
Model

Time
UD Levels (Negative and Significant

4
No Social
Spending
1970-2010

5
W/ Female
Labor Part.
1980-2010

6
W/ Welfare
Regime†
1970-2010

7
W/ Partisan
Leg.
1970-2010

8
Reduced
Model
1970-2010

29 to 69

28 to 68

37 to 56

37 to 52

34 to 65

49

49

51

51

49

19

17

15

20

18

77

None

None

None

79

587
0.087

467
0.115

336
0.142

586
0.088

595
0.071

Left Govt Effect)
Peak Negative and Signficant Left Govt.
Effect
Positive and Significant Left Govt.
Effect (Low UD)
Positive and Significant Left Govt.
Effect (High UD)

N
R2

(Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)
† Regression includes only 9 countries (see fn. 27 and the Appendix)

consistently have the highest and lowest levels of union density in the dataset used here
and thus may disproportionately impact the results. In Model 2, France (which in all 41
years has the lowest level of union density) is removed. In Model 3, Sweden (which in 34
of the 41 years has the highest level of union density) is removed. Second, given that
partisan governments play a critical role in determining levels of, and changes in, social
spending, controlling for this variable may act to under or overestimate the relationship
between partisanship and net income inequality. Therefore, Model 4 drops this variable
from the analysis. Third, Model 5 includes the female labor force participation variables.
Due to data limitations, this model is only able to cover the 1980 to 2010 period. Fourth,
Model 6 incorporates dummy variables for welfare regime type. Countries for which there
is little scholarly consensus regarding their welfare state type are excluded from the

48

analysis.35 Fifth, Model 7 measures the partisan composition of government with the
proportion of legislative seats, rather than cabinet positions, held by parties of the left.
Finally, Model 8 includes only those variables that were significant at the 90 percent level
or greater in Model 1.36
In 6 of these robustness checks, both the UNION DENSITY X PARTISAN
COMPOSTION OF GOVERNMENT and the UNION DENSITY2 X PARTISAN
COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT interaction terms are in the hypothesized direction
and significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The only difference is Model 7, which
includes the alternative measure for partisan composition of government. In that model,
the quadratic interaction term just barely misses the cutoff for statistical significance at the
99 percent confidence level (with a p-value of .013). The “turning point” for the partisan
effect on net income inequality proves robust across models. In every model (including
Model 1), left governments decrease net income inequality the most relative to center or
right governments when the union density level is between 48 and 51. Furthermore, the
substantive effects of partisanship at these turning points do not differ by model (i.e., the
95 percent confidence intervals for these estimates overlap). Also robust is the range in
which a negative effect of left government relative to center and right government is found.
In each model, left government has a significant negative effect when the union density
level is between 37 and 52 (with the range dropping as low as 28 in Model 5 and as high
as 70 in Models 1 and 2). If we exclude the models containing only 9 countries (Model 6)

35

See fn. 27 and the Appendix.
Both short-term and long-term coefficients are included for trade (the variable with a statistically
significant long-term effect in Model 1).
36
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and the alternative measure of the partisan composition of government (Model 7), this
range expands significantly (with the remaining 6 models demonstrating a significant left
government effect when the union density level is between 34 and 65). Slightly less robust
is the finding that left government increases net income inequality relative to center and
right governments at low levels of union density. In Model 2, which excludes the low
union density country of France, left government does not begin to have a statistically
significant positive effect on net income inequality until a union density level of 13. This
is down from a union density level of 19 in Model 1 and would only apply to only 11 of
the 552 remaining country-years, all of which belong to the United States (2000 to 2010).37
Far less robust is the finding that left government increases net income inequality relative
to center and right governments at high levels of union density. No such effect is found in
Model 3, which excludes the high union density country of Sweden, Model 5, which
includes female labor force participation and only covers the years 1980 to 2010, Model 6,
which includes welfare regime and only includes 9 countries, or Model 7, which uses the
alternative measure for partisanship.
The findings in Model 1 regarding the long-term negative effect of trade and the
short-term positive effect of outward FDI flows prove robust. In each of the additional
models the coefficient for the level of trade is negative and significant at the 99 percent
confidence level, while in all but two models the coefficient for the difference in outward
FDI outflows is positive and significant at the 90 confidence level (with the coefficient
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If the Democratic Party of the United States reverts to its original coding as a center party in this model,
the positive effect of left government exists only until a union density level of 4. Given that there is no
country-year in the analysis with a union density level that low, this finding has little substantive meaning.
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reaching the 95 percent confidence level in Models 2 and 3). No other control variable
consistently reaches statistical significance.
If the ability and willingness of politicians to respond to union preferences is
substantially determined by both first-order policy preferences and electoral incentives,
then we might expect the conditioning union effect on partisanship to differ based on the
electoral threshold necessary to hold elected office. The lower electoral thresholds in
proportional representation (PR) systems allow politicians to appeal to a narrower base in
the electorate than politicians in majoritarian systems with higher electoral thresholds,
where there are greater incentives to make electoral appeals to the median voter (Downs
1957; Norris 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2006). This would imply that left party politicians
respond to union preferences “sooner” (at lower levels of unionization) and right and center
party politicians respond to union preferences “later” (at higher levels of unionization) in
countries with a PR system than left, center, and right party politicians in countries with a
majoritarian system.
In an effort to determine whether the conditional effects of unionization on
partisanship found above differ based on the electoral system in place, I include two
supplementary models, one for countries with a majoritarian system and one for countries
with a PR system.38 Figures 3 plots the marginal effects of government partisanship on
net income inequality at different levels of union density in majoritarian and PR electoral
systems, respectively. First, notice that the x axis on these two plots differ, as the levels of

38

I utilize the country classification put forth by Iversen and Soskice (2006). The countries characterized as
having majoritarian systems are Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. The countries characterized as having PR systems are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
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Figure 3. Conditional Effect of Left Government on Net Income Inequality Across
Range of Union Density Levels in 7 Majoritarian and 9 Proportional Representation
Countries.
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union density shown correspond to those that exist in the country-years covered in each
model. Majoritarian systems have a relatively narrow spread in union density (ranging
from about 11 to 54), while PR systems have a much wider spread (ranging from about 19
to 84).

These different spreads have the consequence of producing very different

distributions, with a more or less linear interactive effect in majoritarian systems and the
familiar U-shaped distribution in the PR systems. The theoretical expectations receive
support. The significant and negative left government partisan effect can be identified over
a much wider range of values of union density in the PR plot (union density levels 30 to
60) than the majoritarian plot (union density levels 41 to 49). The substantive size of this
effect, however, does not significantly differ by electoral system.

Three additional

similarities between the two plots should be recognized. First, in confirmation of the
central hypothesis of this article, as unionization approaches moderate levels, left
government has more of a negative effect on net income inequality relative to center and
right governments. Second, the “turning point” for the negative left government effect is
very similar in the two systems. In majoritarian countries, the negative partisan effect of
left government is greatest at a union density level of 49, while in PR systems the negative
partisan effect of left government is greatest at only the slightly lower union density level
of 47. Third, unlike the plot generated by Model 1 which pooled together both types of
electoral systems, in neither plot is there a positive left government effect at low levels of
union density.39

39

In the PR plot, left government has a positive effect on net income inequality relative to center and right
governments when the union density level is 78 or higher. For the same reasons as outlined above, the
regression was run again with Sweden excluded. While the results are substantially similar at lower and
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Discussion and Conclusion
Why has no consistent partisan effect on income inequality been found in the
scholarly literature? I have argued here that a part of the explanation concerns a country’s
level of unionization, which conditions the partisan effect on income inequality. This
argument rests on three main pillars. First, union members favor government intervention
to reduce economic inequalities more than non-union members. Second, politicians are
both pragmatic (office- and vote-seeking) and ideological (policy-seeking).

Third,

politicians in parties of the left, which have historic links with organized labor, have a
greater first-order preference for government intervention to reduce economic inequalities
than politicians in center or right parties. With each of these three pillars in place, we can
expect lower levels of unionization to produce fewer efforts at economic inequality
reduction on the part of all partisan governments, reducing the partisan effect on income
inequality; moderate levels of unionization to produce substantially greater efforts at
economic inequality reduction on the part of left governments than center or right
governments, increasing the partisan effect on income inequality; and high levels of
unionization to produce greater efforts at economic inequality reduction on the part of all
partisan governments, reducing the partisan effects on income inequality. In short, partisan
effects on income inequality are likely to increase (decrease) as we approach relatively
moderate (low or high) levels of unionization. This theory was tested with a series of errorcorrection models, using net income inequality as the dependent variable, linear and

moderate levels of union density as the PR model that included Sweden, the positive effect of left government
at high levels of union density disappears.
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quadratic interaction terms consisting of the level of union density and the partisan
composition of government, and a set of controls. The empirical results confirm the
theoretical expectation and hold regardless of whether there is a majoritarian or PR
electoral system.
Table 4 provides data on the level of unionization in the 16 countries examined in
this analysis. Column two contains the level and year at which unionization reached its
peak, while column three contains the level and year at which unionization fell to its trough.
There are several observations that deserve our attention. First, all but one country
(Belgium) reaches its peak unionization level prior to the twenty-first century, with half of
the countries reaching this peak in the 1970s, the first decade of the analysis. Second, there
is a bimodal distribution in regards to the trough of unionization, with five countries (the
four Nordic countries and Belgium) hitting this point in the 1970s (as unionization trended
upwards) and the remaining eleven countries doing so in the 2000s (as unionization trended
downwards), the last decade of this analysis. Third, the levels of the various peaks and
troughs differ substantially across countries. Three countries (Denmark, Finland, and
Sweden) have peaks that meet or exceed 80, while six countries have peaks less than half
of that level (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States);
and four countries have troughs that exceed 50 (the four Nordic countries), while five
countries have troughs less than half that level (Australia, France, Japan, the Netherlands,
and the United States). In short, wealthy democracies are experiencing a broad decline in
unionization levels, but the timing, depth, and starting level of this decline differs
substantially across countries.
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Table 4. Peak and Trough Unionization Levels in 16 Wealthy Democracies, 19702010
Peak
(Year)

Trough
(Year)

Australia

50.2
(1976)

18.1
(2010)

Austria

62.8
(1970)

28.4
(2010)

Belgium

54.1
(2006)

39.9
(1970)

Canada

36.8
(1982)

27.2
(2008)

Denmark

80.8
(1983)

60.3
(1970)

Finland

80.7
(1993)

51.3
(1970)

France

21.7
(1970)

7.5
(2007)

Germany

36.0
(1991)

18.6
(2010)

Ireland

54.8
(1978)

32.7
(2010)

Italy

50.5
(1976)

33.2
(2006)

Japan

35.1
(1970)

18.2
(2008)

Netherlands

37.8
(1975)

18.6
(2010)

Norway

58.5
(1990)

51.9
(1972)

Sweden

83.9
(1993)

67.7
(1970)

UK

49.9
(1981)

26.4
(2010)

US

27.4
(1970)

11.4
(2010)

Country
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What consequences might such observations have for the partisan effect on income
inequality? The theoretical argument and empirical results outlined here suggests that
declining unionization should not have the same effect on the partisan effect on income
inequality across countries (at least in the short to medium term). Rather, what is critical
is the level of unionization from which each country is falling from. Those countries with
a relatively high peak level of unionization are likely to experience an increase in
partisanship towards distributional issues as unionization declines, while those countries
with a relatively moderate or low peak level of unionization are likely to experience a
decrease in partisanship towards distributional issues as unionization declines. While
many scholars have argued that partisanship is decreasing or increasing across most or all
wealthy democracies as a result of common domestic and international trends (Boix 1998;
Garrett 1998; Pierson 2001; Boix 2010), these findings suggest that the impact of common
trends will differ depending on each country’s starting point (Thelen 1993).
The marginal effects of partisanship on income inequality in PR and majoritarian
electoral systems demonstrate that partisanship persists at a wider range of unionization
levels in the former than the latter. This finding contradicts the traditional description of
PR systems as comparatively “consensual” (Rogowski 1987; Rueda and Pontusson 2000),
but lends support to recent work demonstrating that because of their lower electoral
thresholds, PR systems have more ideologically disparate parties than majoritarian systems
(Dow 2011). Evidence indicating that partisan differences are present in majoritarian
systems only at very moderate levels of unionization provides conditional support for the
traditional argument that such systems limit partisanship by providing all office- and vote57

seeking politicians with an electoral incentive to appeal to the median voter. On the one
hand, the results do indicate that politicians in majoritarian systems attempt to appeal to
the same (median) voter most of the time. On the other hand, the results also indicate that
there are certain electoral conditions in such systems that allow politicians with divergent
policy preferences to appeal to different voters. This suggests that politicians from
different party families may project their own preferred median voter onto the electorate
when doing so is intellectually credible. These results contribute to a growing body of
literature that finds that electoral rules matter for government output and socio-economic
outcomes, but that the extent to which they do so depends on a host of environmental
factors such as the preferences of the politicians in government, the ideological and
demographic characteristics of the electorate, and the competitiveness of the electoral
system (Kang and Powell 2010; Ezrow 2011; Warwick 2011).
The broader implication of this study is that because politicians strategically adjust
to their environment, there is unlikely to ever be an “independent” partisan effect which is
constant across space and time. While such a statement should be uncontroversial among
scholars who study the behavior of politicians and political parties, it is a crucial point that
is often neglected in studies that examine the determinants of income inequality and other
socio-economic outcomes. In the future, it is important for us to take more seriously the
modelling of environmental factors that are likely to increase or decrease the ideological
distance and policy differences between politicians belonging to different political parties.
The theoretical argument outlined above is in the tradition of scholars such as
Garrett, Korpi, and Pontusson, who have emphasized the importance of social, economic,
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and political conditions for the ability of politicians to pursue their first-order policy
preferences. It is important to note that such conditions may not merely be represented by
variables that are more less trending in a predictable direction over time (e.g., unionization
or economic globalization), but frequently unpredictable (or at least largely unpredicted)
major world events such as the Great Depression, World War II, 9/11, and the Great
Recession (Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Pontusson 2013; Picketty 2014). If partisan
politicians have policy preferences, then they should use such crises (which may rally
support for the government in general and/or increase pressure for “government action”)
to push through a predetermined policy agenda that existed independently of the event
discussed. Further work that asks under what conditions partisan politicians are able to
pursue their first-order preferences, as well as under what conditions politicians may
actually alter their first-order preferences, seems to be a promising avenue for future
research.
Before concluding, it is important to note two clear shortcomings of this analysis.
First, I have implicitly assumed that all union members share more or less the same
preferences and that these preferences are largely constant across countries and over time.
However, scholars have found that union members frequently exhibit different preferences
towards distributive issues based on their skill or income level and the sector that they work
within (Garrett and Way 1999; Nijhuis 2009; Becher and Pontusson 2011; Iversen and
Soskice 2010), and that the demographic makeup of union movements differs both across
countries and over time (Iversen and Soskice 2009; Visser and Checci 2009; Pontusson
2013). Although data on union composition is relatively scarce, future research should
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attempt to take such factors into account before estimating direct or indirect union effects.
Second, the focus here has been on the partisan effect on income inequality. However,
partisan governments impact income inequality primarily through the policies that they
pursue, not simply by attaining or holding office (Rueda 2008). The central assertion that
all partisan governments will be less likely to engage in government intervention to reduce
economic inequalities when unionization is low, left parties will be likelier to engage in
substantial government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than center or right
parties when unionization is at moderate levels, and all political parties will be more likely
to engage in government intervention to reduce economic inequalities when unionization
is high, could be tested more directly by examining how unionization conditions the policy
orientation of different types of partisan governments and, in turn, how any of those
enacted policies impact income inequality. Such an analysis will help us better determine
the causes and consequences of partisan conflict over distribution and redistribution, as
well as specific distributional outcomes.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND THE UNION EFFECT ON
WAGE INEQUALITY

Introduction
For many years, one of the few areas of broad consensus in the literature on wage
inequality in the wealthy democracies was that union strength accounts for much of the
cross-national and over-time variation in wage inequality, with stronger unions resulting
in less wage inequality (e.g., see Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Kahn 2000;
Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Londregan 2006; Oliver
2008; Martin and Swank 2012).40 However, recent evidence indicates that this union effect
disappeared at some point in the 1990s (Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013).
Despite the important theoretical and practical implications of this finding, scholars have
yet to craft a comprehensive theory to explain the disappearance of the union effect; nor
have they provided empirical tests of the few suppositions offered to explain it.
What is responsible for the disappearance of the union effect on wage inequality?41
I focus attention on one of the most obvious culprits; economic globalization. While
previous scholarship has examined how economic globalization impacts unions, this
literature has tended to focus on the consequences that economic globalization has for the

“Wage inequality” differs from “income inequality” in that the latter includes compensation derived from
investments (e.g., capital gains) as well as labor. Unlike wage inequality, income inequality encompasses
persons with and without gainful employment and is frequently measured at the household, rather than the
individual, level. This article focuses exclusively on the determinants of wage inequality, a term that is used
synonymously with earnings inequality.
41
Within the existing wage inequality literature, “wage” is a broad term that encompasses employee
remuneration regardless of whether it is provided on a fixed hourly, weekly, monthly, or annual basis or in
return for a particular good or service.
40
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organizational characteristics of unions rather than on unions’ ability or willingness to
utilize a given organization toward particular ends. In particular, numerous scholars have
argued that economic globalization reduces the number of union members relative to nonunion members42 or precipitates the breakdown of centralized wage bargaining
institutions.43 However, none have seriously considered (theoretically or empirically) how
economic globalization conditions the union effect on wage inequality44 – or, for that
matter, many other socio-economic or political outcomes.45
This article aims to explain the disappearance of the union effect on wage inequality
and address such shortcomings in the literature by identifying and examining in detail the
three interrelated processes by which unions impact wage inequality, which I label the
employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms; and by considering how economic
globalization impacts each and all of these mechanisms by altering the bargaining power
and thus also the preferences of different types of employers, union workers, and non-union
workers. The evidence I present suggests that economic globalization reduces the union
effect by exacerbating wage differentials between employers (managers) and lower-paid
union workers, higher-paid union workers and lower-paid union workers, and employers
(managers) relative to many of the least paid non-union workers. Given that economic
globalization is expanding with no obvious interruptions in sight, the implication is that if

42

See Dreher and Gaston (2007) for a brief review of this literature.
See Western (1997) for the most prominent example.
44
Economists frequently examine factors that influence unions’ wage extracting ability. However, these
scholars focus almost exclusively on factors associated with the business cycle (e.g., see McDonald and
Solow 1981 and Messina et al. 2009).
45
Notable exceptions include Beckfield (2006), Iversen and Soskice (2010), and Kwon and Pontusson
(2010).
43
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the traditional union effect on wage inequality has disappeared, it may very well have
vanished for good.
This article is divided into six sections. The first section addresses in detail the
employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.

The second section outlines recent

evidence that the union effect on wage inequality disappeared in recent decades. The third
section discusses how economic globalization can be expected to condition the employer,
intra-union, and insider mechanisms and thus also the union effect more broadly. The
fourth section provides information on the dependent variables, independent variables, and
estimation strategy employed in the empirical analysis. The fifth section reports the results
of the empirical analysis and the sixth section includes a discussion of the findings.

The Union Effect on Wage Inequality
Unions impact wage inequality through three interrelated processes; or what I term
here the employer46, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.47
The employer mechanism is emphasized in the power resource theory (PRT)
literature and refers to unions’ ability to extract wage and other compensation-related
concessions from employers (Stephens 1980; Korpi 1985). In the absence of working class
organizations, market power in capitalist economies is concentrated in the hands of the few
(i.e., employers). By organizing “subordinate classes” (i.e., employees), unions are able to

In this article, “employer” refers not only to actual business owners, but also top managers (e.g., chief
executive officers or high level bureaucrats) that may or may not have an ownership stake in a firm but
nonetheless formulate and implement policies relating to investments and/or employee compensation.
47
The focus in this article is on how unions impact wage inequality “directly”, or through employer-union
and intra-union negotiations. However, unions almost certainly impact wage inequality “indirectly” as well
by supporting (or opposing) particular political parties, politicians, and public policies.
46
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redistribute some of this market power to their members (Bradley et al. 2003). This may
be done, for example, by representing most (potential) workers in a particular firm,
industry, or region and therefore monopolizing a certain segment of the workforce
(Freeman and Medoff 1984; Mishel 1986) or by facilitating the ability of workers to jointly
withhold their services until particular demands are met regarding compensation (Checci
et al. 2007). More generally, unions foster a class-based identity among employees through
information campaigns and the politicization of distributional struggles (Thompson 1978;
Pontusson et al. 2002; Iversen and Soskice 2011); and, by applying “normative power
resources”, may ultimately instill a greater “taste for equality” in the wider citizenry (Korpi
1985; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Plumper et al. 2009).
The intra-union mechanism is emphasized in the varieties of capitalism (VoC)
literature and refers to the tendency of unions to compress wages among their own
members. This may be done by providing equal pay for equal work or by workers in lowerpaid occupations receiving larger wage gains from union membership than workers in
higher-paid occupations (Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998; Pontusson et al. 2002;
Card et al. 2003; Hall and Thelen 2007). This latter phenomenon is explained as the result
of the solidaristic norms within union organizations (Wallerstein 1999), a political
exchange between highly skilled union workers and politicians, whereby the former agree
to wage restraint in return for generous social insurance policies (Iversen and Soskice
2010), and/or the democratic nature of union organizations, which tends to result in wage

64

agreements that benefit the median union member (Pontusson et al. 2002; Checci et al.
2007).48
The insider mechanism is emphasized primarily in the economics literature and
refers to the (positive or negative) externalities that result from union wage gains (and other
costs associated with collective bargaining). If workers earn a wage premium49 as a result
of union membership, then that necessarily implies that unions increase wage inequality
between otherwise identical union and non-union workers (Friedman 1962; Freeman and
Medoff 1984; Card et al. 2003). However, the union wage premium also impacts the wage
differentials between dissimilar union and non-union workers (Freeman 1980). Union
wage premiums for workers in lower-paid jobs shrink earnings differentials between these
union workers and non-union workers (and employers) in higher-paid jobs; while union
wage premiums for workers in higher-paid jobs aggravate wage differentials between these
union workers and non-union workers in lower-paid jobs. However, union wage gains may
result in higher wages in the non-union sector as well and thus at least partly cancel out the
union wage premium - and thus also the impact such a premium has on union/non-union
wage differentials. “Pour over effects” occur as a result of laws requiring that unionbargained wages extend to non-union workers (Wallerstein and Western 2000) while
“spillover effects” occur as a result of non-union employers voluntarily offering higher
wages in an attempt to preempt potential union organizing efforts or to entice workers away

48

A decision-making process that strengthens the median union member relative to the mean union member
is likely to result in a wage agreement that is more beneficial to the former than the latter. Since the median
union wage tends to be lower than the mean union wage, this implies greater within union wage compression.
49
A union wage premium refers to the (positive) difference in the wage of a union worker relative to a
(hypothetical) non-union worker with an identical job profile.
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from already unionized establishments (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Rosenfeld and
Western 2012).50
While distinct theoretical propositions, the employer, intra-union, and insider
mechanisms are clearly neither independent from one another nor are they mutually
exclusive. Indeed, without an employer mechanism there is unlikely to be either an intraunion mechanism or an insider mechanism; as the intra-union mechanism implies that lesspaid union workers have extracted greater wage gains from their employers than betterpaid union workers51 and the insider mechanism is a product of externalities resulting from
any such union wage gains. Therefore, the overall union effect on wage inequality can be
said to be the net result of the gains of union workers relative to their employers, some
union workers relative to other union workers, union workers relative to non-union
workers, and non-union workers relative to their employers.

The Disappearing Union Effect
There has been a broad (implicit) consensus in the comparative political economy
literature that the net result of the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms is to
reduce wage inequality (e.g., see Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Kahn 2000;
Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Londregan 2006; Oliver

50

There are numerous other externalities arising from union wage gains that have consequences for the
overall wage distribution. For example, if the elevated costs of union labor increase unemployment, nonunion wages may fall in response to the larger supply of idle labor (Friedman 1962). On the other hand, such
union-induced unemployment may actually increase non-union wages in the long-term if the unemployed
are induced to augment their skill level in an effort to improve their prospects for employment (Kahn 2000).
Finally, union wage gains may motivate employers to invest in capital improvements to boost worker
productivity, ultimately leading to higher wages throughout the broader economy (Erixon 2010).
51
It is difficult to imagine a sustainable union movement in which lower-paid union workers achieve relative
gains exclusively or even primarily by extracting wage gains from higher-paid union workers, the latter of
which would then experience not only relative but also absolute losses as a result of union membership.
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2008; Martin and Swank 2012). Yet recent evidence provided by prominent scholars in
this literature indicates that this union effect disappeared at some point in the 1990s
(Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013). These scholars have provided two
contradictory explanations for the diminished union effect, neither of which has been tested
empirically. First, greater economic globalization, particularly trade with less developed
countries (LDCs), has produced wage pressures that increasingly weak unions have been
unable to resist (Golden and Wallerstein 2011). This explanation implies that economic
globalization reduces the union effect by harming the ability of unions to extract wage
gains from their employers (i.e., via the employer mechanism). While certainly plausible,
left unconsidered is the impact that economic globalization has on different types of union
workers and non-union workers (as well as non-union employers). Second, in response to
membership losses, unions in the manufacturing sector have become increasingly
supportive of employer efforts to decouple wage developments in the manufacturing and
service sectors (Pontusson 2013). This explanation implies that the union effect has
diminished as the result of greater intra-union and union/non-union wage dispersion (i.e.,
via the intra-union and insider mechanisms), but is primarily descriptive in nature. Left
unexplained is why unions in the manufacturing sector have stopped supporting solidaristic
wage policies, unions in a sector exposed to international competition achieve greater wage
gains than unions in more sheltered sectors, and employers in a sector exposed to
international competition deliver greater wage gains for their workers than employers in
relatively sheltered sectors.
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Economic Globalization and the Union Effect
Economic globalization – or the increasing exposure of states to the world
economy52 - matters for the union effect because of its impact on the bargaining position,
preferences, and behavior of employers as well as different types of union and non-union
workers; and thus also the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.53 Due to their
interdependent nature, the impact that economic globalization has on each of these union
mechanisms necessarily has consequences for the others.

Employer mechanism

There are at least two ways in which economic globalization may impact the ability
of unions to extract wage gains from their employers. First, the greater market competition
that economic globalization implies reduces the “rents” available for union extraction
(Abowd and Lemieux 1993). This could occur as the result of more competition in the
international marketplace (for firms that are exporting) or more domestic competition
(arising from imports or inward flowing foreign direct investments). Second, since capital
tends to be more mobile than labor, employers can invest abroad (rather than domestically)
if labor costs become too high, but workers cannot easily move abroad if wages become
too low (Rodrik 1997; Salvatore 1998; Brady and Wallace 2000).

52

This definition is a slightly modified version of that provided by Li and Reuveny (2003).
Immigration, while potentially consequential for the union effect on wage inequality and other socioeconomic outcomes, is likely to work through a very different set of mechanisms than the (potential) crossborder flow of goods, services, and capital. Therefore, in an effort to maintain theoretical clarity, the term
“economic globalization” refers only to the latter phenomena in this article.
53
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Declining rents and/or greater opportunities for employers relative to workers is
likely to have profound effects on the preferences and bargaining strategies of employers
and unions. Employers are likely to be more cutthroat in their efforts to keep labor costs
down and threaten to exit the domestic market if their demands for lower labor costs are
not met (Huber and Stephens 1998; Flanagan 2007; Rosenfeld and Western 2012). Unions,
on the other hand, will find themselves faced with a more pronounced “wage-employment
trade-off”, whereby higher wages increasingly translate into less available employment
(Dumont et al. 2005). Since collective bargaining means that unions have at least some
say in the outcome of this trade-off, many will choose to restrain wages in order to salvage
union jobs (Rosenfeld and Western 2012).
If economic globalization diminishes union bargaining power, produces more
aggressive bargaining strategies on the part of employers, and weakens union preference
for wage gains, then this leads us to the following expectation:

The employer mechanism hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world
economy, the ability and willingness of unions to reduce wage inequality between
employers (managers) and union workers will decline

Intra-union mechanism

The primary way economic globalization impacts intra-union wage compression is
through its effect on the collective interests of union workers and therefore union solidarity;
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for while economic globalization harms the ability of some union workers to extract wage
gains, it is unlikely to do so for others.
In regard to available rents for union extraction, many sectors – such as education
and transportation – are substantially sheltered from international competition, while other
sectors – such as manufacturing – are not; and firms involved in the production of highly
capital intensive and/or innovative goods or services – such as airplanes or wealth
management - are likely to experience less of an increase in foreign competition as a result
of economic globalization than firms involved in the production of less capital intensive
and innovative goods or services – such as clothes, economy automobiles,54 or call center
customer service. This suggests that employers and unions in some sectors and firms are
impacted more by economic globalization than employers and unions in other sectors and
firms.
In regard to employers’ ability to offshore and shift investments abroad, many
occupations - such as railroad engineers and longshoremen – produce a service that cannot
be delivered over long distances (with current technology), while other occupations – such
as those in manufacturing or call centers – produce a product that can; and occupations
requiring highly specific skill sets – such as commercial aircraft piloting – are relatively
scarce globally, while occupations requiring skill sets that are more easily acquired – such
as product assembling – are not. This suggests that union members in some occupations

Of course, there are firms that produce some “premium” products and other “economy” products. In such
a case, the ability and willingness of unions to extract wage gains will likely be determined by the particular
product mix, with firms generating more revenue from premium products being riper for wage extraction
than firms generating more revenue from economy products.
54
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(and those that employ them) are impacted less by economic globalization than union
members in other occupations (and those that employ them).
If economic globalization reduces the rents in some sectors and firms more than
others and provides opportunities to offshore some occupations but not others, then the
preferences and bargaining strategies of different types of employers and union workers
are likely to diverge considerably as economic globalization expands. Employers in more
sheltered, capital intensive, and/or highly innovative sectors will be less cutthroat in their
efforts to keep labor costs down, and will either not threaten to exit the domestic market at
all or not do so to the same extent as employers in less sheltered, capital intensive, and/or
innovative sectors (Silver 2003). The same can be said for employers in their interaction
with union workers providing services that cannot be delivered over long distances or that
hold a highly specific skill set that is scarce globally. In addition, unions representing
workers in sectors or firms experiencing minimal global competition or union workers in
occupations experiencing minimal threat from foreign workers will not confront an
increasingly steep wage-employment trade-off as a result of economic globalization, and
are therefore unlikely to moderate their wage demands in response to it.
If some union workers are losing their ability to demand higher wages while other
union workers are not, then union movements should grow increasingly divided over the
desirability and acceptability of particular wage bargaining agreements. 55 Union workers

55

While these strains in union solidarity may eventually lead to wholesale reform of collective wage
bargaining institutions (e.g., the devolution of wage bargaining from the national to the sectoral level), such
reforms tend to occur as discrete events, not in incremental stages (Western 1997). In the meantime, unions
need to hash out new collective bargaining agreements in old institutional contexts. If or when there is
successful institutional reform, preferences should continue to diverge as a country grows more exposed to
the world economy, even as wage bargaining institutions (once again) remain relatively stable.
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with an increasingly steep wage-employment trade-off should offer wage concessions in
exchange for employment guarantees, while union workers with a weaker and more stable
wage-employment trade-off should be able to (successfully) resist such wage restraint
(Western 1997). The overall effect of this dynamic for the intra-union mechanism depends
on whether traditionally higher-paid union workers disproportionately occupy the former
or latter category. If the former, then intra-union wage dispersion will diminish as betterpaid union workers engage in wage restraint. If the latter, then intra-union wage dispersion
will grow as better-paid union workers resist wage restraint (and thus also wage
compression) (Wallerstein et al. 1997). Given that the union workers that are maintaining
the ability and willingness to demand higher wages are generally also those that hold
substantial market power in a less open and competitive economy (i.e., those in relatively
sheltered sectors and/or those holding a relatively scarce skill set56), economic
globalization should result in larger wage gains for already higher-paid union workers than
for already lower-paid union workers, and therefore reduce intra-union wage compression.
This leads us to the following expectation:

The intra-union mechanism hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world
economy, the ability and willingness of unions to reduce wage inequality between union
members will decline

56

It is unclear whether union workers providing services in which proximity is critical are, in the aggregate,
lower- or higher-paid than union workers providing services in which proximity is less important. For
example, retail store clerks and nurses’ aides are likely paid less than most workers in the manufacturing
sector (who occupy positions that can be offshored), while university professors and railroad engineers are
likely paid more.
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Insider Mechanism

If lower-paid union workers are not receiving as much of a benefit from union
membership as previously, then this will result in fewer pour over and spillover effects. In
regard to pour over effects, the wage restraint increasingly practiced by lower-paid union
workers will result in lower-paid non-union workers covered by union contracts receiving
less of a benefit from union bargaining than previously (as they practice wage restraint by
proxy). In regard to spillover effects, there will be less of an incentive for (potential) lowerpaid non-union workers to join unions and thus also for employers to offer higher wages
to these workers in an effort to preempt union organizing efforts or to entice such
individuals away from already unionized establishments (Flanagan 2007). This leads us to
the following expectation:

The insider mechanism hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world
economy, the tendency of unions to reduce wage inequality between lower-paid non-union
workers and their employers (managers) will decline57

Briefly summarized, economic globalization, through its effects on the competitive
environment confronted by employers and unions and thus also these actors’ preferences,

57

If lower-paid union workers have traditionally earned a substantial wage premium, then the wage restraint
increasingly practiced by these workers implies two additional (and contradictory) trends. First, shrinking
wage dispersion between lower-paid union workers and similar lower-paid non-union workers. Second,
growing wage dispersion between lower-paid union workers and dissimilar but higher-paid non-union
workers. However, the net result of these two contradictory trends is not obvious and therefore leads to no
firm expectations.
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reduces the ability and willingness of traditionally lower-paid union workers to extract
wage gains from their employers while having no such effect on the ability and willingness
of traditionally higher-paid union workers. This results in greater earnings dispersion
between traditionally lower-paid union workers and employers as well as traditionally
lower-paid union workers and traditionally higher-paid union workers. Furthermore, this
decline in the bargaining power of lower-paid union workers diminishes wage compression
resulting from pour over and spillover effects. In other words, while the exact impact that
economic globalization has on the union effect depends on which union mechanism it is
flowing through, all of these consequences lead to the same general expectation:

General Hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world economy, the union
effect on wage inequality will decline

Data and Methods58
The dependent variable employed in most studies examining the determinants of
wage inequality in wealthy democracies is the 90/10 wage ratio (the ratio of the gross
earnings of a full-time dependent employee at the ninetieth percentile to that of a full-time
dependent employee at the tenth percentile) provided by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Unfortunately, this variable will not allow us to
test the employer mechanism hypothesis or the intra-union mechanism hypotheses, as
union workers tend to be situated modestly above or modestly below the median wage

58

Data and do file are available from the author upon request.
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earner (Checchi et al. 2010). In an effort to better capture the dynamics that were postulated
in these hypotheses, I will instead utilize the other two wage ratios provided by the OECD:
the 90/50 wage ratio (the ratio of the gross earnings of a full-time dependent employee at
the ninetieth percentile to that of a full-time dependent employee at the median) and the
50/10 wage ratio (the ratio of the gross earnings of a full-time dependent employee at the
median to that of a full-time dependent employee at the tenth percentile). However, the
90/10 wage ratio will be employed to test the insider mechanism (more on each of these
dependent variables and their accompanying theoretical expectations below).
A shortcoming of all of the wage inequality data is its severely unbalanced nature.
The primary purpose of this article is to determine what contributed to the disappearance
of the union effect on wage inequality in the 1990s. However, there are only a limited
number of countries for which there are multiple observations both before and after that
period. Table 5 summarizes the availability of wage inequality data for the 18 countries
typically examined in time-series cross-sectional analyses of the determinants of wage
inequality in wealthy democracies.59 Countries are grouped by the year in which their
wage inequality data series begins. Group 1 has wage ratio data that begins during or
before the mid-1970s; Group 2 has wage ratio data that begins between the mid-to-late
1970s and 1990; Group 3 has wage ratio data that begins in the early to mid-1990s; and
Group 4 has wage ratio data that begins in 1995 or later. All countries have wage data
available through 2010. Columns three through five provide the level of the respective
wage ratios in each country in the last year of the data series (2010) and columns six

59

Table 1 includes linearly interpolated data for missing observations in the wage inequality dataset.
Interpolated observations account for approximately 9.1 percent of all observations.
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Table 5. Wage Inequality, Union Strength, and Economic Globalization Data for 18
Wealthy Democracies

Country

Group 1
United
Kingdom
United States
Australia
Japan
Sweden
Group Avg.

First
Year
of
Wage
Ratio
Data†

1970
1973
1975
1975
1975

90/10
Wage
Ratio
(2010)

90/50
Wage
Ratio
(2010)

50/10
Wage
Ratio
(2010)

Union
Density

Level of
Wage
Bargaining

Econ.
Global
Index

Capital
Openness

3.58
5.01
3.33
2.96
2.23
3.42

1.98
2.37
2
1.83
1.62
1.96

1.81
2.12
1.67
1.62
1.38
1.72

35.9
14.9
33
24
78.8
37.3

1.6
1
2.9
1
3.5
2

60.8
36.7
61.2
23
69.9
50.3

2.4
2.4
1.4
2.3
1.8
2.1

Group 2
Finland
Denmark
New Zealand
Italy
Group Avg.

1977
1980
1984
1986

2.52
2.8
2.83
2.22
2.59

1.74
1.68
1.81
1.53
1.69

1.45
1.66
1.56
1.45
1.53

73.3
74.2
36.5
38.3
55.6

4.2
3.3
1.9
2.9
3.1

64.8
75.4
63.8
52
64

1.9
1.7
2
1.3
1.7

Group 3
Germany
Ireland
Group Avg.

1992
1994

3.33
3.63
3.48

1.8
2
1.9

1.86
1.81
1.84

28.3
43.4
35.9

3
3.9
3.5

45.4
94.8
70.1

2.4
1.3
1.9

Group 4
France
Switzerland
Canada
Norway
Belgium
Netherlands
Austria
Group Avg.

1995
1996
1997
1997
1999
2002
2004

2.97
2.7
3.71
2.3
2.38
2.89
3.39
2.91

1.99
1.84
1.89
1.47
1.73
1.78
1.94
1.81

1.5
1.47
1.97
1.56
1.37
1.62
1.74
1.6

10.3
22
31.6
56.3
51.1
24.5
41.8
33.9

2
3
1
3.7
4.5
3.3
3
2.9

47.3
79.8
72.1
69.2
89.9
87.7
68.9
73.6

1.4
2.4††
2.4
1.2
1.7
2.4
1.9
1.9

3.04

1.83

1.65

39.9

2.8

64.6

1.9

Total Avg.

† Wage ratios are available through 2010 for all 18 wealthy democracies.
†† Capital mobility data missing for Switzerland before 1996.
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through nine provide the average level of the main variables of theoretical interest (more
on these below) by country for all years for which the data is available between 1980 and
2010.
There are several important points to note. First, previous analyses of wage
inequality have typically examined all available country-years beginning in the early-tomid 1970s (e.g., see Pontusson et al. 2002 and Rueda 2008). However, only five countries
(Group 1) have wage inequality data stretching back that far. This group of countries have
relatively high wage inequality and the lowest average levels of wage bargaining and the
economic globalization index. Therefore, an analysis that includes all available countryyears beginning in the early-to-mid 1970s likely produces results that are skewed toward
five countries that are not representative of wealthy democracies in general. Second, seven
countries (Group 4) do not have wage inequality data available until 1995 or later (with the
data for two of those countries, Austria and the Netherlands, starting after 2000). Such a
small number of observations inhibit the ability to conduct time-series analysis and make
it difficult (or impossible) to determine if the union effect on wage inequality diminished
in these countries during the 1990s. Furthermore, two additional countries (Group 3) have
only a very small number of observations (three and one, respectively) before 1995. Third,
Group 4 has the lowest average level of union density and the highest average level of the
economic globalization index. Indeed, three of the four countries with the highest average
level of the economic globalization index (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) are
in this group (the lone exception being Ireland, which is in Group 3). In short, at least in
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regard to the variables of theoretical interest to us here, there does appear to be a systematic
difference between the countries with relatively short and relatively long wage data series.
In an effort to be sure that any observed over-time variations in the union effect are
the result of changes within countries, not only differences between them, the primary
models will include only those countries in Group 1 and Group 2 (minus New Zealand60)
and cover the 1980 to 2010 period. These countries and this time period were chosen
because they allow us to examine a more diverse set of countries than if we examined
Group 1 alone, include all of the control variables in the full models (see below), and
maintain a substantial number of observations both before and after the assumed critical
juncture of the early to mid-1990s. This should provide us with confidence that the
observed results are not disproportionately driven by particular types of countries or
specific time periods. However, in an effort to determine the robustness of the above
results, additional models will be presented that include all eleven countries in Group 1,
Group 2, and Group 3.

Main Variables of Theoretical Interest

The empirical analysis will utilize the two most common measures for union
strength in the wage inequality literature; union density and the level of wage bargaining.
Union density refers to the proportion of employed individuals that belong to a union. The

60

New Zealand is missing private service sector employment and public sector employment data. In order
to include all of the control variables in the full models, New Zealand was excluded from the primary analysis.
However, New Zealand (along with Germany and Ireland) are included in an additional model serving as a
robustness check.
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level of wage bargaining refers to the primary level at which unions and employers
negotiate over compensation, ranging from firm-level, to sectoral-level, to national level
bargaining. The level of wage bargaining is measured here with an ordered categorical
variable ranging from 1 to 5. Higher values indicate a more centralized wage bargaining
system.61 Data for all of these union measures are from the Database on Institutional
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts
(ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0.
Economic globalization is measured with an economic globalization index that
captures the actual cross-border flows of goods, services, investments (foreign direct
investments and portfolio investments), and monetary transfers; and a capital openness
measure that captures the potential for domestic employers to invest abroad and for foreign
employers to invest domestically by considering the legal restrictions on cross-border
financial transactions.62 The economic globalization index ranges from 0 to 100, with
higher values indicating greater cross-border flows, and is provided by Dreher (2006). The
capital openness measure ranges from -1.9 to 2.4, with higher values indicating fewer
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions, and is provided by Chinn and Ito (2008).

61

See appendix A for details.
Excluded from the analysis are the much more limited measures for economic globalization that are
commonly used in models of wage inequality in wealthy democracies; total trade and trade with LDCs. These
measures do not capture the increased market competition that arises from foreign owned but domestically
located multi-national corporations (MNCs), nor do they consider the willingness and ability of employers
to offshore or invest abroad.
62

79

Control Variables

In addition to union strength and economic globalization, the socio-economic
factors most frequently cited in the determinants of wage inequality literature are national
wealth, private service sector employment, public sector employment, unemployment,
female labor force participation, education, and immigration. The most commonly cited
political factor is government partisanship.63 Theoretical expectations, data measurement,
and sources for all control variables can be found in Appendix A.

Estimation Strategy

To examine whether economic globalization conditions the union effect on wage
inequality, I utilize single-equation time-series cross-sectional error correction models
(ECMs) estimated with OLS and the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator. The
Rogers’ variance estimator allows for valid hypothesis tests in the presence of any pattern
of correlation within units (countries), including serial correlation and correlation due to
unmodeled country-specific factors (Rogers 1994). However, this estimator also assumes
that errors are uncorrelated between units. This assumption could be violated if there are
unmodeled factors that impact wage inequality in all or most countries at a particular point

63

The ability of partisan governments to impact socio-economic outcomes is almost certainly constrained
(facilitated) by the political and institutional environment in which such governments operate (e.g. see Clark
et al. 1998 and Castater 2015). Therefore, it is probably inappropriate to anticipate left party participation in
government to have an effect on wage inequality that is relatively constant across countries and over time.
Surprisingly, however, previous scholarly work on the determinants of wage inequality in wealthy
democracies has neglected the issue of a conditional partisan effect; and an adequate exploration of the issue
here would carry us well beyond the scope of this article.
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in time (Huber et al. 2006).

In order to address this possibility, dummy variables

representing each decade are included in the analyses.64
ECMs are flexible time-series models that have at least two advantages over other
statistical models. First, they can be applied to both integrated and stationary data (DeBoef
and Keele 2008).65 Second, they are able to estimate both the short-term and long-term
effect of an independent variable on a given dependent variable.

A short-term (or

immediate) effect indicates that a change in an independent variable in one time period
produces a change in the dependent variable only in the concurrent time period. By
contrast, a long-term effect expresses dynamic causality and indicates that a shift in an
independent variable in one time period produces a change in the dependent variable over
many time periods.
A single-equation ECM can be expressed in the following way:

ΔYt = α0 + α1Yt-1 + β1ΔXt + β2Xt-1 + εt,

Each independent variable is included in the equation twice, once in its firstdifference form (∆Xt) and once in its lagged level form (Xt-1). The short-term effect of an
independent variable can be determined simply by observing the coefficient for the firstdifference version of the variable (β1). The long-term effect, by contrast, is determined by

64

Results for the time dummies are not reported below but are available from the author upon request.
While ECMs may be applied to both integrated and stationary data, Enns et al. (2014) demonstrate that
cointegration tests only produce correct inferences when the dependent variable is integrated. An augmented
Dickey-Fuller test was conducted on the dependent variables used in this analysis. The null hypothesis that
all panels contain a unit root could not be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level or greater, indicating
that the dependent variables are integrated.
65
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dividing the coefficient for the lagged version of the variable (β2) by the coefficient for the
lagged dependent variable (α1). The latter coefficient is known as the “error correction
rate” and represents the speed at which the independent variable and the dependent variable
arrive back at equilibrium after a shift in the level of the independent variable. For
example, an α1 of -.1 would indicate that 10 percent of the full long-term effect is felt after
one time period, that 10 percent of the remaining long-term effect is felt in the following
time period, and so on. Higher absolute values of α1 indicate a faster movement back to
equilibrium.
I begin by examining the full model of the 90/10 wage ratio separately for the 1980
to 1994 period and the 1995 to 2010 period. Since a version of this wage ratio66 was
employed by the scholars who observed the disappearance of the union effect, we should
find one or more of the union strength measures to have a statistically significant effect in
the earlier time period but not in the latter. The union strength measure(s) found to have a
time-varying effect on wage inequality in these models will in subsequent models be
separately interacted with the level form of the economic globalization index and the level
form of the capital openness measure. The level rather than the first-difference form of
these variables are chosen because the theoretical explanations provided above are in
regard to whether a state is more or less exposed to the global economy; not whether a state
happens to become more or less exposed in a particular year. The interaction terms are
expected to have significant and positive coefficients, indicating that unions become less

66

Golden and Wallerstein (2011) utilize a differenced natural logarithmic version of the 90/10 wage ratio
[ln(p90-p10/p10)]; while Pontusson (2013) examines both the level of the 90/10 wage ratio and the longterm change in the 90/10 wage ratio.
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wage inequality reducing as a state becomes more exposed to the global economy. The
coefficient for the union strength measure that is a component of the interaction terms
informs us of the impact that a one unit increase in this measure has on wage inequality
when both the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure are zero.
Since there are no country-years in which a state has had no actual cross-border flows of
goods, services, investments, and monetary transfers, this result has little substantive
meaning by itself. However, the central contention in this article is that a major cause of
the recent disappearance in the union effect on wage inequality is the increasing exposure
of states to the world economy. Such an argument clearly implies that unions reduce wage
inequality when they are minimally exposed to the global economy. Therefore, we should
expect the coefficient of the union strength measure that is a component of the interaction
terms to have a significant negative sign.
If we assume that the wage gains of lower-paid union workers spillover to low-paid
non-union workers and the wage gains of higher-paid union workers spillover to non-union
workers near the median, then we would expect lower-paid union workers to matter more
for the bottom half of the wage distribution and higher-paid union workers to matter more
for the upper half of the wage distribution.

The employer mechanism hypothesis

anticipates that economic globalization will reduce the wage extraction ability of all union
workers, and thus diminish the union effect on both the 90/50 wage ratio (the upper half of
the wage distribution) and the 50/10 wage ratio (the lower half of the wage distribution).
The intra-union mechanism hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization will almost
exclusively reduce the wage extracting ability of lower-paid union workers, and thus
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condition the union effect on the 50/10 wage ratio to a greater extent than the union effect
on the 90/50 wage ratio. In order to test this expectation, I employ the “skew” variable
(the 90/50 wage ratio divided by the 50/10 wage ratio) conceptualized by Lupu and
Pontusson (2011).

The insider mechanism hypothesis anticipates that economic

globalization will reduce the wages of low-paid non-union workers relative to their
employers as a result of fewer pour over and spillover effects. The 90/10 wage ratio will
be utilized to test this hypothesis, under the assumption that the ninetieth percentile of wage
earners primarily consists of professionals and employers (managers). Finally, the general
hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization will diminish the union effect on all
three wage ratios.

Results
The first two models in Table 6 employ the 90/10 wage ratio to examine whether
the union effect on wage inequality disappeared in recent decades as previous research
suggests. Model 1 focuses exclusively on the 1980 to 1994 period while Model 2 focuses
exclusively on the 1995 to 2010 period. Both models include all of the variables referenced
above but exclude the interaction terms. Only those variables of main theoretical interest
are included in the table.67 The results provide support for the contention that the union
effect on wage inequality disappeared at some point in the 1990s. In the model that covers
the 1980 to 1994 period (Model 1), union density is found to have a negative and
statistically significant long-term effect on wage inequality (p-value = .023). By contrast,

67

See Appendix B for full results.
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Table 6. Determinants of Wage Inequality in 8 Wealthy Democracies, 1980 to 2010
(1980 to 1994; 1995 to 2010)
Model
Years
Countries

Dependent Variable

90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Union Density (t)

Union Density (t-1)

Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t)

Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1)

Δ EG Index

EG Index (t-1)

1
(Full)
19801994
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio
0.139***
(0.030)

2
(Full)
19952010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio

3
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio

4
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/50
Wage
Ratio

5
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 50/10
Wage
Ratio

6
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†

-0.060*

-0.027**

-0.100***

-0.068***

-0.268**

(0.030)

(0.010)

(0.029)

(0.019)

(0.096)

0.005

-0.009

-0.008

-0.004

-0.000

-0.003*

(0.006)

(0.010)

(0.006)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.002)

-0.004**

0.000

-0.004***

-0.006***

-0.002***

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

0.007

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.007)

-0.007

0.008

(0.008)

(0.007)

0.001

-0.002

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.002

-0.004**

-0.002**

-0.001

-0.002***

0.002***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.000**

0.000*

0.000***

-0.000**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Union Density X EG Index (t-1)

Δ Capital Openness (t)

Capital Openness (t-1)

Δ "skew"

-0.009

-0.003

-0.009

0.006

-0.005

0.001

(0.029)

(0.038)

(0.040)

(0.016)

(0.014)

(0.002)

0.001

0.009

-0.030***

-0.003

-0.008*

-0.002

(0.008)

(0.014)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.003)

0.000***

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Union Density X Capital Openness (t1)

N
2

R

106

128

234

234

234

234

0.361

0.248

0.133

0.120

0.163

0.217

(Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)
† Excludes New Zealand (see fn. 60)
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union density does not have a statistically significant long-term (or short-term) effect in
the model that covers the period since 1995 (Model 2). Indeed, the coefficient on the
lagged level version of the union density variable is positive in this model. The level of
wage bargaining is not found to have a significant effect on wage inequality in either Model
1 or Model 2, suggesting that if economic globalization is conditioning the union effect on
wage inequality, it is doing so primarily through union density.
The last four models in Table 6 examine whether economic globalization is
conditioning the union effect. All four models cover the entire 1980 to 2010 period and
include two interaction terms, each consisting of the union strength measure found to have
a time-varying effect on wage inequality in Model 1 and Model 2 (the lagged level version
of the union density variable) and the lagged level version of one of the economic
globalization variables described above; the economic globalization index and the capital
openness measure, respectively. Model 3 is a reduced model of the 90/10 wage ratio,
Model 4 is a reduced model of the 90/50 wage ratio, Model 5 is a reduced model of the
50/10 wage ratio, and Model 6 is a reduced model of the skew variable.68
As anticipated, the union density measure that serves as a component of the
interaction terms is found to have a negative and statistically significant effect (at the 99

68

Since including the interaction terms with all of the control variables would demand a lot of the relatively
small dataset utilized in this analysis, only the results of the reduced models are reported here. These full
models included all of the control variables outlined above along with a union density squared term to control
for the possibility that the union effect on wage inequality has diminished due to the declining union density
levels that have been observed in nearly all wealthy democracies since the 1990s. If a non-interaction control
variable was found to have a statistically significant long-term effect (at the 90 percent confidence level) in
a given full model, both its first-difference and lagged level form were included in the reduced model. If the
first-difference version of a non-interaction control variable was found to have a statistically significant effect
(at the 90 percent confidence level), only this version of the variable was included in the reduced model. The
results of these full models are available from the author upon request.
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percent confidence level) across Models 3, 4, and 5. This signifies that in the hypothetical
situation in which the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure are
zero, unions significantly reduce all three wage ratios.69

The employer mechanism

hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization will weaken the tendency of unions to
reduce both the 90/50 and 50/10 wage ratios. This expectation finds support. The
interaction term containing the economic globalization index is positive and statistically
significant in both Model 4 and Model 5 (at the 90 percent confidence level and 99 percent
confidence level, respectively). The interaction term containing the capital openness
measure is not statistically significant in either model.
In order to examine whether economic globalization conditions the union effect on
the 90/50 and 50/10 wage ratios in a similar manner, Figure 4 plots the marginal union
effect on each of these wage ratios when the capital openness measure is held at its mean
level for the entire 1980 to 2010 period (1.93).70 The x axis in the figure corresponds to
the levels of the economic globalization index observed between 1980 and 2010 in the
countries examined in Table 2. The short dash vertical line signifies the average score of
the economic globalization index in the 1980 to 1994 period; and the long dash vertical
line signifies the average score of the economic globalization index in the 1995 to 2010
period. Broadly, we observe that while economic globalization conditions the union effect

69

The error correction rates in the models of the three wage ratios are statistically significant at the 95 percent
confidence level or greater. The value of these error correction rates inform us that a shift in the level of an
independent variable produces an effect on wage inequality that is incrementally distributed over time and
not fully realized for approximately 37 years in Model 3, approximately 10 years in Model 4, and
approximately 15 years in Model 5.
70
The averages and ranges utilized in this empirical analysis are for the eight countries (Australia, Denmark,
Finland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK, and the US) and time period (1980 to 2010) examined in Models 3
through 6.
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Figure 4. Conditional Effect of Union Density on Wage Inequality Across Range of
Economic Globalization Index and Capital Openness Levels in 8 Wealthy
Democracies, 1980 to 2010
*Estimates derived from Model 4 (left graph) and Model 5 (right graph).
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on both the upper and lower parts of the wage distribution, the impact is much greater on
the latter than the former. The union effect on the 90/50 wage ratio is present until the
economic globalization index reaches 77, substantially higher than the average economic
globalization index score for both the 1980 to 1994 period and the 1995 to 2010 period.
By contrast, the union effect on the 50/10 wage ratio is only present until the economic
globalization index reaches 49, only slightly higher than the average economic
globalization index score in the 1980 to 1994 period and lower than the average economic
globalization index score in the 1995 to 2010 period.

Indeed, when the economic

globalization index exceeds 72, unions are found to significantly increase the 50/10 wage
ratio (at the 95 percent confidence level). In short, although the (traditional) union effect
on the lower half of the wage distribution has disappeared since the 1990s, the union effect
on the upper half of the wage distribution has not.
The finding that economic globalization conditions the union effect on the lower
half of the wage distribution to a greater extent than the union effect on the upper half of
the wage distribution suggests that economic globalization also conditions the union effect
on the “structure” of the wage distribution. Model 6 confirms this intuition. While the
union strength variable that serves as a component of the interaction terms is statistically
insignificant, the interaction term containing the economic globalization index is found to
be negative and statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level). This informs
us that as a state becomes more exposed to the world economy, unions begin to shrink the
upper half of the wage distribution to a greater extent than the lower half. In particular,
when the capital openness measure is held at its mean level for the entire 1980 to 2010
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period, this “anti-skew effect” becomes statistically significant (at the 95 percent
confidence level) as the economic globalization index exceeds 69, a condition that first
existed in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in the 1990s and Australia in 2006. Given that
economic globalization appears to increase the distance between the higher-paid and lowerpaid union effect, the implication is that economic globalization diminishes the willingness
and/or ability of unions to compress the union wage distribution, and thus provides support
for the intra-union hypothesis. The interaction term containing capital openness is not
found to be statistically significant in Model 6.
Finally, the insider mechanism hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization
will weaken the tendency of unions to reduce the 90/10 wage ratio, as low-paid non-union
workers increasingly lose relative to their employers. This expectation finds support in
Model 3, where both the interaction term containing the economic globalization index and
the interaction term containing the capital openness measure are positive and statistically
significant (at the 95 percent confidence level and 99 percent confidence level,
respectively).
Figure 5 plots the marginal union effect on the 90/10 wage ratio at different levels
of the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure, respectively. The
graphs on the top row illustrate the conditioning effect of each of the economic
globalization variables when the other economic globalization variable is held at its mean
level for the 1980 to 1994 period. The graphs on the bottom row illustrate the conditioning
effect of each of the economic globalization variables when the other economic
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Figure 5. Conditional Effect of Union Density on Wage Inequality Across Range of
Economic Globalization Index and Capital Openness Levels in 8 Wealthy
Democracies, 1980 to 1994; 1995 to 2010
*Estimates derived from Model 3.
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globalization variable is held at its mean level for the 1995 to 2010 period.71 The dashed
vertical lines signify the average level of the economic globalization variable along the x
axis for the period covered in the graph.
When the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure are at
their average for the 1980 to 1994 period (46.8 and 1.5, respectively), a one standard
deviation increase in union density (24.2 percentage points) decreases the 90/10 wage ratio
by 1.49, or by about 2.02 standard deviations. This is slightly greater than the difference
between the average level of the 90/10 wage ratio in Sweden (the country with the lowest
average 90/10 wage ratio in the analysis) and the United Kingdom (the county with the
second highest average 90/10 wage ratio in the analysis) for the entire 1980 to 2010 period.
Although the union effect on the 90/10 wage ratio is found to consistently decline between
1980 and 1994, unions still significantly reduce this wage ratio (at the 95 percent
confidence level or higher) at all existing levels of the economic globalization index and
the capital openness measure during this period.

By contrast, when the economic

globalization index and capital openness measures are at their average for the 1995 to 2010
period (63.6 and 2.3, respectively), the effect of a one standard deviation increase in union
density is .7, or .94 standard deviations, less than half of that of the earlier period. This is
now equivalent to the difference in the average level of the 90/10 wage ratio in Sweden
and Australia (the country with the fourth highest average 90/10 wage ratio in the analysis)
for the entire 1980 to 2010 period. Between 1995 and 2010, unions are found to no longer
significantly reduce the 90/10 wage ratio (at the 95 percent confidence level) when the

71

The x axes in Figure 5 correspond to the levels of the economic globalization index and the capital openness
measure, respectively, for the time period covered in the given graph.
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economic globalization index exceeds 71, a condition that existed in four of the eight
countries examined in Table 2 (Australia, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) by the end of
the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Furthermore, while unions continue to

significantly reduce the 90/10 wage ratio at all existing levels of the capital openness
measure between 1995 and 2010, they just barely do so when this measure hits its upper
bound limit (2.46), a condition that existed in seven of the eight countries examined in
Table 6 (the lone exception being Australia) during the entire first decade of the twentyfirst century.
The primary purpose of the interaction terms included here was to determine
whether economic globalization conditions the union effect on wage inequality, but the
inherently symmetrical nature of interaction terms allows us to simultaneously observe
whether unions condition the economic globalization effect on wage inequality as well
(Berry et al. 2012). Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on the economic globalization
index that is a component of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant (at
the 95 percent confidence level or higher) in the models containing the tenth percentile of
wage earners (i.e., Model 3 and Model 5); while, once again, most of the interaction terms
in these models are positive and statistically significant (at the 95 percent level or higher).
These results inform us that economic globalization strengthens the relative economic
position of many of the lowest-paid non-union workers when union density is at low to
moderate levels and that greater union density actually diminishes this negative economic
globalization effect. While the exact mechanisms behind this result will have to be
examined in future research, one tentative explanation is that the higher labor costs that
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greater union density implies may, over time, increase the tendency of domestic employers
to (threaten to) exercise their exit option and/or decrease the desire of foreign investors to
invest in a given host country (Silver 2003). Either or both of these scenarios might be
expected to decrease demand for less skilled labor and thus also lead to greater wage
inequality.
In regard to the control variables, six are found to be statistically significant at the
95 percent confidence level or higher in at least one of the wage ratio models (full results
are reported in Appendix B): immigration, female labor force participation, education,
private service sector employment, and left government. Greater immigration and female
labor force participation increase all three wage ratios, informing us that an influx of
workers competing for lower-paid jobs exacerbates wage inequality generally; a higher
proportion of individuals with a secondary education decreases all three wage ratios,
demonstrating that an increased supply of educated workers reduces the “skill wage
premium”; a higher proportion of individuals in the private service sector decrease the
wage ratios containing wage earners at the ninetieth percentile (i.e., the 90/10 and 90/50
wage ratios), suggesting that expansion in private service sector employment implies a
larger relative supply of low-end service sector jobs (e.g., in retail) than high-end service
sector jobs (e.g., in the legal and medical professions); greater left party participation in
government decreases the wage ratios containing wage earners at the tenth percentile (i.e.,
the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios), providing evidence that partisan policy platforms matter
most for workers at the lower-end of the wage distribution (likely through higher
reservation wages, minimum wages, and investments in education and/or worker training);
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and unemployment significantly reduces the 50/10 wage ratio owing to the
disproportionate number of lower-paid workers losing (gaining) employment when
unemployment rises (falls).72
The models in Table 7 replicate the interaction models in Table 2 but include New
Zealand and the two countries in Group 3 (Germany and Ireland).73 Model 7 replicates
Model 3, Model 8 replicates Model 4, and so on. We once again observe that the union
density measure that serves as a component of the interaction terms (the lagged level
version of the union density variable) is found to have a negative and statistically
significant effect (at the 99 percent confidence level) across all three wage ratios.
Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction terms containing the economic globalization
index remains positive and statistically significant (at the 99 percent confidence level) in
the models of the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios (i.e., Model 7 and Model 9). However, the
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term containing the
economic globalization index has now been replaced by a positive and statistically
significant coefficient on the interaction term containing the capital openness measure in
the model of the 90/50 wage ratio (Model 8), while the same interaction term has turned
statistically insignificant in the model of the 50/10 wage ratio (Model 9).74 These results,

72

Contrary to expectations, the squared union density term has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient (at the 99 percent confidence level) in the model of the 90/50 wage ratio (Model 4). One potential
explanation for this finding is the tendency of unions to increasingly represent higher-paid workers as
unionization declines (see Han and Castater 2014 and Castater and Han 2015).
73
The private service sector employment and public sector employment data are unavailable for New Zealand
and Germany and thus are dropped from the models in Table 7.
74
In regard to the control variables in the models in Table 7, the most robust findings are for female labor
force participation (long-term positive effect on the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios), left government (longterm negative effect on the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios), and the union density squared term (positive effect
on the 90/50 wage ratio). See Appendix C for full results.
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Table 7. Determinants of Wage Inequality in 11 Wealthy Democracies, 1980 to 2010

Model
Years
Countries
Dependent Variable
90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Union Density (t)

Union Density (t-1)

Δ EG Index

EG Index (t-1)

Union Density X EG Index (t-1)

Δ Capital Openness (t)

Capital Openness (t-1)

Union Density X Capital Openness (t-1)

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

7
(Reduced)
1980-2010
Groups 1,2,&3
Δ 90/10 Wage
Ratio

8
(Reduced)
1980-2010
Groups 1,2,&3
Δ 90/50 Wage
Ratio

9
(Reduced)
1980-2010
Groups 1,2,&3
Δ 50/10 Wage
Ratio

10
(Reduced)
1980-2010
Groups 1,2,&3

-0.040**

-0.042***

-0.079***

-0.165***

(0.014)

(0.009)

(0.025)

(0.048)

0.003

-0.002

0.002

-0.002

(0.005)

(0.001)

(0.003)

(0.002)

-0.005***

-0.004***

-0.002***

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.002

0.000

0.001

-0.000

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

0.000

-0.001

0.001

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.000***

0.000

0.000***

-0.000**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.001

-0.002

0.002

-0.005

(0.039)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.006)

-0.018

-0.012**

0.001

-0.013

(0.020)

(0.004)

(0.011)

(0.008)

0.000

0.000***

-0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

294

294

294

294

0.078

0.065

0.120

0.135

Δ "skew"

-0.002
(0.004)

N
2

R

(Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)
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while moderately different than those reported in Table 6, continue to provide support for
the employer and insider mechanism hypotheses, as an interaction term is found to be
statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level) in all three wage ratio models.75
The results for the skew model (Model 10) are also similar to those observed in Table 6,
as the union density variable that is a component of the interaction terms and the interaction
term containing the capital openness measure remain statistically insignificant while the
coefficient on the interaction term containing the economic globalization index remains
negative and statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level). This finding lends
further support to the intra-union hypothesis, or that the willingness and ability of unions
to reduce wage inequality between union members declines as a country becomes more
exposed to the world economy.

Discussion and Conclusion
Unlike previous scholarship, this article provides a comprehensive explanation of
the conditional nature of the union effect on wage inequality and conducts empirical tests
to determine the validity of the theoretical claims that are offered. I began by identifying
and consolidating the three processes by which unions have been argued to impact wage
inequality, which I labeled the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms. I then
argued that economic globalization – broadly defined as the exposure of states to the world
economy – weakens or alters the expression of each of these mechanisms, and thus also
the union effect on wage inequality more generally.

75

More specifically, economic

However, it should be noted that economic globalization does not significantly reduce any of the wage
ratios in the models in Table 7 at low levels of union density.
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globalization, through its effects on the competitive environment confronted by different
types of employers and union workers, reduces the ability and therefore willingness of
unions to compress the employer/union, union/union, and employer/non-union wage
distributions (and, by implication, the union/non-union wage distribution as well). A series
of single-equation time-series cross-sectional error-correction models including interaction
terms, a set of controls, and different wage ratios provided robust evidence for these
theoretical claims.
Has the union effect on wage inequality disappeared in recent decades? That
depends on what exactly we mean by “the union effect on wage inequality”. While the
union effect has declined in general, unions appear to still be able to impact the upper half
of the wage distribution. Furthermore, as a country becomes more exposed to the global
economy, unions increasingly reduce the “skew” of the wage distribution, or compress the
upper half of the wage distribution to a greater extent than the lower half. Indeed, such a
phenomenon requires a qualification of the general hypothesis provided above, for while
economic globalization was found to reduce the union effect on the extent of wage
inequality, it was also found to increase the union effect on the structure of wage inequality.
Finally, while the union effect on the lower half of the wage distribution apparently
disappears as a country becomes more exposed to the world economy, the evidence
presented here suggests that the union effect on this part of the wage distribution may
actually reverse when a country becomes highly exposed to the world economy. In short,
the meaning of the “the union effect” depends on which aspects of wage inequality are
being considered; and increasingly changes as economic globalization proceeds.
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At first glance, some might infer that such changes in the union effect must be
substantially responsible for the well documented rise in wage inequality across the
wealthy democracies in recent decades. After all, if union strength used to account for
much of the cross-national and over-time variation in wage inequality, with stronger unions
resulting in less wage inequality, and this union effect has diminished or perhaps even
reversed, then wage inequality must be higher than it would have been otherwise.
However, such an interpretation would be neglecting to consider the consistent decline in
union strength over the last three decades.76 This trend suggests, to the contrary, that union
decline is no longer contributing to the rise in wage inequality, and, in some cases, may
even be decreasing wage inequality. What accounts for this latter phenomenon is not
exactly clear, although it is likely related to the increasingly precarious nature of much low
wage non-union employment.
While the union effect on wage inequality is in most cases diminishing, this does
not necessarily mean that the union effect on other aspects of economic inequality is also
diminishing; or that union membership is providing fewer (relative) benefits to individual
workers.

Indeed, the theoretical arguments outlined here suggest that as economic

globalization expands, unions should matter more for the employment security of workers
in lower-paid jobs and continue to matter for the wages of workers in traditionally higherpaid jobs. Furthermore, in an age of “permanent austerity”, unions may be increasingly
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As a number of scholars have noted, union density began a sharp decline across most wealthy democracies
in the early 1980s after climbing steadily throughout much of the post-World War II period. While several
European countries initially escaped this fate, the ICTWSS database informs us that by the first decade of the
twenty-first century, every wealthy democracy included in Table 5 with the exception of Belgium (and
perhaps Norway) was experiencing such a decline.
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important for the provision of fringe benefits, such as those relating to healthcare and
retirement. Under what conditions unions are willing and able to provide such nonmonetary benefits to their workers has received surprisingly little attention in the political
science literature, but is certainly worthy of future research.
A broad implication of this study is that because unions and the workers they
represent are situated within a particular environmental context, there is unlikely to ever
be an “independent” union effect that is constant across space and time. The union effect
on wage inequality and other socio-economic outcomes is likely to be influenced by a range
of factors in addition to economic globalization, such as those relating to political
globalization (e.g., European integration), the partisan or ideological orientation of
government, and the congruence between public opinion and the traditional union agenda
of greater wage compression and redistribution (Beckfield 2006; Scheve and Stasavage
2009; Jacobs and Myers 2014; Castater 2015). Further work needs to be done to determine
under what conditions particular union members or union organizations are able to achieve
their distributional goals, as well as under what conditions these goals may be altered.
Before concluding, it is important to note three clear shortcomings of this analysis.
First, data limitations restricted most of the empirical analysis to a relatively small subset
of wealthy democracies and the 1980 to 2010 period. Therefore, we cannot state with
confidence that economic globalization has conditioned the union effect across all wealthy
democracies, or that union strength translated into less wage inequality throughout most of
the post-World War II period (as the argument presented here clearly implies). Second,
the theoretical expectations outlined above are built on strong micro-foundations that
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cannot be directly tested with macro-level data such as that used here. Therefore, additional
empirical analyses, utilizing survey data and multi-level models, will need to be conducted
to more fully determine the validity of the theoretical claims. Third, while arguing that
economic globalization is substantially responsible for the diminished union effect on wage
inequality, I have implicitly assumed that the job profile of union workers is more or less
constant across countries and over-time.

However, a growing body of research

demonstrates the dubious nature of this assumption. Most relevant for this analysis, recent
evidence indicates that unions are increasingly representing higher-skilled and better paid
workers (Beecher and Pontusson 2011; Han and Castater 2014; Castaer and Han 2015).77
This implies a further weakening of the intra-union mechanism and a growing tendency of
the insider mechanism to increase wage inequality. Furthermore, the limited data available
on the sectoral composition of national union movements reveals a profound shift in the
types of sectors that are unionized. Increasingly, unions are representing fewer workers in
the traditional union stronghold of manufacturing and representing more workers in the
sheltered public sector.78 This would suggest that the tendency of economic globalization
to condition the union effect on wage inequality in the way described here is probably
fading, although a different type of mediating role for economic globalization (through
downward pressure on tax rates and government expenditures) may very well be growing
stronger.
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For other work on cross-national and over-time variation in the composition of union movements, see
Iversen and Soskice 2009; Nijhuis 2009; Visser and Checchi 2009; and Castater and Han 2015.
78
According to the ICTWSS database, manufacturing union density and public sector union density were
almost identical, on average, across the wealthy democracies in the 1980s. However, between the 1980s and
2000s, the average manufacturing union density level declined by over 20 percent while the average public
sector union density level rose by nearly 5 percent. This occurred at the same time that manufacturing
employment was falling relative to public sector employment.
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CHAPTER IV
GENDERING THE UNION EFFECT ON WAGE INEQUALITY
Introduction
One of the few areas of broad consensus in the comparative political economy
literature is that stronger unions translate into less wage inequality. Indeed, the rapid
decline in union density (the proportion of workers that belong to a union) and the
decentralization of wage bargaining institutions are among the most commonly cited
explanations for the rise in aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies in recent
decades (Wallerstein 1999; Freeman and Oostendorp 2000; Rueda and Pontusson 2000;
Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Martin and Swank 2012). Receiving
far less attention, however, has been whether certain types of union workers have
undergone a more substantial decline than others. Most relevant to us here is evidence that
male unionization has fallen substantially more than female unionization; and that a large
and growing share of union members are women as a result.79 If female unionization
reduces female wage inequality to the same extent as male unionization reduces male wage
inequality, then this would imply that aggregate union decline has contributed not only to
a rise in wage inequality in general, but to a rise in male wage inequality in particular. Yet
occupational segregation across the wealthy democracies suggests that the union effect on
female wage inequality may in fact differ from the union effect on male wage inequality;
and different degrees and types of such segregation across liberal market economies

79

Data on female and male union density is presented below.
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(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) as well as liberal, conservative, and
social democratic welfare states (Sainsbury 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999; Chang 2000;
Korpi 2000; Soskice 2005), further suggest that the size of the difference between the union
effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on male wage inequality may depend
on which of these regime types unions are situated within.
To assess whether there are differences within and across market institution and
welfare state regimes in the union effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on
male wage inequality, I utilize European Values Study survey data and conduct a timeseries cross-sectional analysis of 15 wealthy democracies between 1980 and 2010. The
evidence I present demonstrates that the union effect on female wage inequality and the
union effect on male wage inequality are substantially determined by a product of market
institution and welfare state design – the occupational composition of female and male
union members.

In particular, the union effect on female wage inequality is less

widespread than the union effect on male wage inequality in LMEs (with liberal welfare
states) – the regime in which workers in professional occupations are particularly well
represented among female union members; while the union effect on female wage
inequality is more substantial than the union effect on male wage inequality in CMEs with
conservative welfare states – the regime in which workers in traditionally lower-paid
occupations are particularly well represented among female union members. Nonetheless,
union effects are generally more widespread and substantial in CMEs with conservative
welfare states than either LMEs or CMEs with social democratic welfare states. These
findings suggest that the consequences of union decline for aggregate economic inequality
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and gender economic inequality depend (indirectly) on the market institution and welfare
state regime that such union decline is occurring within.
This article is divided into five sections. The first section provides descriptive
statistics on female and male union strength. The second section generates hypotheses of
a conditional union effect on female and male wage inequality that is dependent on market
institution and welfare state regime type. The third section provides information on the
dependent variables, estimation strategy, and independent variables employed in the
empirical analysis. The fourth section reports the results of the empirical analysis and the
fifth section includes a discussion of the findings.

Gender-Specific Union Strength
As mentioned at the outset, there is a broad consensus in the comparative political
economy literature that stronger unions result in less wage inequality; and that union
weakening is a primary explanation for the rise in aggregate wage inequality in the wealthy
democracies in recent decades (e.g., see Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Kahn
2000; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Londregan 2006;
Oliver 2008; Martin and Swank 2012). One of the most common measures for union
strength in this literature is union density, or the proportion of employed individuals that
belong to a union. In order to examine whether union weakening has been equally
distributed among women and men, Figure 6 utilizes data from the Institutional
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts
(ICTWSS) to separately plot the level of female union density (the proportion of female
workers that belong to a union) and male union density (the proportion of male workers
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Figure 6. Female and Male Union Membership in 17 Wealthy Democracies by
Decade Average, 1970s to 2000s
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that belong to a union) as well as the proportion of all union members that are female for
17 wealthy democracies by country-decade average.80 The plots demonstrate that male
union density has experienced a sharper and steadier decline than female union density;
and that these union density trends have contributed to an increasing share of union
members that are female. Indeed, by the 2000s, seven countries (Canada, Denmark,
Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) – all of them LMEs or
CMEs with social democratic welfare states - had higher female than male union density;
and five of these countries (Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom) had a union membership that was majority female. While these trends certainly
suggest that aggregate union decline has contributed more to a rise in male wage inequality
than female wage inequality, the extent to which this is so will depend on the relative
magnitude of the union effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on male wage
inequality.

Variation in the Union Effect
Unions have been argued to impact wage inequality through three interrelated
processes; or what I term here the employer81, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.82 The
employer mechanism refers to the process of unions extracting wage concessions from
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Female and male union density data are unavailable for France and Italy and the proportion of union
members that are female data are unavailable for France.
81
In this context, “employer” refers not only to actual business owners, but also top managers (e.g., chief
executive officers or high level bureaucrats) that may or may not have an ownership stake in a firm but
nonetheless formulate and implement policies relating to employee compensation.
82 The focus here is on how unions impact wage inequality “directly”, or through employer-union and intraunion negotiations. However, unions impact wage inequality “indirectly” as well by supporting (or opposing)
particular political parties, politicians, and public policies.
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employers (Stephens 1980; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Korpi 1985; Mishel 1986; Bradley
et al. 2003; Checci et al. 2007); the intra-union mechanism refers to the process of unions
compressing wages among their own members (Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998;
Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002; Card et al. 2003; Checci et al. 2007; Hall and
Thelen 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2010); and the insider mechanism refers to the process
of union wage gains producing (positive or negative) externalities (Freeman 1980;
Friedman 1962; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Card et al. 2003; Rueda and Pontusson 2000;
Wallerstein and Western 2000; Rosenfeld and Western 2012). While distinct theoretical
propositions, these three mechanisms are neither independent from one another nor are
they mutually exclusive; as the intra-union mechanism implies that less-paid union workers
have extracted greater wage gains from their employers than better-paid union workers83
and the insider mechanism is the product of externalities resulting from any such union
wage gains.
Despite the broad (implicit) consensus that the net result of the employer, intraunion, and insider mechanisms is to reduce wage inequality, a growing body of evidence
indicates that the magnitude of this union effect differs across countries and over time; and
that circumstances exist in which this union effect is not present at all (Becher and
Pontusson 2011; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013; Han and Castater 2014).
One explanation for the varying union effect is differences in the occupational composition
of unions (Becher and Pontusson 2011; Han and Castater 2014). In particular, unions

83

It is difficult to imagine a sustainable union movement in which lower-paid union workers achieve relative
gains exclusively or even primarily by extracting wage gains from higher-paid union workers, the latter of
which would then experience not only relative but also (substantial) absolute losses as a result of union
membership.
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dominated by workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations are expected to reduce wage
inequality more than unions dominated by workers in traditionally better-paid occupations.
Most obviously, this is because unions with fewer workers in traditionally lower-paying
jobs means fewer numbers of such workers experiencing wage gains relative to (union and
non-union) employers and (union and non-union) workers in traditionally better-paying
jobs. While accurate, this rather straightforward reasoning may actually underestimate the
influence of union occupational composition on the union effect; as union composition
helps determine the wage gains of specific types of union workers.
One of the primary expressions of the intra-union mechanism is union workers in
traditionally lower-paid occupations extracting larger wage gains from employers than
union workers in traditionally higher-paid occupations (Pontusson et al. 2002; Card et al.
2003).84 This phenomenon is explained as the result of the solidaristic norms within union
organizations (Wallerstein 1999), union workers in traditionally higher-paying jobs
practicing wage restraint in return for generous social insurance policies (Iversen and
Soskice 2010), and/or the democratic nature of union organizations (Pontusson et al. 2002;
Checci et al. 2007). It is through this last route that we would expect union occupational
composition to matter most for the relative wage gains of different types of union workers.
Prior to negotiating with employers, unions develop particular wage bargaining goals (e.g.,
regarding wage levels for certain occupational categories) through internal compromise
between different types of union workers (Carruth and Oswald 1987). Since unions are
relatively democratic organizations, these compromises need to consider the preferences

84

The other primary expression of the intra-union mechanism is the provision of equal pay for equal work
(Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998).
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of different types of union workers (Pontusson et al. 2002; Checci et al. 2007). As one
might expect, union workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations generally favor (intraunion) wage compression more than union workers in traditionally better-paid occupations
(Hall and Thelen 2007; Oliver 2008; Iversen and Soskice 2010; Becher and Pontusson
2011; Han and Castater 2014). How these preferences are aggregated into collective action
depends on several factors, including the formal decision-making rules within the union
and the unions’ institutional culture (Baccaro and Lim 2007; Checci et al. 2007; Ahlquist
and Levi 2013). Nonetheless, a reasonable assumption is that wage agreements better
reflect the preferences of a particular occupational group when that group has substantial
representation within the union - both in absolute terms and relative to other occupational
groups with different preferences. Thus, we would expect unions dominated by workers in
traditionally lower-paid occupations to produce more egalitarian wage bargaining
agreements than unions dominated by workers in traditionally better-paid occupations.

Gender Occupational Segregation and Union Composition
While all wealthy democracies exhibit substantial gender occupational segregation, or a
large proportion of workers employed in occupations dominated by one sex (Anker et al.
2003), the form and extent of this segregation differ substantially across market institutions
and welfare state types. CMEs, which are characterized as consisting of workers with
“specific skills”, strong employment protections, and a large public sector, generate greater
gender occupational segregation than LMEs, which are characterized as consisting of
workers with “general skills”, weak employment protections, and a small public sector
(Estevez-Abe 2006). To a greater extent than their counterparts in LMEs, women in CMEs
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are overrepresented in low-end private service sector occupations85 and underrepresented
in managerial positions (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2011).86

However, among CMEs,

substantial variation exists between those with social democratic and conservative welfare
states. Social democratic welfare states, which include robust active labor market policies,
publicly provided childcare services, paid maternity and paternity leave, and strong gender
equality norms, produce more well-educated and higher earning women than conservative
welfare states, which include “labor clearing” policies, financial support only for female
caregivers, and norms accepting of a gendered division of labor (Sainsbury 1996; EspingAndersen 1999; Chang 2000; Korpi 2000; Soskice 2005).
The differences in gender occupational segregation across market institutions and
welfare states suggests that differences may also exist across regimes in the occupational
composition of female and male union members, and thus also the female and male union
effect. Of most relevance in this regard is the degree of vertical gender occupational
segregation within unions, or the extent to which lower-paid (higher-paid) occupations are
better represented among female or male union members. To explore this matter, Table 8
includes data from the European Values Study (EVS) on the types of occupations held by
female and male union members with countries separated by regime type.87 The survey

It is argued that “women-specific risks” – namely, career interruptions due to family caregiving – produce
a disincentive for women to acquire (less portable) “specific skills” and for employers to hire women for jobs
that require such skills (Estevez-Abe 2006).
86
It is argued that the restrictions on working hours present in many CMEs exacerbate gender-based
discrimination in the selection of managers, as women are unable to demonstrate a commitment to the firm
(rather than family caring responsibilities) by working long hours.
87
For the market institution and welfare state types, I utilize the country classifications put forth by Iversen
and Stephens (2008), with two minor modifications. First, I rename their “Christian Democratic” welfare
state “Conservative”. Second, following Esping-Andersen (1990), I categorize Japan as a conservative
welfare state, rather than leaving it outside of the welfare state typology.
85
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Table 8. Female and Male Union Composition and Union Density (by Occupation
Type) in 14 Wealthy Democracies

Country

%
Union
Professional
(Women)

%
Union
Professio
nal
(Men)

%
Union
LowerPaid
(Women)

%
Union
LowerPaid
(Men)

Union
Density
Profession
al
(Women)

Union
Density
Professio
nal
(Men)

Union
Density
LowerPaid
(Women)

Union
Density
LowerPaid
(Men)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

17

28.2

43.7

17

12.2

6.5

24

15.1

29.9

27.6

15.6

20.1

6.5

19

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

14.9

32

23

20.2

15.9

8.1

20.1

44.5

12.3

7

11.3

17.4

4.7

8.4

35.9

22.9

25.6

25.3

16

16.4

6.5

17.9

1

1.8

62.5

40.1

3.4

6

20.2

31.8

4.3

6.2

33.5

28.9

5.2

8.9

13.7

24.1

2

1.4

47.5

27.6

7.1

4.6

15.6

29.1

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

11.5

14.1

16.5

8.9

22.9

26.2

11.4

22.4

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

4.7

5.9

40

26.4

9.7

11.4

15.2

26.9

LMEs
(Liberal)
Australia
Canada

43.7

Ireland

26.7

New
Zealand
United
King. †
United
States
LME Avg.

NA
24
49.2

CMEs
(Cons)
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Japan
Nether/
Switz.
CME
(Cons)
Avg.
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Table 8. Continued.

Country

%
Union
Profession
al
(Women)

%
Union
Profession
al
(Men)

%
Union
LowerPaid
(Women
)

%
Union
Lower
-Paid
(Men)

Union
Density
Profession
al
(Women)

Union
Density
Profession
al (Men)

Union
Density
LowerPaid
(Women
)

Union
Densit
y
Lower
-Paid
(Men)

3.7

26.9

23.3

14.2

26.7

42.7

58.4

CMEs (Social Democratic)
Denmark

1.3

Finland

7.6

5.6

17

9

45.8

37.5

43.6

38.4

Norway

11.4

16.5

22.7

14.4

49.3

38.9

35.7

42.3

Sweden
CME (SD)
Avg.

7.4

9.5

11.8

10.8

59.8

43.6

70.3

68.8

6.9

8.8

19.6

14.4

42.3

36.7

48.1

52

CME Avg.

5.8

7.4

29.8

20.4

26

24.1

31.7

39.4

Mixed (Conservative)
France

14.3

20.7

21.5

15

9.4

12.2

2.6

7.6

Italy
Mixed
Avg.

32.2

13.6

12.9

29.3

11.8

6.6

3.2

13.7

23.3

17.2

17.2

22.2

10.6

9.4

2.9

10.7

Total Avg.

16.9

13.2

26.8

22

20.9

19.8

20.3

29.2

The presented statistics are averages for each country using all available observations between 1981 and
1999.
† Data do not include Northern Ireland.
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data includes all available observations for 14 wealthy democracies88 over the 1981 to 1999
period.89 Columns 1 and 2 consist of averages of the proportion of female and male union
members, respectively, that are in professional occupations; and columns 3 and 4 consist
of averages of the proportion of female and male union members, respectively, that are in
traditionally lower-paid occupations.90 Since the effect of the occupational composition of
union members on wage inequality is partly determined by the composition of union
members relative to non-union members, columns 5 and 6 consist of union density
averages for female and male workers, respectively, in professional occupations and
columns 7 and 8 consist of union density averages for female and male workers,
respectively, in traditionally lower-paid occupations.
In general, we observe larger differences in the occupational composition of union
members across regimes than between female and male union members within each
regime, although some significant gender-based intra-regime differences do exist.91 By far

88

Data is not available for Australia, New Zealand, Japan, or Switzerland for the survey waves examined
here (see fn. 90).
89
The EVS conducted four waves of surveys between 1981 and 2008; in 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2008. In
2008, however, the potential answers to the question regarding the respondent’s job type changed
substantially (see variables x036 and x036d in the EVS Longitudinal Data File 1981 – 2008). Since the
number of respondents that answer that they belong to a trade (labor) union (variable a067) may be relatively
small in a particular country in a given wave and the 2008 survey does not cover countries outside of Europe,
I have chosen to pool together the three waves between 1981 and 1999 and exclude the fourth wave from the
analysis.
90
The EVS asks respondents whether they belong to a trade (labor) union (variable a067) and what type of
job they hold in their particular profession or industry (variable x036). Respondents answering “yes” to the
first question and “employer/manager” or “professional worker” to the second question are categorized here
as union workers in professional occupations; and respondents answering “yes” to the first question and
“junior level non-manual”, “semi-skilled manual”, or “unskilled manual” to the second question are
categorized here as union workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations.
91
Since there are no female or male union density data available for the mixed market economies (with
conservative welfare states) (France and Italy), these countries will be excluded from the forthcoming
discussion and the empirical models to follow. Nonetheless, in terms of the occupational composition of
female and male union members and the occupation-specific female and male union density, we can observe
in Table 8 that mixed market economies most closely resemble LMEs.
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the largest share of union members that are in professional occupations can be found in
LMEs (with liberal welfare states). In this regime, professionals consist of over one-third
of female union members and one-fifth of male union members. In no other regime do
professionals consist of even one-tenth of female or male union members. However,
traditionally lower-paid workers do have a sizable presence within unions in this regime,
representing approximately one-fourth of both female and male union members. We
observe by far the largest class imbalance in union membership in CMEs with conservative
welfare states, where female union members in traditionally lower-paid occupations
outnumber female union members in professional occupations by over eight to one and
male union members in traditionally lower-paid occupations outnumber male union
members in professional occupations by over four to one. In CMEs with social democratic
welfare states, the proportion of professionals and workers in traditionally lower-paid
occupations among union workers is relatively low for both women and men (although the
union density level for each of these gender-specific occupational groupings is relatively
high), suggesting that union members consist of a large share of workers in traditionally
medium-paid occupations within this regime.92
If unions with a large absolute and relative presence of workers in traditionally
lower-paid (professional) occupations reduce wage inequality the most (least); and this
tendency is strengthened when unions disproportionately represent traditionally lower-paid
(professional) workers, the observations derived from the EVS data lead us to different

92

The remaining difference in the proportion of union members (after taking professional and traditionally
lower-paid workers into account) does not entirely consist of workers in traditionally medium-paid
occupations, as union members may also consist of the unemployed or retirees (Western 1997; Anderson and
Lynch 2007).
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expectations regarding the relative size of the union effect on female and male wage
inequality depending on regime type. On the one hand, the union effect on male wage
inequality is likely to be greater than the union effect on female wage inequality in LMEs
– as there are fewer professionals among male union members than female union members
within this regime. On the other hand, the union effect on female wage inequality is likely
to be greater than the union effect on male wage inequality in CMEs with conservative
welfare states – as there are more workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations among
female union members than male union members within this regime.93 The relatively low
levels of both professional and traditionally lower-paid workers among union members in
CMEs with social democratic welfare states does not lend itself to any clear expectations
regarding differences in the union effect within that regime. Therefore, two hypotheses
regarding intra-regime differences are offered:

Hypothesis 1: The union effect on male wage inequality is greater than the union effect on
female wage inequality in LMEs

93

The precise method by which we would expect the union effect on female wage inequality and the union
effect on male wage inequality to differ within a particular market institution and welfare state regime
depends on the extent to which wage bargaining agreements are produced by unions that disproportionately
represent one gender (as a consequence of individual unions representing female and/or male dominated
occupations). If wage bargaining agreements are the product of unions that substantially represent both
female and male workers, then any difference in the union effect on female wage inequality and the union
effect on male wage inequality will be because female (male) union workers disproportionately benefit from
a particular wage bargaining agreement. If, instead, wage bargaining agreements are the product of unions
that disproportionately represent one gender (which is perhaps often the case given substantial horizontal and
vertical gender occupational segregation), then the union effect on female wage inequality and the union
effect on male wage inequality will differ because of distinct female-dominated union and male-dominated
union bargaining agreements.
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Hypothesis 2: The union effect on female wage inequality is greater than union effect on
male wage inequality in CMEs with conservative welfare states

Given the particularly large class imbalance among both female and male union
members in CMEs with conservative welfare states, a third hypothesis focusing on interregime differences is also offered:

Hypothesis 3: The union effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on male
wage inequality are greater in CMEs with conservative welfare states than in LMEs or
CMEs with social democratic welfare states

Data and Methods
Female and Male Wage Inequality
The dependent variables most commonly employed in studies examining the
determinants of aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies are three ratios
including the wages of full-time dependent employees provided by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): the ratio of the ninetieth percentile
earning to that of the tenth percentile earning (90/10 ratio), the ratio of the ninetieth
percentile earning to that of the median earning (90/50 ratio), and the ratio of the median
earning to that of the tenth percentile earning (50/10 ratio). A wage ratio with a larger
value signifies a greater distance between those with higher and lower earnings, and thus
higher wage inequality. It should be stated explicitly that these measures focus exclusively
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on income from labor and do not explicitly measure the earnings at the very top or very
bottom of the earnings distribution (e.g., the top or bottom 1 percent). In other words, the
data do not capture the earnings of many top managers (who may have earnings above the
ninetieth percentile) or marginalized workers (who may have earnings below the tenth
percentile).

Furthermore, because this variable includes only full-time dependent

employees, it necessarily excludes business owners, the unemployed, the self-employed,
and part-time workers. For these reasons, the three wage ratios almost certainly and
substantially understate the extent of economic inequality in wealthy democracies.
The OECD provides three different versions of each wage ratio, one that includes
only women, one that includes only men, and another that pools together women and men.
Previous analyses of the determinants of wage inequality have focused exclusively on the
pooled wage data. This analysis will instead focus exclusively on the gender-specific wage
data. To examine whether there are substantial differences between female and male wage
inequality, Figure 7 provides graphical depictions and correlation coefficients for the level
and first-difference (year over year change) form of each like female and male wage ratio
for the 18 wealthy democracies94 typically examined in time-series cross-sectional analyses
of the determinants of aggregate wage inequality. Included are all available observations
for these countries between 1980 and 2010.
The levels of each wage ratio are found to be strongly and positively correlated,
with the correlation coefficient ranging from .884 for the 50/10 wage ratios to .945 for the

94

The 18 Countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
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Figure 7. Bivariate Correlations of the Female and Male 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10
Wage Ratios, Respectively, in their Level and First-Difference (Year to Year
Change) Form
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90/10 wage ratios. However, a quite different result is found for the first-difference form
of the variable. Here, the correlation coefficients range from a meager .019 for the 90/50
wage ratios to only a moderately stronger .273 for the 50/10 wage ratios. The very different
coefficients for the level and first-difference forms of the wage ratios could be interpreted
as informing us that countries with relatively high (low) levels of female wage inequality
also have relatively high (low) levels of male wage inequality, but the extent of the annual
increase or decrease of female (male) wage inequality tells us little, if anything, about the
extent of the annual increase or decrease in male (female) wage inequality. This would
suggest that, controlling for country specific features, female and male wage inequality
have different determinants and/or are impacted by particular factors in dissimilar ways,
and thus it is appropriate to model each of these wage distributions separately. Summary
data for the female and male wage ratios are included in Appendix D.

Estimation Strategy

Due to limitations in the gender-specific union density and wage ratio data, the
empirical analysis is restricted to 15 wealthy democracies95 between 1980 and 2010.96 To

95

The 15 countries examined are those 18 included in fn. 95 minus France, Italy, and Switzerland. These
three countries do not have any overlapping union density and wage ratio data and thus are automatically
dropped from the regression analysis.
96
A majority of the countries in the analysis only have overlapping gender-specific union density and wage
ratio data after 1990, and only four countries – Australia, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – have
overlapping union density and wage ratio data before 1980. In an effort to maintain a maximum number of
observations while diminishing any possible bias toward particular countries, the empirical analysis has been
restricted to the 1980 to 2010 period. Nonetheless, empirical analyses of the 1975 to 2010 and 1990 to 2010
periods provide substantively similar (although not identical) results to those reported below. Results are
available from the author upon request.
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examine the (conditional) effect of female and male union strength and other socioeconomic and political factors on female and male wage inequality, I utilize the singleequation time-series cross-sectional error correction model (ECM), the seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR) model, and the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator
ECMs are flexible time-series models that have at least two advantages over other
statistical models. First, they can be applied to both integrated and stationary data (DeBoef
and Keele 2008).97 Second, they are able to estimate both the short-term and long-term
effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable. A short-term (or immediate)
effect indicates that a change in an independent variable in one time period produces a
change in the dependent variable only in the concurrent time period. By contrast, a longterm effect expresses dynamic causality and indicates that a shift in an independent variable
in one time period produces a change in the dependent variable over many time periods.
A single-equation ECM can be expressed in the following way:

ΔYt = α0 + α1Yt-1 + β1ΔXt + β2Xt-1 + εt,

Each independent variable is included in the equation twice, once in its firstdifference form (∆Xt) and once in its lagged level form (Xt-1). The short-term effect of an
independent variable can be determined simply by observing the coefficient for the first-

97

While ECMs may be applied to both integrated and stationary data, Enns et al. (2014) demonstrate that
cointegration tests only produce correct inferences when the dependent variable is integrated. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests were conducted on each of the dependent variables in this analysis (the female and male
90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 wage ratios, respectively). In every case, the null hypothesis that all panels contain
a unit root (i.e., are integrated) could not be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level or greater.
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difference version of the variable (β1). The long-term effect, by contrast, is determined by
dividing the coefficient for the lagged version of the variable (β2) by the coefficient for the
lagged dependent variable (α1). The latter coefficient is known as the “error correction
rate” and represents the speed at which the independent variable and the dependent variable
arrive back at equilibrium after a shift in the level of the independent variable. For
example, an α1 of -.1 would indicate that 10 percent of the full long-term effect is felt after
one time period, that 10 percent of the remaining long-term effect is felt in the following
time period, and so on. Higher absolute values of α1 indicate a faster movement back to
equilibrium.
A SUR model allows us to employ sample information in one regression to improve
the precision of the parameter estimates in other regressions. This can be done when the
error terms in multiple regressions exhibit contemporaneous cross-equation error
correlation, each regression contains a different dependent variable, and there is at least
one unlike independent variable across the regressions (Zellner 1962; Moon and Peron
2006; Zellner 2006).98 The latter two conditions are met by our use of six distinct
dependent variables (the female and male versions of the 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 wage
ratios, respectively) and multiple gender specific independent variables (union density,
unemployment, and education). The first condition is met with the result of a BreuschPagan test, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the regression errors are
independent (at the 99 percent confidence level).

98

SUR models reduce to single-equation estimators when the error terms in the two or more equations are
uncorrelated (Zellner 2006).
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Finally, the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator provides valid hypothesis
tests in the presence of any pattern of correlation within units (countries), including serial
correlation and correlation due to unmodeled country-specific factors (Rogers 1994).
However, this estimator also assumes that errors are uncorrelated between units. This
assumption could be violated if there are unmodeled factors that impact wage inequality in
all or most countries at a particular point in time (Huber et al. 2006). In order to address
this possibility, dummy variables representing each decade are included in the analyses.99

Main Independent Variables

Each model in the empirical analysis will contain four interaction terms: the firstdifference and lagged level form of the gender-specific union density variable each
separately interacted with a dummy variable for CMEs with social democratic welfare
states (Δ Union Density X CME (SD) and Union Density (t-1) X CME (SD)) and a dummy
variable for LMEs (Δ Union Density X LME (Lib.) and Union Density (t-1) X LME (Lib)).
Since CMEs with conservative welfare states serve as the baseline category, the
coefficients on the non-interacted first-difference and lagged level union density variables
inform us of the short- and long-term effect, respectively, of gender-specific union density
within this regime. The coefficients on the interaction terms containing the dummy for
CMEs with social democratic welfare states inform us of the difference between the union
effect in CMEs with social democratic welfare states and CMEs with conservative welfare

99

Results for the time dummies are not reported below but are available from the author upon request.
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states; while the coefficients on the interaction terms containing the dummy for LMEs
inform us of the difference between the union effect in LMEs and CMEs with conservative
welfare states.100
In an effort to make the investigation as expansive as possible, three aspects of the
results will be considered when determining whether a particular hypothesis has or has not
received empirical support. First, the direction, statistical significance, and magnitude of
the interaction terms. This will inform us of the difference between the union effect in
CMEs with conservative welfare states and the union effect in each of the other two
regimes (for a given gender-specific wage ratio). Second, the direction and statistical
significance of the union effect in each regime in each model (determined via marginal
effects). This will inform us of whether a statistically significant union effect exists for a
particular gender on a specific wage ratio but not the other gender on the same (but genderspecific) wage ratio. Third, the magnitude of statistically significant union effects on each
like wage ratio within each regime. This will inform us of whether the substantive union
effect is greater for a particular gender on a given (but gender-specific) wage ratio.

100

CMEs with conservative welfare states were chosen as the baseline category to provide an easily
identifiable test of Hypothesis 3, which anticipates the coefficients on the union variables that serve as
components of the interaction terms to be negative and statistically significant and the coefficients on the
interaction terms to be positive and statistically significant. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the statistical
significance and magnitude of the union effects in each regime are not affected by which regime serves as
the baseline category.
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Control Variables

The other socio-economic and political factors considered in this analysis are those
that are typically included in models of aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies:
the level of wage bargaining, international trade, national wealth, service sector
employment, unemployment, female labor force participation, education, immigration, and
left party participation in government.101 Theoretical expectations102, data measurement,
and sources for all variables can be found in Appendix E.

Results
Table 9 contains “full” models of the female and male 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 wage
ratios, respectively. These models include all of the socio-economic and political factors
outlined above (including the dummy variables for LMEs and CMEs with social
democratic welfare states) but exclude the interaction terms. The odd numbered models
are of female wage inequality and the even numbered models are of male wage inequality.
Only the gender-specific union variables and those found to be statistically significant (at
the 90 percent confidence level or higher) are included in the table.103 In terms of the main

101

Public sector employment (public employment as a share of total employment) is another factor typically
included in models of aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies. However, in order to test the
hypotheses outlined above, the statistical models in this article include other (indirect) measures of public
sector employment - dummy variables indicating the presence of particular market institution and welfare
state regimes. Therefore, a unique public sector employment variable is excluded from the analysis.
102
While there are theoretical reasons to suppose that some of these factors will impact the female wage
distribution differently than the male wage distribution, this is less clearly the case with other factors.
Therefore, gender is only explicitly mentioned in the theoretical expectations when there is a strong
theoretical prior that a particular factor has a disproportionate impact on the wage distribution of women or
men.
103
Full results can be found in Appendix F.
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Table 9. Determinants of Female and Male Wage Inequality in 15 Wealthy
Democracies between 1980 and 2010
Model
Gender
(Number of Countries)
Dependent Variable
(Model)
Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)

LME (Lib.)

CME (SD)

Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t)

Δ International Trade

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

Δ Unemployment (t)

Unemployment (t-1)

Female Labor Force Participation (t-

1
Women
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Full)
-0.080***

2
Men
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Full)
-0.090***

3
Women
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Full)
-0.087***

4
Men
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Full)
-0.102***

5
Women
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Full)
-0.081***

6
Men
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Full)
-0.096***

(0.014)
-0.005

(0.014)

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.014)

0.002

-0.004*

-0.000

0.001

0.000

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.002

-0.003**

-0.000

-0.001*

-0.001

-0.001**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

0.055**

0.089***

0.017**

0.024**

0.019*

0.027***

(0.023)

(0.026)

(0.009)

(0.010)

(0.011)

(0.010)

0.033

0.087*

-0.008

0.005

0.031

0.045**

(0.063)

(0.050)

(0.024)

(0.020)

(0.030)

(0.019)

0.015*

-0.004

0.005

-0.005

0.005

0.003

(0.009)

(0.010)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

-0.003**

-0.003**

-0.002***

-0.000

0.000

-0.001**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.022***

0.007

0.012***

0.001

-0.000

0.003

(0.008)

(0.011)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.026***

0.010

0.009***

0.004

0.005

0.002

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.003)

0.002

0.007**

0.000

0.001

0.001

0.003***

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.008*

0.002

0.004**

0.002

0.001

-0.002

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.001

0.008***

0.001

0.002**

-0.002**

0.002**

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

-0.003**

-0.001**

-0.001

0.001

-0.001*

1)

Female (Male) Education (t-1)

Immigration (t-1)

Left Govt. (t-1)

N
R2

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001***

0.000

-0.000

0.000

-0.001***

0.000

(0.000)
225
0.201

(0.001)
225
0.136

(0.000)
225
0.223

(0.000)
225
0.118

(0.000)
225
0.129

(0.000)
225
0.186

(Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)
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variables of theoretical interest, male union density significantly reduces male wage
inequality in the long-term (at the 90 percent confidence level or greater) across all three
male wage ratios but female union density only significantly reduces female wage
inequality in the short-term (at the 90 percent confidence level) in the model of the 90/50
wage ratio. Indeed, this phenomena of a variable impacting female and male wage
inequality in the same general direction but for different wage ratios and/or time horizons
is found for international trade, unemployment, and immigration as well. Three additional
variables – GDP per capita, female labor force participation, and left government – are
found to significantly influence two or more female wage ratios but not any male wage
ratios; while the proportion of individuals with a tertiary education acts to significantly
increase all three male wage ratios but decrease the female 50/10 wage ratio. Not
surprisingly, the dummy variable for LMEs has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient in all six models while the coefficient for the dummy variable for CMEs with
social democratic welfare states is statistically insignificant in five of the six models. This
result indicates that in terms of wage inequality, larger differences exist between market
institutions than welfare states, per se.
Given the relatively small number of observations in each of the models (225), the
interaction terms are added to slimmed down, more efficient models in Table 10.

In

addition to the interaction terms, these “reduced” models include those variables found to
be statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level or greater in the full models in
Table 9.104 Model 7 is the reduced version of Model 1, Model 8 is the reduced version of

104

If a variable has a statistically significant long-term effect, both its first-difference and lagged level form
are included in the reduced models. Furthermore, to keep the results for the female and male wage
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Table 10. Conditional Union Effect on Female and Male Wage Inequality in 15
Wealthy Democracies between 1980 and 2010
Model
Gender
(Number of Countries)
Dependent Variable
(Model)
Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)

LME (Lib.)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X

7

8

9

10

11

12

Women
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.077***

Men
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.095***

Women
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.080***

Men
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.107***

Women
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.084***

Men
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.103***

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.017)

(0.019)

(0.017)

(0.017)

0.035

0.023

0.010

-0.007

0.010

0.020*

(0.026)

(0.029)

(0.010)

(0.016)

(0.012)

(0.010)

-0.004***

-0.005***

-0.001

-0.000

-0.002**

-0.003***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.018

-0.013

0.011

0.053

-0.004

-0.066**

(0.056)

(0.081)

(0.022)

(0.035)

(0.026)

(0.028)

-0.036

-0.016

-0.010

0.009

-0.009

-0.018*

(0.028)

(0.030)

(0.011)

(0.012)

(0.013)

(0.011)

0.001

0.002

0.000

-0.001

0.001

0.002***

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.234***

-0.207*

-0.096***

-0.079*

-0.045

-0.052

(0.096)

(0.107)

(0.037)

(0.042)

(0.044)

(0.040)

-0.043

-0.035

-0.015

0.001

-0.009

-0.022*

(0.028)

(0.032)

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.011)

0.005***

0.005**

0.001**

0.001

0.002*

0.002**

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.004***

-0.003**

-0.002***

-0.000

-0.000

-0.001**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.024***

0.003

0.013***

0.002

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.003)

(0.004)

LME (Lib.)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X
LME (Lib.)

CME (SD)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X
CME (SD)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X
CME (SD)

Δ International Trade

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

distributions as comparable as possible, measures found to be statistically significant in a model of a
particular female (male) wage ratio are included in the reduced model not only for that female (male) wage
ratio but also the like male (female) wage ratio.
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Table 10. Continued.
Model
Gender
(Number of Countries)
Dependent Variable
(Model)
Δ Unemployment (t)

Unemployment (t-1)

Female (Male) Education (t-1)

Immigration (t-1)

Left Govt. (t-1)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) LME

7
Women
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.023***

8
Men
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.006

9
Women
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.008***

10
Men
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.005

11
Women
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.004

12
Men
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.001

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.002)

0.000

0.004**

0.000

0.002**

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.002

0.005*

0.001

0.001

-0.002**

0.002*

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

-0.003**

-0.001***

-0.001*

0.000

-0.001*

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001***

-0.000

-0.001***

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.001

0.007

-0.000

0.002

0.001

0.001

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.003)

-0.002**

-0.003**

-0.001

-0.001**

-0.001

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.008

-0.012

-0.006*

-0.006

0.001

-0.002

(0.008)

(0.011)

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.001

-0.000

0.001

0.001

-0.000

-0.001**

(0.001)
225
0.222

(0.001)
225
0.145

(0.000)
225
0.236

(0.000)
225
0.127

(0.001)
225
0.134

(0.000)
225
0.191

(Lib.)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) LME
(Lib.)
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) CME
(SD)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) CME
(SD)

N
R2

(Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)
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Model 2, and so on. Once again, only the gender-specific union variables and those found
to be statistically significant (at the 90 percent confidence level or higher) are included in
the table.105 Beginning with the error correction rates, we observe that all six are significant
at the 99 percent confidence level. The values of the error correction rates inform us that
a shift in the level of an independent variable produces an effect on female and male wage
inequality that is incrementally distributed over time and not fully realized for
approximately 9 to 13 years. As anticipated, unions are found to reduce wage inequality
across most of the female and male wage ratios in CMEs with conservative welfare states.
More specifically, gender-specific union density has a negative and statistically significant
long-term effect (at the 95 percent confidence level or higher) in four of the six models.
Not surprisingly given the union composition survey data, all of these statistically
significant coefficients are in models that include the lower parts of the wage distributions
(i.e., models of the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios, respectively). However, no support is
found for Hypothesis 2, as female and male union strength are found to significantly impact
the same wage ratios within this regime
Turning our attention to the interaction terms, we observe that Hypothesis 3, which
states that the female and male union effect are greatest in CMEs with conservative welfare
states, receives broad support: the interaction term containing the lagged level form of the
union density variable and the dummy variable for CMEs with social democratic welfare
states has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (at the 90 percent confidence
level or higher) in five of the six models; and the interaction term containing the lagged

105

Full results can be found in Appendix G.
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level form of the union density variable and the dummy variable for LMEs has a positive
and statistically significant coefficient (at the 99 percent confidence level) in one model
(Model 12).106 These results indicate that the long-term union effect in CMEs with
conservative welfare states is significantly greater than the long-term union effect in CMEs
with social democratic welfare states across nearly all parts of the female and male wage
distributions and the long-term union effect in LMEs when we consider the lower half of
the male wage distribution. The much stronger result for CMEs with social democratic
welfare states may be the result of the particularly small number of union workers in
traditionally lower-paid occupations within that regime.
Included at the bottom of Table 10 are the effects of female and male union strength in
LMEs and CMEs with social democratic welfare states, respectively. Consistent with
Hypothesis 1, male union strength is found to significantly reduce wage inequality across
a larger portion of the male wage distribution than female union strength does across the
female wage distribution in LMEs. More specifically, male union density significantly
reduces the male 90/10 and 90/50 wage ratios (at the 95 percent confidence level) while
female union density “only” significantly reduces the female 90/10 wage ratio (at the 95
percent confidence level). This would suggest that, within LMEs, unions are able to
increase the relative wages of those in the middle part of the male wage distribution to a
greater extent than those in the middle part of the female wage distribution – perhaps due
to the particularly small number of female union members in traditionally medium-paid

106

The only interaction term with the lagged level union density variable to have a negative coefficient is
that including the dummy for LMEs in Model 10; but this coefficient does not approach statistical
significance (p-value = .41).
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occupations within this regime.107 As anticipated based on the union composition survey
data, weaker gender differences are found in CMEs with social democratic welfare states.
Both female and male union density significantly reduce one wage ratio (at the 90 percent
confidence level or higher), although it is a short-term effect on the 90/50 wage ratio for
women and a long-term effect on the 50/10 wage ratio for men. It is not clear what would
cause such a pattern of diverging female and male union effects within this regime.
In order to examine the substantive effects of female and male union strength,
Figure 8 graphs the impact of a one standard deviation change in female and male union
density108 in each of the three regimes on the female and male 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10
wage ratios, respectively.109 All bars signify negative (inequality reducing) effects. In an
effort to make the results for each model as comparable and intuitive as possible, these
effects have been converted into standard deviation changes in the corresponding wage
ratio. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, union strength is generally found to have the largest
substantive effects in CMEs with conservative welfare states. Within this regime, a one
standard deviation increase in gender-specific union density reduces gender-specific wage
inequality by approximately 1.5 standard deviations or more in three models (Models 7, 8,
and 11). In no other regime does a union effect even exceed 1.2 standard deviations. In
CMEs with conservative welfare states, the female union effect is only .3 standard
deviations larger than the male union effect in the models of the 90/10 wage ratios but over

107

In LMEs, approximately 61.5 percent of female union members are either professionals or workers in
traditionally lower-paid occupations. For no other regime- and gender-specific union grouping does this
figure even reach 50 percent.
108
The standard deviations utilized in this analysis are derived from the country-years covered in Table 10.
109
Substantive effects include short-term and long-term coefficients that are statistically significant at the 90
percent confidence level or greater.
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Figure 8. Total (Long-Term Plus Short-Term) Effect of a One Standard Deviation
Shift in Female and Male Union Density.
*Results derived from models in Table 10.
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1.7 standard deviations larger in the models of the 50/10 wage ratios. While this latter result
provides strong support for Hypothesis 2, it should be noted that it is primarily due to an
unusual significant and positive short-term coefficient (at the 90 percent confidence level)
for male union density in Model 12. If this marginally significant short-term result is
excluded, then the difference between the female and male union effect in the models of
the 50/10 wage ratios shrinks to less than .1 standard deviations. In LMEs, a one standard
deviation rise in male union density is associated with a substantially large reduction in the
male 90/50 wage ratio (1.2 standard deviations), while a similar rise in female union
density has no significant effect on the female 90/50 wage ratio. While this finding lends
support to Hypothesis 1, the slightly larger substantive effect of female union density
compared to male union density in the models of the 90/10 wage ratios (1.1 standard
deviations to .8 standard deviations, respectively) runs counter to this hypothesis. Finally,
the gender-specific union effects in CMEs with social democratic welfare states – in the
two instances in which the union effects in this regime are statistically significant – are
relatively modest, never reaching two-thirds of a standard deviation.
The primary purpose of the interaction terms included here was to determine
whether the occupational composition of union members conditions the union effect on
female and male wage inequality, but the inherently symmetrical nature of interaction
terms allows us to simultaneously observe whether female and male union strength
condition the market institution and welfare state regime effect on wage inequality as well
(given that dummy variables for market institution and welfare state regimes were used as
indirect measures for union composition) (Berry et al. 2012). The coefficient on the
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dummy variable for CMEs with social democratic welfare states is negative and
statistically significant (at the 90 percent confidence level or higher) in the models
containing wage ratios with the ninetieth percentile of wage earners (i.e., the genderspecific 90/10 and 90/50 wage ratios, respectively). Since both female and male union
strength have been diminishing across nearly all wealthy democracies in recent years, we
can interpret the positive and statistically significant interaction terms containing the
dummy for CMEs with social democratic welfare states as informing us that policies
associated with the social democratic welfare state reduce the relative wages of top earners
more compared with policies associated with the conservative welfare state as female and
male union density decline within the former regime. This finding suggests a sort of
“substitution effect”, whereby policies associated with social democratic welfare states
play a more important role in restraining the wages of top earners as unions become less
able – or less willing – to do so. Interestingly, a similar result is found in only one model
of LMEs – that for the male 50/10 wage ratio. This may indicate that particular features
associated with LMEs – such as minimum wages and means tested benefits - have been
particularly important for lower earning men as male union density has declined sharply
and steadily within this regime.110
There are four important points to note regarding the other socio-economic and
political determinants of female and male wage inequality included in the models. First,
and as alluded to above when discussing the results in Table 9, several factors impact

110

In the dataset utilized here, male union density declined by about 29 percentage points in LMEs between
the 1970s and 2000s. Over that same period, female union density in LMEs declined by about 13 percentage
points; male union density in CMEs declined by about 10 percentage points; and female union density in
CMEs rose by about 9 percentage points.
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female and male wage inequality in the same general direction, but do so in dissimilar
ways. In particular, unemployment increases female wage inequality exclusively in the
short-term but increases male wage inequality exclusively in the long-term; while
immigration and international trade reduce different parts of the female and male wage
distributions. Second, two factors – GDP per capita and left government – impact female
wage inequality but not male wage inequality. More specifically, economic growth allows
the highest earning women to make wage gains relative to lower earning women while left
government helps the lowest earning women to make wage gains relative to higher earning
women. Third, only one factor – education – is found to impact female and male wage
inequality in opposite directions. The proportion of males with a tertiary education is found
to increase the wage ratios including the highest earning men (i.e., the male 90/10 and
90/50 wage ratios); while a rise in the proportion of females with a tertiary education is
found to decrease wage inequality among the lower half of the wage distribution. Finally,
none of the substantive effects of these other socio-economic and political factors match
the magnitude of the statistically significant union effects provided in Figure 8. While a
one standard deviation shift in gender-specific union density often impacts a particular
wage ratio by more than one standard deviation, the impact of a one standard deviation
shift in left government in Model 11 – the next largest effect outside of those for the genderspecific union density variables – is less than three-fourths of a standard deviation.

Discussion and Conclusion
Does female union strength reduce female wage inequality to the same extent that
male union strength reduces male wage inequality? In an effort to answer this question, I
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focused attention on differences in the occupational composition of female and male union
members - a condition that is itself determined by market institution and welfare state
design. I began by providing descriptive statistics demonstrating that male union strength
has experienced a sharper and steadier decline than female union strength. I then outlined
the three processes by which unions have been argued to impact wage inequality, which I
labeled the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms; and considered how
differences in the occupational composition of union members is likely to influence the
intra-union mechanism and thus also the union effect on wage inequality more broadly.
EVS survey data informed us that the occupational composition of female and male union
members differs within and (especially) across market institution and welfare state
regimes. A series of single-equation time-series cross-sectional error-correction models
and seemingly unrelated regression models covering 15 countries between 1980 and 2010
provided evidence that the union effect on female wage inequality is less widespread than
the union effect on male wage inequality in LMEs, the regime in which workers in
professional occupations are particularly well represented among female union members;
while the union effect on female wage inequality is more substantial than the union effect
on male wage inequality in CMEs with conservative welfare states, the regime in which
workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations are particularly well represented among
female union members. Nonetheless, both female and male union effects were generally
more widespread and substantial in CMEs with conservative welfare states than in either
LMEs or CMEs with social democratic welfare states.
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The findings in this article have several implications for the broader gender and
economic inequality literature. First, the popular perception of unions as organizations
dedicated to the protection of working class male “insiders” at the expense of vulnerable
female “outsiders” (Rueda 2005, 2007) has become antiquated. In a number of LMEs and
CMEs with social democratic welfare states, female union density is now greater than male
union density and female union members now outnumber male union members; and in at
least four LMEs - Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States - female
workers in professional occupations are better represented among union members and/or
more highly unionized than male workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations. Future
research might examine how such changes in the gender and occupational composition of
national union movements has impacted internal and external labor politics and the
perception of unions among the wider citizenry.
Second, before we can determine whether declining union strength is contributing
to a rise in aggregate economic inequality or a reduction in gender economic inequality,
we have to first consider whether (de)unionization trends vary across different types of
union workers; and whether certain types of union workers impact wage inequality more
or less than others. The evidence provided here suggests that a focus on declining
unionization in general conceals a disproportionate decline in male union strength and a
corresponding (and radical) shift in union composition; and that the extent to which these
trends matter for aggregate economic inequality and gender economic inequality depends
on the market institution and welfare state regime that such changes are occurring within.
Furthermore, the finding that unions reduce female and male wage inequality more when
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they represent many workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations suggests that trends
in the occupational composition of female and male union members can inform us of
developments in the union effect on female wage inequality, male wage inequality, and
gender economic inequality. While recent evidence indicates that the overall union effect
on wage inequality is diminishing as a result of unions representing fewer low-skilled
workers (Han and Castater 2014), future work could be done to determine whether these
occupational changes are disproportionately found among women or men; and if so, what
impact this has on the female and male wage distributions as well as the gender wage gap.
Third, the evidence here strongly suggests that institutional, political, and supply
and demand factors do not impact the wages and wage distributions of women and men in
identical ways. In particular, unemployment was found to increase female wage inequality
in the short-term but male wage inequality over the long-term, international trade and
immigration were found to impact the upper part of the female wage distribution but (also)
the lower part of the male wage distribution, GDP per capita and left government were
found to impact the female wage distribution but not the male wage distribution, and the
proportion of individuals (women or men, respectively) with a tertiary education was found
to decrease female wage inequality but increase male wage inequality. Such distinctive
ways for factors to impact female and male wage inequality likely account for the
negligible positive correlation between the (year over year) change in the like female and
male wage ratios observed in Figure 1 – and implore scholars to more seriously consider
gender when examining the determinants of aggregate economic inequality in the wealthy
democracies.
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Before concluding, it is important to note three clear shortcomings of this analysis.
First, the focus here has been somewhat narrowly concentrated on one indirect way in
which gender influences the union effect on wage inequality – through the vertical gender
occupational segregation of union members. Yet there are other ways that gender may
impact the union effect as well, such as indirectly through the horizontal gender
occupational segregation of union members (e.g., female-dominated public sector unions
versus male-dominated private sector unions) or directly through differences in the
preferences of female and male union members even after controlling for occupation.
Additional work could and should be done to determine whether such factors influence the
union effect on female and male wage inequality as much or more than the vertical gender
occupational segregation of union members considered here. Second, this article posits a
causal relationship flowing from market institution and welfare state design to union
composition to female and male wage inequality.

However, the measure used to

empirically assess this relationship – a simple dummy variable noting the presence or lack
thereof of a particular market institution or welfare state regime – is rather crude. This
measure was chosen out of practical necessity, as there is a dearth of data on the
occupational composition of union members in general and female and male union
members in particular. Nonetheless, the use of this measure precluded identification of
any intra-regime or over-time variation in female and male union composition and thus
also the union effect on female and male wage inequality – variation that recent work on
the skill composition of union members suggests almost surely exists. Finally, this article
has focused primarily on the gender-specific union effect on female and male wage
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inequality. The other factors considered in this analysis – particularly those found to have
a statistically significant effect on the female and/or male wage distributions – deserve
additional attention. In general, further investigation is needed into why certain factors
impact female wage inequality in one way but male wage inequality in another way (or not
at all). Of particular interest to scholars of comparative political economy may be the
finding that the partisan composition of government matters for the female wage
distribution but not the male wage distribution. Future research could consider whether the
left government effect on female wage inequality is driven by governments explicitly
targeting working poor women, which policies act to compress (exacerbate) the female
wage distribution but not the male wage distribution, and if this partisan effect is
conditional on particular socio-economic and political institutions – including labor unions
with a large and growing female presence.

140

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Empirical and Theoretical Contributions
Previous research on the determinants of economic inequality in the wealthy
democracies found that differences in the size and constitution of labor unions accounted
for much of the cross-national and over time variation in economic inequality. Despite
numerous theoretical and empirical reasons to suppose the contrary, most of this research
assumed the union effect on economic inequality to be independent of the particular socioeconomic and political environment unions were situated within and the types of workers
actually unionized. The broad purpose of this dissertation has been to push back against
these assumptions and examine whether the union effect on economic inequality is
conditioned by certain factors external and internal to unions. The evidence presented
suggests that unions are able to impact economic inequality the most when unionization is
relatively high or relatively moderate and accompanied by a left leaning government
(chapter 2);111 a country is minimally exposed to the global economy and unions primarily
represent workers in occupations most vulnerable to market competition (chapter 3); and
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The analysis in Chapter 2 focused on how unions impact income inequality through the political
mechanism, or by conditioning the partisan effect on income inequality. However, the symmetry of
interaction (Berry et al. 2012) informs us that if unions condition the partisan effect on income inequality
then this necessarily implies that partisan governments condition the union effect on income inequality as
well (through some combination of the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms). This may be done,
for example, through government intervention in the collective bargaining process (e.g., see Thelen 1993 and
Jacobs and Myers 2014) or through the formation and completion of social pacts (e.g., see Baccaro and Lim
2007 and Avdagic et al. 2011).
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unions represent many workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations but few workers in
professional occupations (chapter 4).
Although nearly all scholars of comparative political economy acknowledge that
unions matter for economic inequality, few recognize the multitude of ways that unions
come to matter. For example, scholars in the power resource theory tradition emphasize
how unions allow workers to extract more generous compensation from employers and
help in the election of left leaning governments but neglect internal union conflicts over
compensation and negative externalities arising from collective bargaining; while those in
the varieties of capitalism tradition emphasize distributional conflicts between private and
public sector union members, blue and white collar union members, or less and more
skilled union members, but neglect the important role unions play in furthering the interests
of all of these types of workers relative to their employers, supporting class-based political
parties, and generating positive outcomes for many non-union members. A major aim of
this dissertation has been to recognize and delve more deeply into the different ways that
unions impact economic inequality. To further this goal, I identified the four primary
processes by which unions impact economic inequality, which I labeled the employer,
intra-union, insider, and political mechanisms. Unions influence the wages and benefits
provided by union employers (the “employer mechanism”); the wages and benefits
provided to different types of union workers (the “intra-union mechanism”); the
employment opportunities, wages, and benefits offered to different types of non-union
members (the “insider mechanism”); and the types of policies governments implement (the
“political mechanism”). It needs to be emphasized that we cannot understand the totality
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of the union effect on economic inequality - or on any other socio-economic outcome without considering each of these four mechanisms, the many and varied ways that they
are expressed, and how they interact within particular contexts.

Omissions and Suggestions
In an effort to achieve analytical precision and theoretical clarity, every research
project must necessarily omit a number of factors relevant to the subject matter under
consideration; and this dissertation is no exception. In this section, I will discuss two of
the most important – and interesting – omissions from the previous chapters and provide
suggestions for how to incorporate these factors into future research on labor unions and
economic inequality. First, the focus throughout this dissertation has been on different
aspects of unions: the breadth of their membership, their preferences, their internal
conflicts, the types of workers they represent, and so on. Little attention, however, has
been given to other interest groups operating within the same economic and political
system and how unions impact, and are impacted by, these interest groups.

One

particularly notable omission is employer organizations. As mentioned several times
above, one of the primary measures of union strength in the economic inequality literature
is the level of wage bargaining, or whether unions negotiate with employers primarily at
the firm, sectoral, or national level. It is assumed that union organizations that bargain at
a “higher” level – i.e., negotiate on behalf of a larger share of the workforce – are stronger
than those that do not, as the “encompassing” nature of these organizations implies a
relatively cohesive and coherent workers’ movement (e.g., see Craypo 1986). Yet such an
encompassing union organization would be incapable of negotiating on behalf of so many
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workers if a similarly encompassing employers’ organization was not present. Thus, at
least some of the outcomes attributed to unions in this dissertation must also, necessarily,
be the result of employers’ organizations as well. Furthermore, evidence that employers’
organizations initially formed in response to the rise in working class organizations (Martin
and Swank 2011), that dysfunction within employers’ organizations ultimately weakens
unions (Thelen and van Wijnbergen 2003), and that the revealed preferences of employer
organizations are at least partly the result of union strength (Thelen 2001; Paster 2013),
suggest a symbiotic relationship between employers’ organizations and unions that
deserves much greater attention than that which was received here.
Given the apparent interdependent nature of unions and employer organizations, it
is probably inappropriate to speak of independent “union effects” and “employer
organization effects” on economic inequality (as is done, for example, by Martin and
Swank 2012). On the other hand, conflict between unions and employers’ organizations
over employment, compensation, and public policy recommend against treating these two
groups as analytical equals – as a measure such as the level of wage bargaining implicitly
does. Rather, one might instead consider the “structure” of wage bargaining institutions –
or how union/employer organization relations are constituted – to determine whether
particular configurations exist that provide a relative advantage or benefit to one or the
other of these (broadly conceived) economic actors. For example, it may be the case that
a highly centralized employer organization facilitates the provision of generous social
insurance policies when accompanied by an equally centralized union organization but not
otherwise; or institutionally fragmented unions are able to achieve substantial wage
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concessions from their employers when employer organizations are equally fragmented,
but not when employer organizations are highly centralized and thus able to formulate a
collective response to union demands. If the configuration of union-employer relations
does matter for socio-economic and political outcomes, then we would still be able to speak
of union effects and employer organization effects, but not without considering the relative
strength of both unions and employers’ organizations.
Second, following most of the literature on the causes and consequences of
economic inequality, each of the core chapters in this dissertation focused exclusively on
one of two types of economic inequality; income inequality or wage inequality. However,
this has meant that other types of economic inequality have been neglected; most notably
wealth inequality (e.g., see Jantti et al. 2013; Sierminska et al. 2013; Fredriksen 2014) and
conceptions of economic inequality that incorporate consumption and/or unpaid nonmarket work (e.g., see Folbre et al. 2013). While income and wage inequality are highly
and positively correlated across the wealthy democracies (Hoeller et al. 2014), this is not
necessarily the case with income and wage inequality on the one hand and these additional
types of economic inequality on the other. For example, Fredriksen (2014) finds that
Sweden – often the most equal country in terms of income and wage inequality – has, along
with the United States, the highest level of wealth inequality among the 11 wealthy
democracies she examines; and Folbre et al. (2013) find that if we consider the value of
unpaid work, household market income inequality rises as women enter the paid
workforce, suggesting that countries with relatively low female labor force participation
(e.g., CMEs with conservative welfare states) have less economic inequality relative to
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countries with more female labor force participation (e.g., LMEs and CMEs with social
democratic welfare states) than typically acknowledged. Such evidence informs us that
theories used to explain variation in wage and income inequality are probably not as helpful
in explaining variation in other types of economic inequality; and, therefore, much
theorizing still needs to be done on how unions influence economic inequality more
broadly understood. In terms of wealth inequality, we should consider whether unions, by
successfully improving their members’ working conditions and the generosity of publically
provided social insurance policies, sometimes disincentivize the accumulation of private
wealth (Esping-Andersen 2009). In terms of incorporating consumption and/or unpaid
non-market work into our analyses of economic inequality, we need to more seriously
consider factors at the household (rather than just the individual) level. This is particularly
the case in models of income inequality, a phenomenon that tends to be measured at the
household level. Two of the more obvious factors that deserve consideration are the
proportion of households with multiple wage earners and the number of dependents, on
average, living within each household (Esping-Andersen 2007, 2009).112 Including such
factors into our analysis will help us better understand how economic inequality is
impacted by the decline in marriage, lower birthrates, children remaining in their parents’
household well into adulthood, and middle-aged adults assuming caring responsibilities for
their elderly parents (Adserà 2004; Giuliano 2007; Isengard and Szydlik 2012).
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While most of the comparative politics literature on the determinants of income inequality neglects such
household level factors, this is not universally the case. For example, Bradley et al. (2003) model “singlemother families”, or the percentage of households with children under 18 that have a female head of
household – and find it to be significantly and positively associated with pre-tax and pre-transfer (household)
income inequality.
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Avenues for Future Research
In the conclusion of each of the three core chapters of the dissertation I proposed
several potentially promising avenues for future research. Many of these proposals focused
on unions as a cause; fewer focused on unions as an effect. It is the latter of which I will
expand further on here.
Given widespread scholarly agreement that unions matter for a host of socioeconomic and political outcomes, it is surprising how little attention has been given in the
comparative political economy literature to understanding variation in the macro and micro
level characteristics of unions. While a number of scholars have sought to explain crossnational and over time variation in aggregate unionization and wage bargaining
centralization (e.g., see Western 1997; Lee 2005; Dreher and Gaston 2007; and Ahlquist
2010), much less work has been done on explaining variation in other important union
characteristics, such as union composition and union preferences.113
As has been discussed throughout this dissertation, union composition has changed
substantially in the wealthy democracies over the last several decades, as unions
increasingly represent workers in the public sector, the service sector, higher-earning
occupations, and women. An intriguing research agenda would be to explore the factors
driving these changes in union composition. For example, we might ask whether those
socio-economic factors most frequently cited as contributing to aggregate union decline –
such as economic globalization and deindustrialization – may more properly be said to
contribute to private sector union decline; while a different set of factors – such as those
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Two notable and recent exceptions are Ahlquist and Levi (2013) and Ahlquist et al. (2014).
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relating to public opinion, partisanship, and political globalization – are more relevant in
explaining public sector union decline, persistence, or even growth. We could also ask
whether certain cultural factors are diminishing the attractiveness of unions for workers in
lower earning occupations; or whether unions are more attractive to women than men
because of particular fringe benefits that unions provide.
If we conceptualize unions as unitary actors and hold much of their environment
constant, such changes in union composition are almost certain to have consequences for
the preferences and behavior of unions. Yet unions, of course, are made up of individual
members and are situated in very different environmental contexts both across countries
and over time.

Do different environmental conditions - such as those relating to

unionization, collective bargaining centralization, the public sector, immigration from the
Global South, and economic inequality – affect the attitudes of particular types of union
members in different ways? If so, then it may well tell us something about what is
happening to worker solidarity across the wealthy democracies, help explain the shifting
political landscapes we are witnessing across much of Europe, and provide us with some
firmer micro-foundations for our theories on the (conditional) effect of unions on a number
of macro-level outcomes.

Real World Implications and Concluding Remarks
The introduction of this dissertation referenced some of the large body of literature
establishing a causal link between higher levels of economic inequality and outcomes
widely perceived of as negative in the contemporary world. The findings reported above
suggest that unions are becoming less and less able – and perhaps less and less willing - to
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mitigate those undesirable outcomes associated with economic inequality. Unionization is
declining across nearly all wealthy democracies, diminishing the political influence of
unions; influence that has traditionally been used to elect politicians sympathetic to a
redistributive agenda or to pressure politicians unsympathetic to that agenda to implement
it anyway or face the electoral consequences. Economic globalization is expanding
unabated, strengthening the bargaining power of employers relative to union and non-union
workers alike, particularly those in low to moderate paying occupations exposed to
international competition – some of the individuals most in need of the wage and non-wage
benefits that union membership has historically provided. Unionization is declining most
rapidly among private sector workers and those in low to moderate paying occupations –
the individuals who have in the past most benefited from union membership and thus are
substantially responsible for the long-standing association between union strength and
economic inequality.
Yet while union strength is diminishing and unions ability and/or willingness to
reduce economic inequality is waning, that traditional redistributive union agenda appears
to be gaining steam – apparently and ironically because of the rise in economic inequality
that a weakening union movement has helped to bring about. There is evidence that as the
wealthy gain relative to the working and middle classes, the latter increasingly join with
the poor in a political coalition in favor of government action to reduce economic
inequalities (Lupu and Pontusson 2011); and that in response, left parties often engage in
such government action (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Furthermore, growing movements
for higher minimum wages across the United States (substantially organized by a flagging
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union movement), the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany by a center-right
government, an increase in the minimum wage in the United Kingdom by a center-right
government, and the electoral success of formerly peripheral populist parties throughout
Europe suggest that there is growing recognition of, and substantial dissatisfaction with,
rising economic inequality and a widespread desire to counteract it. Whether such
movements can be sustained or will be enough to negate or overwhelm the growing
political power of domestic and international capital - and the deregulation, tax reforms,
and public spending reductions that it often desires - remains to be seen. Nonetheless, if
economic inequality and its concomitant dissatisfaction continue to grow, it may, in a
further irony, ultimately increase demand for the formation or strengthening of
organizations dedicated to resisting it – something, it would seem, like labor unions.
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APPENDIX
Welfare Regime is measured with two dummy variables, one for conservative regimes and
the other for liberal regimes, with the baseline category represented by the social
democratic regimes. The conservative regimes are Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy; the
liberal regimes are Canada and the United States; and the social democratic regimes are
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. These 9 countries were chosen and coded based on a
comprehensive review of the welfare state literature provided by Arts and Gelissen (2002).
The Level of Wage Bargaining is measured with an ordered categorical variable, where
higher values indicate a more centralized wage bargaining system. The variable is coded
as follows: 1 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the local or company level; 2 =
bargaining is intermediate or alternating between sector and company bargaining; 3 =
bargaining predominantly takes place at the sector or industry level; 4 = bargaining is
intermediate or alternating between central and industry bargaining; and 5 = bargaining
predominantly takes place at central or the cross-industry level and there are centrally
determined binding norms or ceilings to be respected by agreements negotiated at lower
levels. Data is from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2011.
National wealth is measured as GDP Per Capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP)
and is in 2005 constant U.S. dollars. The data is from the Penn World Table (v.7.1).
Unemployment is measured as the percentage of the civilian labor force that is unemployed.
Data is from the Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).
Service Sector Employment is measured as the proportion of the civilian workforce that is
employed in the service sector (as opposed to industry or agriculture). Data is from the
Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).
Social Spending is measured as social assistance grants and welfare benefits paid by the
general government as a percentage of GDP. Data is from the Comparative Politics Dataset
I (Armingeon et al. 2013).
Female Labor Force Participation is measured as the proportion of the total labor force
that is female. Data is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).
International trade is measured as exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Data is
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
Capital Openness is measured with the Chinn-Ito index, which is based on the binary
dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial
transactions reported by the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Higher values signify greater capital
account openness. Data is from Chinn and Ito (2008).
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is measured as outward FDI flows as a percentage of
GDP. Data is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).
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APPENDIX A: DATA
National Wealth (GDP per capita): One the one hand, greater national wealth may reduce
wage inequality by slowing population growth (and thus also the supply of labor) and
generating tax revenue necessary to sustain costly egalitarian policies (Nielson and
Alderson 1995; Martin and Swank 2012). On the other hand, economic growth in the
wealthy democracies has become increasingly associated with investment in, and
production of, technologies that require greater skills to utilize and that make previous jobs
requiring less skills redundant (Koske et al. 2014). Since the aggregate result of these two
contrary rationales is unknown, there is no strong expectation regarding the impact that a
rise in national wealth (GDP per capita) will have on wage inequality. National wealth is
measured as GDP Per Capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) and is in 2005
constant U.S. dollars (in thousands). Data is from the Penn World Table (version 7.1).
Private service sector employment: The private service sector is frequently characterized
as containing jobs that are bifurcated into those that require high skills and provide
generous compensation (e.g., physicians and lawyers) and those that require little skill and
provide meager compensation (e.g., retail store clerks and dishwashers) (Alderson and
Nielson 2002). Given that this implies increased demand for workers both at the high and
low end of the wage distribution, there is no strong expectation regarding the impact that
a rise in private service sector employment will have on wage inequality. Private service
sector employment is measured as the proportion of the civilian workforce that is employed
in the service sector (as opposed to industry or agriculture) minus the proportion of total
employment in the public sector. The variable is constructed by the author from data in
the Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Economic Outlook.
Public Sector Employment: The relatively compressed nature of the public sector wage
distribution relative to the private sector wage distribution implies that an “intra-public
sector mechanism” may be present (Pontusson et al. 2002). However, the existence of a
wage premium for at least some public sector workers and/or public sector spillover effects
imply a public sector insider mechanism as well. Previous work suggests that the aggregate
effect of these mechanisms is to reduce wage inequality (Rueda 2008). Therefore, a rise
in public sector employment is anticipated to decrease wage inequality. Public sector
employment is measured as public employment as a share of total employment. Data is
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Economic
Outlook.
Unemployment: The highly substitutable nature of less skilled workers makes them more
vulnerable to unemployment than highly skilled workers (Hall and Franzese 1998). A
surplus supply of idle workers with less skills should reduce the bargaining power of these
workers and thus increase wage inequality (Korpi 2002). However, if the unemployed
consist of a disproportionate number of less skilled workers, then wage earners (i.e.,
individuals in employment) must consist of a disproportionate number of more skilled
workers, which suggests less wage inequality. Since the aggregate result of these two
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contrary rationales cannot be determined a priori, there is no strong expectation regarding
the impact that a rise in unemployment will have on wage inequality. Unemployment is
measured as the percentage of the civilian labor force that is unemployed. Data is from the
Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).
Female Labor Force Participation: All wealthy democracies exhibit a gap between the
earnings of men (who are paid more) and women (who are paid less). There are numerous
explanations for this gap, including gender discrimination, differing skill levels, gender
occupational segregation, and hours worked (Blau and Kahn 1992; Pontusson et al. 2002;
Magnussen 2009; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2011). While an increase in the supply of
women workers might reduce gender discrimination in the long-term, in the short- to
medium-term it implies greater competition for jobs requiring less skills and/or that are
dominated by women, as well as greater variation in hours worked. Therefore, a rise in
female labor force participation is anticipated to increase wage inequality. Female labor
force participation is measured as the proportion of the total labor force that is female. Data
is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Education: As the supply of more educated labor grows, the wage premium attached to
that education should decline (Alderson and Doran 2013). Since earnings and education
tend to be positively correlated, a rise in the proportion of individuals with secondary
education is anticipated to decrease wage inequality. Education is measured as the
proportion of individuals fifteen years of age and older who completed their secondary
education. Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing years. Data is from Barro
and Lee (2013).
Immigration: Growth in immigration in wealthy democracies implies both an increase in
the supply of less skilled labor (e.g., certain types of manual laborers and customer service
representatives) and higher skilled labor (e.g., scientists and information technology
professionals) (Card 2001; Mahroum 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Since the
aggregate result of these two contrary forces is unknown, there is no strong expectation
regarding the impact that a rise in immigration will have on female and male wage
inequality. Immigration is measured as proportion of the population that is foreign born.
Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing years. Data is from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
Left government: The expectation that government partisanship should matter for wage
inequality arises somewhat tautologically out of the traditional political party typology,
whereby left parties are defined as those most strongly favoring government action to
reduce economic inequalities (Lijphart 1997). Therefore, an increase in left party
participation in government is anticipated to decrease wage inequality. Left government
is measured as left party legislative seats as a proportion of all legislative seats. Data is
from the Comparative Political Parties Dataset: Electoral, Legislative, and Government
Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group in 21 Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2011
(Swank 2013).
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APPENDIX B: FULL RESULTS (TABLE 2)
Model
Years
Countries

Dependent Variable

90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Union Density (t)

Union Density (t-1)

Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t)

Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1)

Δ EG Index

EG Index (t-1)

1
(Full)
19801994
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio
-0.139***

2
(Full)
19952010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio
-0.060*

3
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio
-0.027**

4
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/50
Wage
Ratio
-0.100***

5
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 50/10
Wage
Ratio
-0.068***

6
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†

(0.030)

(0.030)

(0.010)

(0.029)

(0.019)

(0.096)

0.005

-0.009

-0.008

-0.004

-0.000

-0.003*

(0.006)

(0.010)

(0.006)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.002)

-0.004**

0.000

-0.004***

-0.006***

-0.002***

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

0.007

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.007)

-0.007

0.008

(0.008)

(0.007)

0.001

-0.002

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.002

-0.004**

-0.002**

-0.001

-0.002***

0.002***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.000**

0.000*

0.000***

-0.000**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Union Density X EG Index (t-1)

Δ Capital Openness (t)

Capital Openness (t-1)

GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1)

-0.268**

-0.009

-0.003

-0.009

0.006

-0.005

0.001

(0.029)

(0.038)

(0.040)

(0.016)

(0.014)

(0.002)

0.001

0.009

-0.030***

-0.003

-0.008*

-0.002

(0.008)

(0.014)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.003)

0.000***

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Union Density X Capital Openness (t-1)

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

Δ "skew"

0.003

-0.003

-0.002

(0.018)

(0.008)

(0.006)

-0.013**

0.009*

(0.004)

(0.004)
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APPENDIX B. Continued.
Model
Years
Countries

Dependent Variable
Δ Private Service Sector Employment (t)

Private Service Sector Employment (t-1)

Δ Public Sector Employment (t)

Public Sector Employment (t-1)
Δ Unemployment (t)

Unemployment (t-1)
Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t)

Female Labor Force Participation (t-1)
Δ Education (t)

Education (t-1)
Δ Immigration (t)

Immigration (t-1)
Δ Left Govt. (t)

Left Govt. (t-1)

1
(Full)
19801994
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio
-0.004
(0.009)
-0.000
(0.006)
0.009
(0.009)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.013*
(0.017)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.028
(0.022)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.296***
(0.053)
0.006**
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.004***
(0.001)

2
(Full)
19952010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio
-0.002***
(0.000)
-0.002*
(0.001)
-0.032**
(0.012)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005
(0.009)
0.005
(0.005)
0.037*
(0.017)
0.011***
(0.002)
0.045***
(0.005)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.146**
(0.061)
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)

3
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/10
Wage
Ratio
-0.002**
(0.001)
-0.001**
(0.000)

-0.010
(0.013)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.018
(0.010)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.065**
(0.021)
0.005***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)

N
R2

5
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 50/10
Wage
Ratio

6
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†

-0.004**
(0.002)

0.004**
(0.002)

-0.012
(0.007)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.016
(0.018)
0.002**
(0.001)

0.006
(0.004)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.041***
(0.011)
0.003***
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)

0.803***

0.275***

0.131*

0.000***
(0.000)
0.274**

106
0.361

128
0.248

234
0.133

234
0.120

Union Density X Union Density (t-1)

Constant

4
(Reduced)
19802010
Groups
1&2†
Δ 90/50
Wage
Ratio
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.001*
(0.001)
0.005*
(0.002)
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Δ "skew"

0.145**

-0.013**
(0.005)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.063***
(0.015)
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.196*

234
0.163

234
0.217

APPENDIX C: FULL RESULTS (TABLE 3)
Model

7
(Reduced)

8
(Reduced)

9
(Reduced)

10
(Reduced)

Years

1980-2010

1980-2010

1980-2010

1980-2010

Countries

Groups 1,2,&3

Groups 1,2,&3

Groups 1,2,&3

Groups 1,2,&3

Dependent Variable

Δ 90/10 Wage
Ratio

Δ 90/50 Wage
Ratio

Δ 50/10 Wage
Ratio

Δ "skew"

-0.040**

-0.042***

-0.079***

-0.165***

(0.014)

(0.009)

(0.025)

(0.048)

0.003

-0.002

0.002

-0.002

(0.005)

(0.001)

(0.003)

(0.002)

-0.005***

-0.004***

-0.002***

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.002

0.000

0.001

-0.000

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

0.000

-0.001

0.001

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.000***

0.000

0.000***

-0.000**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.001

-0.002

0.002

-0.005

(0.039)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.006)

-0.018

-0.012**

0.001

-0.013

(0.020)

(0.004)

(0.011)

(0.008)

0.000

0.000***

-0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.003**

-0.002

0.003**

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Union Density (t)

Union Density (t-1)

Δ EG Index

EG Index (t-1)

Union Density X EG Index (t-1)

Δ Capital Openness (t)

Capital Openness (t-1)

Union Density X Capital Openness (t-1)

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

-0.002
(0.004)

Δ Unemployment (t)

174

APPENDIX C. Continued.
Model
Years
Countries
Dependent Variable
Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t)

Female Labor Force Participation (t-1)

Δ Education (t)

Education (t-1)

Δ Immigration (t)

Immigration (t-1)

Δ Left Govt. (t)

Left Govt. (t-1)

7
(Reduced)
1980-2010

8
(Reduced)
1980-2010

9
(Reduced)
1980-2010

10
(Reduced)
1980-2010

Groups 1,2,&3
Δ 90/10 Wage
Ratio

Groups 1,2,&3
Δ 90/50 Wage
Ratio

Groups 1,2,&3
Δ 50/10 Wage
Ratio

Groups 1,2,&3

0.026

-0.004

0.018*

-0.015**

(0.022)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.005)

0.007***

-0.000

0.003**

-0.000

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.004

-0.004

0.003*

-0.003

(0.007)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.003)

-0.001

-0.000*

-0.001

0.000

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.022

0.007

-0.013

0.011

(0.074)

(0.007)

(0.042)

(0.026)

0.003

0.000

0.002*

-0.001

(0.002)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

-0.000

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

-0.001**

-0.001**

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Union Density X Union Density (t-1)

Constant

N
2

R

Δ "skew"

0.000***

0.000**

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.025

0.182***

0.113**

0.210**

294

294

294

294

0.078

0.065

0.120

0.135
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APPENDIX D: FEMALE AND MALE WAGE INEQUALITY
90/10 Ratio
(Women)

90/50 Ratio
(Women)

50/10 Ratio
(Women)

Country
(Years)

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

Australia
(1975-2010)

2.61

22.30

1.61

21.00

1.62

1.13

Austria
(2004-2010)

3.23

3.82

1.83

2.94

1.76

1.26

Belgium
(1999-2010)

2.25

2.20

1.63

3.24

1.38

-1.01

Canada
(1997-2010)

3.54

5.76

1.86

5.38

1.90

0.32

Denmark
(1996-2010)

2.37

15.67

1.54

3.62

1.54

11.64

Finland
(1977-2010)

2.10

1.45

1.54

8.05

1.36

-6.15

France
(1995-2010)

2.59

0.12

1.82

4.41

1.43

-4.09

Germany
(1992-2010)

2.91

4.29

1.64

-0.41

1.77

4.72

Ireland
(1994-2010)

3.38

-2.18

1.94

2.47

1.74

-4.54

Italy
(1986-2010)

2.16

4.29

1.42

6.99

1.52

-2.50

Japan
(1975-2010)

2.29

-2.59

1.59

-0.74

1.44

-1.92

Netherlands
(2002-2010)

2.76

2.10

1.76

2.12

1.57

0.00

New
Zealand (19842010)

2.35

24.52

1.55

18.30

1.52

5.24
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APPENDIX D. Continued.
90/10 Ratio
(Women)

90/50 Ratio
(Women)

50/10 Ratio
(Women)

Country
(Years)

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

Norway
(1997-2010)

1.85

17.41

1.31

4.89

1.41

11.93

Sweden
(1975-2010)

1.84

6.38

1.41

9.40

1.30

-2.72

Switzerland
(1996-2010)

2.31

18.57

1.64

14.80

1.41

3.33

2.90

15.27

1.77

8.99

1.63

5.75

3.69

50.92

1.99

29.23

1.85

16.79

2.62

10.57

1.66

8.04

1.56

2.18

0.56

13.18

0.19

7.99

0.18

6.25

United
Kingdom
(1970-2010)

United States
(1973-2010)
Average
Standard
Deviation

90/10 Ratio
(Men)

90/50 Ratio
(Men)

50/10 Ratio
(Men)

Country
(Years)

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

Australia
(1975-2010)

2.97

49.70

1.79

24.00

1.66

20.70

Austria
(2004-2010)

3.10

6.57

1.97

1.54

1.57

4.94
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APPENDIX D. Continued.
90/10 Ratio
(Men)
Country
(Years)
Belgium
(1999-2010)
Canada
(1997-2010)
Denmark
(1996-2010)
Finland
(1977-2010)
France
(1995-2010)
Germany
(1992-2010)
Ireland
(1994-2010)
Italy
(1986-2010)
Japan
(1975-2010)
Netherlands
(2002-2010)
New
Zealand (19842010)
Norway
(1997-2010)
Sweden
(1975-2010)
Switzerland
(1996-2010)
United
Kingdom
(1970-2010)
United States
(1973-2010)
Average
Standard
Deviation

90/50 Ratio
(Men)

50/10 Ratio
(Men)

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

Mean

% Change

2.36

1.66

1.74

1.67

1.36

0.00

3.52

3.50

1.78

9.78

1.98

-5.74

2.63

11.89

1.70

1.93

1.55

9.74

2.53

4.19

1.71

1.72

1.48

2.40

3.23

-6.18

2.09

-2.60

1.54

-3.71

3.02

-1.25

1.78

4.32

1.70

-5.31

3.87

-6.57

2.01

2.60

1.92

-8.98

2.34

6.05

1.62

4.48

1.45

1.50

2.75

11.50

1.71

10.97

1.61

0.44

2.84

3.72

1.80

1.31

1.57

2.39

2.70

35.68

1.71

26.25

1.57

7.48

2.29

21.24

1.52

6.15

1.50

14.17

2.21

12.39

1.63

5.14

1.35

6.88

2.50

17.54

1.77

15.97

1.41

1.28

3.16

36.44

1.79

26.31

1.76

7.97

4.38

51.40

2.08

25.67

2.10

20.45

2.91

14.42

1.79

9.29

1.62

4.26

0.58

17.77

0.16

9.89

0.21

8.33
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APPENDIX E: DATA
Female union density is measured as union membership as a proportion of all female
wage and salary earners in employment. Linear interpolation is used to impute data for
missing years. Data is from Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting,
State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0.
Male union density is measured as union membership as a proportion of all male wage and
salary earners in employment. Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing
years. Data is from Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State
Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0.
The Level of Wage Bargaining: As with union density, the level of wage bargaining (the
primary level at which unions negotiate over compensation with employers, ranging from
the firm level to the national level) is an indicator of union strength that is often found to
be negatively associated with wage inequality in wealthy democracies (e.g., see
Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002). Therefore, a rise in the level of wage bargaining
is anticipated to decrease female and male wage inequality. The level of wage bargaining
is measured with an ordered categorical variable and is coded as follows: 1 = bargaining
predominantly takes place at the local or company level; 2 = bargaining is intermediate or
alternating between company and industry level; 3 = bargaining predominantly takes place
at the industry level; 4 = bargaining is intermediate or alternating between industry and
national level; and 5 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the national level and there
are centrally determined binding norms or ceilings to be respected by agreements
negotiated at lower levels. Data is from Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions,
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0.
International Trade: As a wealthy (“capital abundant”) country becomes more exposed to
the world economy, workers and owners in the capital intensive sector make gains (through
exports) while workers and owners in the labor intensive sector experience losses (through
imports) (Stolper and Samuelson 1941; Oatley 2011). Since workers in the capital
intensive sector tend to be more skilled than workers in the labor intensive sector, such an
argument implies that demand (and thus wages) will rise for the former and fall for the
latter (Boix and Adserà 2000; Thelen and Wijnbergen 2003). Given that men are likelier
to be in the private manufacturing sector, which produces tangible goods for exports and
must compete directly with imports, a rise international trade is anticipated to increase
male wage inequality more than female wage inequality. International trade is measured
as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. Data is from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI).
National Wealth (GDP per capita): One the one hand, greater national wealth may reduce
wage inequality by slowing population growth (and thus also the supply of labor) and
generating tax revenue necessary to sustain costly egalitarian policies (Nielson and
Alderson 1995; Martin and Swank 2012). On the other hand, economic growth in the
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wealthy democracies has become increasingly associated with investment in, and
production of, technologies that require greater skills to utilize and that make previous jobs
requiring less skills redundant (Koske et al. 2014). Since the aggregate result of these two
contrary rationales is unknown, there is no strong expectation regarding the impact that a
rise in national wealth will have on female and male wage inequality. National wealth is
measured as GDP Per Capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) and is in 2005
constant U.S. dollars (in thousands). Data is from the Penn World Table (version 7.1).
Service Sector Employment: A larger share of jobs in the service sector implies a smaller
share of jobs in the (male-dominated) manufacturing sector. If men (that would have been)
formerly employed in medium-skill manufacturing jobs disproportionately seek out lowskill manual labor and service sector jobs, then this will increase the supply of labor at the
low end of the wage distribution. In such a condition, a rise in service sector employment
is anticipated to increase female and male wage inequality. Service Sector Employment
is measured as the proportion of the civilian workforce that is employed in the service
sector (as opposed to industry or agriculture). Data is from the Comparative Politics
Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).
Unemployment: The highly substitutable nature of less skilled workers makes them more
vulnerable to unemployment than highly skilled workers (Hall and Franzese 1998). A
surplus supply of idle workers with less skills should reduce the bargaining power of these
workers and thus increase wage inequality (Korpi 2002). However, if the unemployed
consist of a disproportionate number of less skilled workers, then wage earners (i.e.,
individuals in employment) must consist of a disproportionate number of more skilled
workers. Since the aggregate result of these two contrary rationales is unknown, there is
no strong expectation regarding the impact that a rise in unemployment will have on female
and male wage inequality. Due to the existence of substantial gender occupational
segregation, a rise in aggregate unemployment may conceal a disproportionate rise in
female or male unemployment. Unemployment is therefore measured as the proportion of
the female labor force that is unemployed in the models of female wage inequality and as
the proportion of the male labor force that is unemployed in the models of male wage
inequality. Data is from the OECD, Short-term Labour Market Statistics.
Female Labor Force Participation: In the shorter-term, a rise in female labor force
participation implies greater competition for low-skilled service sector jobs (Svensson
1995). Over the longer-term, however, female labor force participation increasingly
translates into experienced and skilled female workers, as well as more liberal gender
norms (Pontusson et al. 2002). Therefore, a rise in female labor force participation is
anticipated to increase female and male wage inequality in the short-term and decrease
female and male wage inequality in the long-term. Female Labor Force Participation is
measured as the proportion of the total labor force that is female. Data is from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
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Education: Skill-biased technological change and shifts in consumer preferences have
increased the demand for, and thus also the wages of, more educated workers. Since
earnings and education tend to be positively correlated, this implies a rise in wage
inequality. However, as the supply of more educated labor grows, the wage premium
attached to that education should decline (Autor et al. 2008; Alderson and Doran 2013).
Therefore, a rise in the proportion of individuals with a tertiary education is anticipated to
decrease female and male wage inequality. Since aggregate data may conceal substantial
cross-national and particularly over-time variation in the gender profile of those with a
higher education, education is measured as the proportion of the female population (over
the age of 15) with a tertiary education in the models of female wage inequality and as the
proportion of the male population (over the age of 15) with a tertiary education in the
models of male wage inequality. Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing
years. Data is from Barro and Lee (2013).
Immigration: Growth in immigration in wealthy democracies implies both an increase in
the supply of less skilled labor (e.g., certain types of manual laborers and customer service
representatives) and higher skilled labor (e.g., scientists and information technology
professionals) (Card 2001; Mahroum 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Since the
aggregate result of these two contrary forces is unknown, there is no strong expectation
regarding the impact that a rise in immigration will have on female and male wage
inequality. Immigration is measured as proportion of the population that is foreign born.
Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing years. Data is from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
Left Party Representation in Government: The expectation that government partisanship
matters for wage inequality arises somewhat tautologically out of the traditional political
party typology, whereby left parties are defined as those most strongly favoring
government action to reduce economic inequalities (Lijphart 1997) Given the
disproportionate number of women in the lowest paying jobs (Sainsbury 1996),
government actions that increase earnings for workers near the bottom of the wage
distribution (e.g., higher minimum wages or active labor market policies) provide a
particular benefit to lower-earning women (Card et al. 2003; Soskice 2005; Orloff 2009).
Therefore, an increase in left party participation in government is anticipated to decrease
female wage inequality more than male wage inequality. Left Government is measured as
left party legislative seats as a proportion of all legislative seats. Data is from the
Comparative Political Parties Dataset: Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of
Political Parties by Ideological Group in 21 Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2011 (Swank
2013).
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APPENDIX F: FULL RESULTS (TABLE 2)
Model
Gender
(Number of Countries)
Dependent Variable
(Model)
Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)

LME (Lib.)

CME (SD)

Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t)

Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1)

Δ International Trade

International Trade (t-1)

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)

GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1)

1
Women
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Full)

2
Men
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Full)

3
Women
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Full)

4
Men
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Full)

5
Women
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Full)

6
Men
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Full)

-0.080***

-0.090***

-0.087***

-0.102***

-0.081***

-0.096***

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.014)

-0.005

0.002

-0.004*

-0.000

0.001

0.000

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.002

-0.003**

-0.000

-0.001*

-0.001

-0.001**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

0.055**

0.089***

0.017**

0.024**

0.019*

0.027***

(0.023)

(0.026)

(0.009)

(0.010)

(0.011)

(0.010)

0.033

0.087*

-0.008

0.005

0.031

0.045**

(0.063)

(0.050)

(0.024)

(0.020)

(0.030)

(0.019)

0.015*

-0.004

0.005

-0.005

0.005

0.003

(0.009)

(0.010)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.003

-0.001

0.002

0.003

-0.000

-0.004

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.003**

-0.003**

-0.002***

-0.000

0.000

-0.001**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.003)

(0.000)

0.022***

0.007

0.012***

0.001

-0.000

0.003

(0.008)

(0.011)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

-0.002

0.001

-0.001

-0.001

-0.000

0.001

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)
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APPENDIX F. Continued.
Model
Gender
(Number of Countries)

Dependent Variable
(Model)
Δ Service Sector Employment (t)

Service Sector Employment (t-1)

Δ Unemployment (t)

Unemployment (t-1)

Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t)

Female Labor Force Participation (t-1)

Δ Female (Male) Education (t)

Female (Male) Education (t-1)

Δ Immigration (t)

Immigration (t-1)

Δ Left Govt. (t)

Left Govt. (t-1)

Constant

1
Women
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Full)

2
Men
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Full)

3
Women
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Full)

4
Men
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Full)

5
Women
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Full)

6
Men
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Full)

-0.002

-0.004

-0.001

-0.001

-0.000

-0.002

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

0.001

-0.001

0.000

-0.000

0.000

-0.000

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.026***

0.010

0.009***

0.004

0.005

0.002

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.003)

0.002

0.007**

0.000

0.001

0.001

0.003***

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.013

-0.016

0.012

-0.020

-0.006

0.009

(0.029)

(0.033)

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.012)

0.008*

0.002

0.004**

0.002

0.001

-0.002

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.008

0.012

0.003

0.005

-0.008

0.003

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.006)

-0.001

0.008***

0.001

0.002**

-0.002**

0.002**

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.020

-0.022

-0.010

0.009

0.020

-0.024

(0.038)

(0.043)

(0.014)

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.016)

-0.001

-0.003**

-0.001**

-0.001

0.001

-0.001*

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.000

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001***

0.000

-0.000

0.000

-0.001***

0.000

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.071

0.212

0.002

0.112

0.139

0.224**

N

225

225

225

225

225

225

R2

0.201

0.136

0.223

0.118

0.129

0.186
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APPENDIX G: FULL RESULTS (TABLE 3)
Model
Gender
(Number of Countries)
Dependent Variable
(Model)
Wage Ratio (t-1)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)

LME (Lib.)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X LME

7

8

9

10

11

12

Women
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)

Men
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)

Women
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)

Men
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)

Women
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)

Men
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)

-0.077***

-0.095***

-0.080***

-0.107***

-0.084***

-0.103***

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.017)

(0.019)

(0.017)

(0.017)

0.035

0.023

0.010

-0.007

0.010

0.020*

(0.026)

(0.029)

(0.010)

(0.016)

(0.012)

(0.010)

-0.004***

-0.005***

-0.001

-0.000

-0.002**

-0.003***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.018

-0.013

0.011

0.053

-0.004

-0.066**

(0.056)

(0.081)

(0.022)

(0.035)

(0.026)

(0.028)

-0.036

-0.016

-0.010

0.009

-0.009

-0.018*

(0.028)

(0.030)

(0.011)

(0.012)

(0.013)

(0.011)

0.001

0.002

0.000

-0.001

0.001

0.002***

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.234***

-0.207*

-0.096***

-0.079*

-0.045

-0.052

(0.096)

(0.107)

(0.037)

(0.042)

(0.044)

(0.040)

-0.043

-0.035

-0.015

0.001

-0.009

-0.022*

(0.028)

(0.032)

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.011)

0.005***

0.005**

0.001**

0.001

0.002*

0.002**

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

-0.001

(0.002)

(0.001)

-0.004***

-0.003**

-0.002***

-0.000

-0.000

-0.001**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.024***

0.003

0.013***

0.002

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(Lib.)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X LME
(Lib.)

CME (SD)

Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X CME
(SD)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X CME
(SD)

Δ Level of Wage Bargaining

Δ International Trade

Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t)
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APPENDIX G. Continued.
Model
Gender
(Number of Countries)
Dependent Variable
(Model)
Δ Unemployment (t)

Unemployment (t-1)

Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t)

Female Labor Force Participation (t-1)

Δ Female (Male) Education (t)

Female (Male) Education (t-1)

Δ Immigration (t)

Immigration (t-1)

Δ Left Govt. (t)

Left Govt. (t-1)

Constant
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) LME

7
Women
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.023***
(0.007)
0.000
(0.002)
0.027
(0.016)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.014
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.006
(0.032)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.248*

8
Men
(15
Countries)
90/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.006
(0.006)
0.004**
(0.002)
-0.014
(0.021)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.015
(0.015)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.005
(0.032)
-0.003**
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.525***

9
Women
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.008***
(0.003)

10
Men
(15
Countries)
90/50
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.005
(0.003)

11
Women
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
0.004
(0.003)
0.000
(0.001)

12
Men
(15
Countries)
50/10
wage ratio
(Reduced)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.002**
(0.001)

0.015
(0.010)
0.002
(0.002)
0.003
(0.006)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.007
(0.012)
-0.001***
(0.001)

-0.009
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.006)
0.001
(0.001)
0.014
(0.013)
-0.001*
(0.001)

0.262**

-0.011
(0.008)
-0.002**
(0.001)
0.009
(0.015)
0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.229***

0.004
(0.006)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.012)
-0.001*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.255***

0.091

-0.001

0.007

-0.000

0.002

0.001

0.001

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.003)

-0.002**

-0.003**

-0.001

-0.001**

-0.001

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.008

-0.012

-0.006*

-0.006

0.001

-0.002

(0.008)

(0.011)

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.001

-0.000

0.001

0.001

-0.000

-0.001**

(0.001)
225
0.222

(0.001)
225
0.145

(0.000)
225
0.236

(0.000)
225
0.127

(0.001)
225
0.134

(0.000)
225
0.191

(Lib.)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) LME
(Lib.)
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) CME
(SD)

Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) CME
(SD)

N
R2
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